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FOREWORD
The development of Islamic education in Southeast Asia is tremendous and receiving an overwhelming support from the community. Many governments 
support the establishment of Islamic educational institutions both financially and 
administratively.
In a more recent development, a specialised international university, namely 
the International Islamic University of Malaysia was established. The university em-
ploys a unique methodology in its education system, having Islam at the core of its 
foundation. At the same time, knowledge which is loosely labelled ‘conventional’ 
or ‘western’ by some, is not neglected. The approach is synergistic and diverse in 
nature. 
More Muslim parents are convinced that an educational institution which cov-
ers both parameters of education in their content and environment offers a better 
option for their children. Interestingly, an institution such as the International Is-
lamic University of Malaysia attracts non-Muslims to study and to work at the uni-
versity. Nowadays, many schools which are either being ‘Islamic religious school’ in 
its name or carrying out similar perspective receive strong support from the Muslim 
community. In Malaysia, it is certainly flourishing. In other parts of Southeast Asia, 
this system is gaining popularity.
What is important is that Islam becomes the pillar of this education system. 
The product of this education system, namely the students, must also be trained to 
live according to the teaching of Islam. Life is governed by the tenets of Islam regard-
less of its activities. To immediately have a comprehensive and advanced institution 
may not be possible to all. Initiative, effort and strong-will would assist in gradually 
realise the establishment of such an institution.
Another important aspect is teacher selection and training. Teachers must not 
be assumed to know what to do. Naturally, they have to meet the necessary criteria. 
However, if the human resource development part is not given serious attention, 
they may not be able to cope not only with academic responsibilities, but also in 
the understanding of the direction of the institution. Therefore, a holistic training 
module must be developed and performance is continuously monitored in order to 
meet the standard required. 
What truly characterise a school or institution to be Islamic is not its name. It 
is the philosophy, content, environment and leadership that provide completeness 
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to the system. When they are well in place, we should be able to predict its positive 
result. Ideally, a good system is the one that is able to dig and impart knowledge 
form its original sources, namely the Divine revelations, which are combined with 
modernity. The discipline of specialisations must be varied and enough to cover the 
worldly needs. Ultimately, pious professionals with global perspectives should be 
able to lead the world. Knowledge is truly translated to serve the well being of the 
community. The era of civilisational glory would perhaps resurface.
DR. KHAIRUL ‘AZMI MOHAMAD
Executive Chairman,
Yayasan Ilmuwan 
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INTRODUCTION
No-one would deny that in recent years there has been an explosion of interest in the study of Islam worldwide, both within the Muslim community and out-
side it. Islamic education and the burgeoning field of Islamic Studies in Southeast 
Asia are no exception. Such interest is contributing to significant changes in the 
way that the study of Islam is both conceptualized and taught in the region. Once 
dominated by scriptural interpretation and exegesis, for some years there has been a 
growing trend towards the use of new disciplinary approaches in the understanding 
of various religion-influenced phenomena in Muslim societies. The field of Islamic 
Studies now encompasses a wide variety of disciplines, including those of anthro-
pology, sociology, political science, economics, and the more interdisciplinary fields 
of gender studies and area studies.1 Outside of Islamic Studies scholars in these 
disciplines are also turning their attention to the study of issues pertaining to Mus-
lims and Islam. The topics which such scholarship seeks to understand in Muslim 
societies are also increasingly diverse, and include democracy and political plural-
ism, secularism, gender, law, human rights, ethics, economic development, the en-
vironment, popular culture, consumerism, Islamic finance, even management and 
organizational theory. 
A major factor impacting upon this enlarged field of Islamic Studies is the rapid 
growth in the number of scholars who are working in it, and in particular those who 
come from outside the Islamic religious tradition. The influence of the latter, wor-
king as they often are in prestigious academic institutions with abundant scholarly 
resources, using the latest methodologies, and in conditions of academic freedom, is 
in many cases significant. Yet their status as scholars who have grown up outside the 
Islamic tradition, who may live and work in non-Muslim countries, and who may 
lack a profound knowledge of Islamic scripture or a personal religious commitment 
to Islam, surely colours their interpretations. This dialogue between “insiders” and 
“outsiders” is one of the defining characteristics of Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia 
– one which, in fact, has a long tradition in Muslim scholarship.2
While it can, of course, be said that the study of Islam in Southeast Asia has 
a long history of being “globalized”, it is clear that the educational networks and 
scholarly pilgrimages in Islamic Studies are also changing significantly. For some 
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years the universities of McGill, Temple, Leiden, Chicago, and the Australian Na-
tional University (for Islam in Southeast Asia) have been competing with the tra-
ditional centres of Islamic Studies, such as Al Azhar or the Islamic University of 
Medina, for influence over a much more broader field of Islamic Studies. Globaliza-
tion has given unprecedented opportunities to greater numbers of young Southeast 
Asian Muslims to study overseas than ever before, whether it is in the Middle East, 
Iran, South Asia, Europe, the UK, North America, or Australia. Student mobility, 
scholarly exchange, international conferences, joint research projects, the setting-
up of Islamic Studies centers in Western universities, international benchmarking 
and quality assurance among universities in Muslim countries, the increasing use 
of English as a medium of academic discourse, and not least of all the communica-
tive revolution made possible by the Internet and email, are all impacting upon the 
nature of the study of Islam in Southeast Asia. They are increasingly drawing it into 
a single, globalized academic landscape.
The expansion of material resources available for the study of Islam in South-
east Asia is a further crucial factor in the development of the field. The unpre-
cedented interest in Islam has also attracted the attention of scholarly foundations 
and funding agencies globally – both in the Islamic world and the West. While the 
flow of Middle Eastern oil wealth into Islamic schools and education institutions 
worldwide is well-known, less attention has been given to how non-Muslim funding 
agencies are also impacting upon studies of Muslims and Islam. Some of these fun-
ding bodies may reflect the political agenda of the governments with whom they are 
affiliated (e.g. combating terrorism or promoting democracy), or at least concerns 
that are more prominent in the West: e.g. in the case of Europe, the integration of 
Muslim minorities into European mainstream society, or the promotion of a demo-
cratic, ‘liberal’ Islam. In the case of Southeast Asia, international funding agencies 
have long been active in funding local scholars and projects in the field of Southeast 
Asian Studies within the context of promoting economic and social development. 
Local funding sources should also not be overlooked. The relatively successful path 
to economic development of Muslim-majority countries like Malaysia and Brunei, 
and to a lesser extent Indonesia, has enabled the governments of these countries 
to provide greater resources for the study of Islam in their schools, colleges and 
universities.
Evidently the September 11 2001 attacks and the ensuing “war on terror” have 
affected the public image of Islamic educational institutions.3 The education of Mus-
lims in Southeast Asia has become an object of international attention, in particular 
since a spate of bomb attacks in Indonesia, a resurgence of violence in the Muslim 
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regions of the southern Philippines, and especially the bloody separatist uprising 
in Thailand’s southern border provinces since 2004. The rhetoric of the militants 
involved in these incidents is couched in religious terminology. Governments (not 
only Western but also of countries in the region itself), intelligence organizations, 
security analysts, the mass media, and scholars in diverse fields studying Islam have 
sought to explain the ideology behind the violence by examining the education that 
young Southeast Asian Muslims receive. One of the results of this politicization 
of Islamic education has been the drowning out of the voices of the teachers and 
administrators as public discourse focuses on the presumed links between Islamic 
education and the global political situation – particularly the phenomenon of Is-
lamic radicalism. It has also contributed to the mistaken view that recent develop-
ments in Islamic education are due purely to outside political pressure – especially 
that of Western governments – while underplaying the internal dynamics of Islamic 
educational reform that have been at work in Southeast Asia and elsewhere decades 
before 2001.
It was with these issues in mind that an international workshop was held at 
Walailak University, Nakhon Si Thammarat, southern Thailand, in January 2006, 
on the theme, “Voices of Islam in Europe and Southeast Asia”. The aim of the work-
shop was to gather leading scholars from Southeast Asia and Europe from various 
disciplinary backgrounds, to discuss the diversity of perspectives within this rapidly 
developing field of Islamic Studies. The timing and venue of the workshop were 
prompted by a more immediate factor: the outbreak of violent conflict in southern 
Thailand. This development, which received great attention in both the local as well 
as the regional media in Southeast Asia, obscured the more far-reaching changes 
already taking place in the study of Islam in Southeast Asia – including in Thailand 
itself. While papers presented at the workshop covered a wide range of areas includ-
ing radicalism, gender, migration, identity and conflict resolution, the theme that 
almost all papers touched upon – and for many was the focus – was education.
The essays selected for inclusion in this volume were drawn from papers that 
were presented at this workshop. The book is an attempt to capture a portrait of the 
current state of Islamic education and Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia. It argues 
that the study of Islam in Southeast Asia today, whether at the school or university 
level, is characterized by dynamism and change. This change has been an on-going 
phenomenon over at least the last three decades and is driven principally by internal 
factors which are too often overlooked by observers from outside the field. The book 
presents a region-wide survey of the state of Islamic education in Southeast Asia. It 
argues that, both because of the historical precedent of the “Jawi networks” in this 
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region,4 as well as the more recent acceleration of the regionalization of Islamic edu-
cation, the study of Islam in Southeast Asia today ought to be understood within a 
regional context. 
At the same time, however, the development of Islamic education should pri-
marily be seen as having been determined by the unique historical circumstances 
of each country. The landscape of Islamic Studies in the various countries repre-
sented in this volume is the outcome of long struggles with governments, religious 
bureaucracies, and different religious schools of thought, protecting varying interests 
– political and economic, as well as scholarly.
For example, in Indonesia since independence Islamic education has under-
gone a long struggle, firstly during the period of secular nationalism under Sukarno 
and his NASAKOM (nationalism-religion-communism) ideology, then through 
the period of heightened political control during Suharto’s New Order regime. It 
was during the latter period that Western-educated scholars in Islamic Studies like 
Harun Nasution and Nurcholish Madjid began to exert their influence in the field, 
and this influence has increased since the end of the New Order in 1998 after a long 
contest with more traditional approaches. The result has been a gradual change of 
paradigm in Islamic Studies, particularly in relation to the increasing integration of 
social science methodologies.5 
In the case of Malaysia the colonial legacy has loomed much larger over the 
development of Islamic Studies than in the case of Indonesia, as Shamsul and Azmi 
argue in this volume. Much of the debate has been about how to integrate and 
strengthen Islamic Studies within the university system, and, since the 1980s, to 
implement the “Islamization of knowledge”,6 a project seemingly born of disillusion-
ment with secular, “Western” modes of knowledge. In Malaysia – and also in Brunei 
where, as Iik shows in his essay, the Ministry of Education has recently (2005) sup-
ported the Islamization of knowledge “at all levels of education” – Islamic Studies 
is a state agenda to a much greater extent than in other countries in the region. In 
that respect, more “liberal” interpretations of Islam are regarded with some suspi-
cion. Another defining characteristic of debates about Islam in the plural society of 
Malaysia is that, unlike in Indonesia, Islam is never far away from race politics, and 
in particular the question of the status of one ethnic group – the Malays. Islam has 
become a vital element in discourses of Malayness favoured by conservative Malay 
sections of the government, which have a clear political agenda.7
Debates about Islamic education in countries where Muslims are a minority 
show rather different characteristics. In Islamic education in southern Thailand, 
the region where the largest proportion of Thailand’s Muslim live and which has a 
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long tradition of Islamic education, there are two main dynamics. The first is the 
influence of southern Thai Muslims who have graduated from the Middle East – 
particularly from Egyptian universities, as Hasan Madmarn outlines in his essay. In 
this regard southern Thailand bears similarities to the situation of Islamic education 
in Indonesia in the 1960s, before the influence of Western social science perspec-
tives. But another crucial aspect of Islamic education in southern Thailand is its role 
in the struggle against projects of national assimilation carried out by the Thai state 
since the 1940s. The pondok, or traditional Islamic school, is not only associated with 
religious study but with the preservation of Patani Malay cultural identity. Islam has 
thus, to a certain extent, become a pawn in a nationalist struggle for the identity of 
the Patani Malay population, which since 2004 has once again turned violent.8 Ow-
ing to a sense of ethnic kinship with the Malays across the border, Malaysia looms 
large for Thailand’s southern Muslims, both as a destination for Islamic education 
as well as a model for the development of Islamic educational institutions and pro-
grams. For the Muslim minorities of Cambodia and the Philippines the struggle for 
Islamic education is more formal than substantive. That is, the principal dynamic 
remains the need to establish a systematic system of education for Muslims, who are 
handicapped by their minority status, the reluctance of the state to give too much 
autonomy in educational matters, and a lack of resources.
All of the contributors to this volume of essays except for one are Southeast 
Asian scholars who are working, or have worked, in Southeast Asian tertiary institu-
tions. Their disciplinary backgrounds range from Islamic law, to history, sociology, 
anthropology, politics and area studies. Many of the contributors to the book are not 
only scholars working on topics related to Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia but 
are also university administrators who have had a significant impact on the study of 
Islam in their own universities and indeed in the countries in which they work.
While the national focus and the content of each of the essays selected for inclu-
sion in this volume vary considerably, five dominant themes can be discerned.
First, all of the essays show that perhaps the most significant aspect of this 
dynamism in Islamic Studies is the field’s engagement with the social sciences and 
integration with mainstream or “secular” education. This movement can be seen in 
the two powerhouses of Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
although the place of the social sciences within the two systems differs significantly. 
Nur Manuty outlines the integration of Islamic Studies programs into the Malaysian 
university system over the last three decades. With the founding of the International 
Islamic University of Malaysia in 1983 and the Institute of Islamic Thought and 
Civilization under Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas in 1987, social science method-
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ologies gained an important place in Malaysian Islamic Studies programs, although 
they were formally subject to the concept of the “Islamization of knowledge”. Azyu-
mardi Azra’s essay discusses the sweeping changes taking place in Islamic higher edu-
cation in Indonesia, as the State Institutes for Islamic Studies (IAINs) are gradually 
transformed into state Islamic universities (UINs) based on, in Azra’s words, “the 
reintegration of the so-called Islamic religious sciences and ‘secular’ sciences”. Azra 
explicitly distinguishes the philosophy of the IAINs from the Islamization of knowl-
edge concept that is so influential in Malaysia’s Islamic Studies models. He argues 
that the “[n]atural sciences are of course already based on universal principles. If cer-
tain theories in the social sciences and humanities are Western-based, then the need 
is not to ‘Islamize’ them, but to develop theories that are based on Muslim social and 
cultural realities.” In the case of the Muslim minority countries the development of 
such Islamic Studies programs integrating the social sciences at the university level 
lags behind. However in reforms to Islamic school education in Thailand, mainland 
Southeast Asia, and the Philippines, the emphasis is clearly now on mainstreaming 
and integrating religious education within the national education systems.
As Southeast Asian governments have gradually changed the focus of their edu-
cation systems from nation-building to training for employment Islamic Studies pro-
grams program are being forced to become and more vocationally-oriented. Reforms 
in higher education in Muslim countries are making universities more responsive 
to market forces, with the result that innovative new areas of study and courses 
have emerged. In the case of Malaysia, one of the most developed economies in the 
region and where the vocational orientation of higher education has progressed the 
furthest, Nur Manuty gives one examples of a degree in Da‘wah (“Missionary Work”) 
which has been integrated with modern management studies to produce courses like 
“Principles and Theory of Leadership”, “Islam and Contemporary Issues”, “Human 
Resources Management”, “Islamic Work Ethics”, “Organizational Management”, 
and “Planning and Strategy”. Courses in Islamic finance are particularly popular 
with Malaysian students because of their direct relevance to the job market.
With the increasing pressure from government and a more competitive higher 
education sector issues of quality assurance have also come to the fore for university 
administrators. In a much-quoted paper in 2000 the former Vice Chancellor of 
the International Islamic University of Malaysia, Mohd. Kamal Hassan, argued that 
“institutionalizing the culture of quality” was one of the key challenges for Islamic 
Studies in Southeast Asia today.9 In the case of Indonesia Azra shows that govern-
ment demands for quality assurance, and competition for students both within the 
national system as well as internationally, have resulted in UIN Syarif Hidayatullah 
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Jakarta, the first former IAIN to begin the transformation to UIN status in 2002, 
achieving a high ranking in numerous “non-religious” categories when compared 
with other Indonesian “secular” universities. As the Malaysian government makes 
greater efforts to market its universities to overseas students, particularly from the 
Muslim world, it is giving greater attention than ever before to international rank-
ings. Malaysian universities and indeed their Islamic Studies programs are now sub-
ject to increasingly stringent review processes.
Secondly, as mentioned above, this dynamism in Islamic Studies and education 
is an internal phenomenon that has been on-going for at least the last three decades. 
This period coincides with the rapid economic development of Southeast Asia, one 
of the results of which has been the provision of increased resources for the promo-
tion of Islamic Studies as part of the state’s support for education generally. The 
return of increasing numbers of highly-qualified, overseas-educated scholars both 
from the Middle East and North America, to expanding tertiary education systems 
in Southeast Asia, has been another significant factor in the reform of Islamic Stud-
ies. The much-discussed “Islamic Revival” over this period has also made Southeast 
Asian Muslims more conscious of their Islamic identity, which has translated into 
increased public support for Islamic education.10
Azra shows that the impetus for the transformation of Indonesia’s IAINs into 
UINs actually began in the late-1970s, even though the process has only begun to be 
implemented since the Reformasi period following the fall of the Suharto and the 
New Order in 1998. The reform and modernization of Islamic education in Malay-
sia was receiving attention from the early 1980s if not earlier, as Nur Manuty’s essay 
clearly demonstrates. Numerous regional conferences on the development of Islamic 
Studies in Southeast Asia over this period attest to this internal dynamic.11 In the 
case of the Philippines, Carmen Abu Bakar claims that events after September 11 
2001 have clearly stimulated the government’s renewed attention to Islamic educa-
tion. However, she also shows that at least since the Marcos period the government 
recognized the importance of Islamic education to the Muslim communities of the 
southern island of Mindanao, and the need to improve standards and integrate it 
with the national education system. Hasan Madmarn highlights the influence of 
Thais educated in Egyptian universities from the 1960s and 1970s on the develop-
ment of Islamic education in Thailand. This influence marked a milestone with the 
establishment of the College of Islamic Studies at Prince of Songkhla University in 
1989, and continues to the present day. In the case of Brunei Iik likewise shows the 
great contribution of the Al Azhar graduates to the development of Islamic educa-
tion there from the 1960s. 
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A third point that emerges from the essays is the greatly varying quality of Is-
lamic education in the different countries of Southeast Asia. Islamic education has, 
in recent decades, generally proceeded in leaps and bounds in the Muslim-major-
ity countries of Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. However, as Omar Farouk clearly 
demonstrates in his essay, in countries where the Muslim community is a minority, 
such as in Thailand, Cambodia, and the other countries of mainland Southeast 
Asia, Islamic education is lagging. This is due to a range of factors stemming from 
their minority status, including a chronic lack of resources, a lack educational leader-
ship, and the Muslim community’s comparatively weak political representation in 
the national governments. In the case of the Muslim region of southern Thailand – 
more specifically in the region of the former sultanate of Patani – the relative decline 
of Islamic education is a bitter pill to swallow for a community that still nurtures 
historical memories of Patani as a former regional centre of Islamic scholarship, a 
centre which produced Islamic scholars respected in the Middle East and read by 
students of Islam in many parts of Southeast Asia. It is also in these Muslim minor-
ity countries that the politicization of Islamic education following September 11 
has been most keenly felt. For example, Carmen Abu Bakar shows that while steps 
to reform Islamic education in the Philippines and integrate it with the national 
system date from at least the early 1980s, the government’s approach since then can 
be characterized at best as largely one of benign neglect. The fact that since 2001 the 
government’s attention to the issue has too obviously been motivated by suspected 
links between madrasahs and terrorism, she argues, threatens the recent significant 
progress towards the “mainstreaming” of Islamic education in the Philippines.
Fourthly, and perhaps surprisingly, there are clear signs of the growth of a criti-
cal, even “liberal” trend in Islamic Studies scholarship in Southeast Asia.12 Contrary 
to popular perception, as many of the essays in this volume demonstrate, it is the reli-
gious scholars who are often the more open-minded and critical, while governments 
(and government-controlled religious bureaucracies) tend to be more conservative in 
their attempts to frame religious discourse. A common observation made of Islam in 
Indonesia is that radical Islamic thinking tends to find a refuge not in the “religious” 
IAIN institutes but in the “secular”-oriented, state universities. What is motivating 
this “liberal”, critical trend? One reason is the economic and political development 
of countries in the region, which have increased resources as well as opened up po-
litical space in which to express such critique. In the case of Indonesia the process 
of democratization following the collapse of the New Order in 1998 has ushered in 
a period of liberalization in Indonesia’s politics, which Azra argues has also affected 
its education system. In his words the IAIN is “basically a liberal institute”. By con-
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trast, in countries with less open political systems criticism and debate are muted 
and religious educational institutions much more subject to state control – as can be 
seen in Iik’s study of Islamic education in Brunei under the hegemony of the “Malay 
Islamic Monarchy” ideology.
The integration of the social sciences with religious studies discussed above 
is producing students with more diverse perspectives on Islam and issues facing 
Southeast Asian Muslims. Iik shows that in the case of Brunei programs that have in-
tegrated Islamic Studies with other disciplines such as literature, linguistics, history, 
English, geography, or economics tended to “widen the horizons of [the students’] 
thought and learning”, making them “more articulate in diverse fields beyond pure-
ly Islamic Studies.” He notes that similar observations have been made by Osman 
Bakar about students who have graduated from Malaysian institutions offering such 
programs.13  Azra notes that besides working as kyais in pesantren, graduates of Indo-
nesia’s IAINs also work as “social and NGO activists, journalists, political activists, 
leaders of socio-religious organizations”, and, since the end of the New Order, also 
as leaders of political parties and members of legislative bodies.
This approach is leading to a significant shift in the way Islam itself is being 
studied. In the context of the study of Islam in Indonesia this change is referred to 
in an influential 1996 book by Amin Abdullah, Rector of UIN Sunan Kalijaga in 
Yogyakarta, as a progression from “normativity to historicity”.14 That is, formerly 
the study of Islam was dominated by an idealized, ahistorical view of religion that 
emphasized Islam’s doctrinal and legal aspects and tended to ignore empirical reali-
ties. As Azra writes in his essay, the IAINs have gradually seen a paradigm shift where 
“historical and sociological approaches provide a wide range of analysis for the study 
of Islam, bringing social-historical realities into interaction with religious experi-
ence”. In the case of Malaysia, too, Ibrahim Abu Bakar has argued that Islamic Stud-
ies in Malaysia has undergone a progression of phases, from “the religious”, to “the 
linguistic” to the “pragmatic and liberal”15 Nur Manuty calls for Malaysian scholars 
to engage with “liberal-minded” scholars in the Muslim world, including figures like 
Mohammed Arkoun, Hassan Hanafi, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, and Ibrahim Musa. If 
one were to place Brunei along this continuum, however, Islamic Studies has for the 
most part, according to Iik, remained “heavily religious”.
One of the most interesting and challenging aspects of this progression has 
been the development of programs in comparative religion. How do Muslims study 
other religions, or members of other religions study Islam, in a multi-religious coun-
try? Is it possible to be truly objective in the study of religions not one’s own, to go 
beyond “the production of subjective truths about the other”? Irwan and Zainal 
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assess the challenges, methodological as well as practical, facing the development of 
comparative religious programs in Indonesia during a period of religious conflict in 
Indonesia following the collapse of the New Order. 
Finally, it is clear that besides its functions of teaching religious knowledge and 
vocational skills, Islamic education in Southeast Asia is bound up with the problem 
of Islamic identity. Educational reform is closely related to the desire to retain an 
Islamic identity. This desire has been a motivating factor in the internal political 
struggles that Islamic education has been involved in within their own countries, as 
outlined above, as well as the struggle with the legacy of Western colonialism that 
is so important to Southeast Asian nationalism. Indeed, Shamsul and Azmi argue 
in their essay that “of all the past influences that have influenced Islam, Muslims, 
and Islamic education in Malaysia it is British colonialism that has had the greatest 
impact. Indeed, its effects have lasted well into the postcolonial era.”16 Western edu-
cational models are one of the most powerful and enduring legacies of the colonial 
era. It is partly for this reason that the concept of the “Islamization of knowledge” 
resonates so strongly in Malaysia and in models of education for Muslims influ-
enced by Malaysia, such as southern Thailand and Brunei. In the case of Indonesia, 
although they form only a minority, Indonesia’s Salafi madrasahs reject the “corrup-
ting influence of Western culture” and their students express an exclusive identity 
through a strictly regulated code of behaviour, dress and language, as Noorhaidi 
shows in his essay.
If Westernization may be seen as one challenge for Islamic Studies in Southeast 
Asia, then another is the issue of the appropriateness of developing programs in Is-
lamic Studies based on the blind imitation of Middle Eastern models. The Southeast 
Asian Muslim community numbers around 250 million people. Its size, common 
Jawi tradition, and increasing regional interaction, make it one of the largest, dis-
tinct, and most dynamic communities in the Islamic world. While there is no doubt 
that Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia has had and will continue to have an organic 
connection to developments in the field in the Middle East, yet at the same time 
authors in this volume point out the necessity for the study of Islam in Southeast 
Asia to respond to contemporary realities and needs of Southeast Asian countries. 
Kamal Hassan noted in his 2000 essay the tendency of local Muslim organizations 
and “politically-oriented individuals” to rely on Middle Eastern scholars and activists 
who lacked knowledge of the “cultural, social and political history and complex-
ity of Southeast Asian countries”.17 Nur Manuty offers examples of Islamic Studies 
programs in Malaysia today which, rather than transplanting methodologies and 
programs from Middle Eastern universities, have attempted to tailor their programs 
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to “the distinct social, political, and religious setting in Malaysia”. Azra also sees in 
Indonesia the tendency for the development of a “distinctive Indonesian tradition 
of Islamic studies”, that is the product of intense interaction both with Islamic learn-
ing in the Middle East and the Western intellectual tradition, and which is geared 
to local Indonesian contexts. This confidence is much less apparent, however, in 
the Muslim minority countries of mainland Southeast Asia, where, as Omar Farouk 
points out, movements to modernize education are viewed with mistrust as an at-
tempt to “disconnect and uproot people from their own identity by separating their 
spiritual from their material needs” – particularly when the Muslim community in 
these countries is in a position of political and economic marginalization.
If the Middle East has a disproportionate influence on Southeast Asian Mus-
lims, the “gaze” of the Middle East towards “the East” and Southeast Asia in par-
ticular is much less acknowledged. The image of Asia among Muslims in the Middle 
East is the subject of Mona Abaza’s essay, which appropriately starts this volume. 
For Abaza, “the Middle East seems to have played a hegemonic role as a donor 
of religious supremacy and ‘authentic’ culture as exemplified in a domineering or-
thodox discourse, while Southeast Asians remain cast as its syncretistic recipients.” 
Whereas there is a tendency amongst Southeast Asian Muslims to view the West 
and the Middle East as diametrically opposed to each other and epistemologically in 
conflict, Abaza highlights a stream of thought among Middle Eastern intellectuals 
that is greatly admiring of the Western enlightenment and its liberal tradition, and 
whose views of “the Orient” are blurry and replete with “cultural biases” and a “lack 
of respect”. This situation is only recently being addressed with the establishment of 
research institutes and teaching programs in Middle Eastern universities that focus 
on the Asian region.
Seeking knowledge has long been a fundamental part of the Southeast Asia 
Islamic tradition. Traditionally young Muslims left their villages and even their 
homelands for the purposes of obtaining an education in Islam. Upon their return 
they were highly regarded. Many would establish pondoks or madrasahs and become 
respected as learned people in their communities. The education that the young 
Muslims who attended these pondoks and madrasahs received was highly valued by 
society. Centres of Islamic learning like Kelantan, Patani, and Aceh were known as 
the “Verandah of Mecca” for the quality of their ‘ulama, their Islamic education, and 
the religiosity of the community. This traditional model of education for Muslims 
began to be challenged in the late colonial era with the intrusions of colonial rule 
and Western educational models on the one hand, and the influence of Islamic 
modernism on the other. It suffered a further blow following independence and the 
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establishment of nation-states. With the rise of bureaucratic polities across Southeast 
Asia seekers of knowledge found new roles as functionaries in government bureauc-
racies. The meaning of the search for knowledge also changed. Education was geared 
to serving the ends of the state, in particular its objectives of national integration 
and economic development. From its former status as a thing of value traditional 
Islamic education now came to be seen more and more as a backwater and problem 
for national development. This crisis in Islamic education has affected every Muslim 
community in Southeast Asia, and, as the essays contained in this volume attempt 
to show, each community has attempted to solve the problem in its own way and 
according to its own circumstances.
The crisis in traditional Islamic educaation in Southeast Asia is felt not only in 
the sphere of education but also in the way that Islam is understood. The decline 
of pesantren and pondok education is related to the eclipse of the Sufi traditions that 
were nurtured by traditional Islamic education.18 This is turn has contributed to a 
decline of the Sufi element in formal expressions of Islam in Southeast Asia - the per-
sonal, emotional, spiritual relationship with God - which, together with the shariah, 
theology, and philosophy, make Islam whole. The result in many cases tends to be 
the dominance of the literalist, formalistic, and legalistic aspects of Islam – particu-
larly when reinforced by the strong arm of the state.
It might be said, then, that Islamic education in Southeast Asia remains an 
unfinished project. Within each state there have been intense struggles over what an 
education in Islam should mean. At the international level there are diverse forces 
each seeking to influence the paradigm of Islam in its own way. Many Muslims in 
Southeast Asia wish to return to their own tradition of education, yet the old tem-
plate has already been broken. The new templates that are currently being formed 
are the subject of this book.
Editors
Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad
Patrick Jory
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1Asia Imagined by the Arabs
CHAPTER ONE
ASIA IMAGINED BY THE ARABS
Mona Abaza1
I was raised to love the West and to admire its civilization. I have 
spent my most significant formative years in Europe which rein-
forced my love and the pillars of my admiration. When I went to 
the East and returned to my country, my love and admiration of 
the West was transformed into a certitude.2
In 1938, Taha Husayn, the then Dean of Arabic culture and considered to be one of the most significant intellectuals of Egypt’s renaissance and liberal age, pub-
lished a posthumous work, ‘The Future of Culture in Egypt’.3 It was written dur-
ing the period of the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty which officially ended 
the occupation. It marked a new epoch in national life. There were serious hopes 
among nationalists that the world would change. The opening chapters start with an 
intriguing question, namely: did Egypt belong to the East or the Orient (the Arabic 
word al-sharq entails the two meanings), or to the West (al-gharb)? Was the Egyptian 
mind oriental in its perception and judgement over matters? Briefly said, which was 
easier for an Egyptian, to understand a Japanese and a Chinese, or a Frenchman and 
an Englishman?4 In raising such a question Husayn wanted to convey the message 
that at that time Egypt indeed belonged to the West, rather than to the East. Egypt 
was part of the culture and civilisation of the Greek-Roman Mediterranean world. 
For Husayn, there were two fundamentally different civilisations: that which derived 
from Greek philosophy and art, Roman law, and the morals of Christianity, and that 
which derived from India. Egypt, according to Husayn, belonged to Greek-Roman 
civilisation.5
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This chapter will look at how ‘Asia’ is imagined by Arab intellectuals. It will 
look at travel accounts, specifically Anees Mansur and Husayn Fawzi’s two journeys 
to India. It will also survey the Southeast Asian research Institutes in the Middle East 
and the production of knowledge by Arabs on Asia - including Iran, India, Japan 
and Southeast Asia.
BETWEEN THE ORIENT AND THE WEST
For Husayn, since Egypt was part of Europe and of the Greek-Roman realm the an-
cient Egyptian mind was not ‘oriental’, if one understands the ‘Orient’ as meaning 
China, Japan, and India and that which is related to these regions.6 For Husayn, the 
confines of ‘near’ Asia were Palestine, greater Syria, and Mesopotamia. But Persia 
is described as an Oriental nation, located in far-away lands. Persia seemed to be 
remote and have little to share with Egypt. Egypt did not really have much con-
tact with the Persian Empire. In fact, in the past the Persians had attacked Egypt 
and destroyed the empire. Persia, then, seemed to Husayn to have been an invader. 
Its relations with Egypt were characterized by war and mutual disdain.7 Egypt had 
fought this new conqueror with all its strength, and had sometimes even relied on 
the assistance of Greece. Husayn then tells us that Egypt had little contact with Asia 
and much less with the far East in comparison with its ties to the Mediterranean 
world. Indeed, Husayn laments that he never understood the aims of the Society of 
the Oriental League in Egypt, which emphasized solidarity with the Far East instead 
of the near West.
Within a year of the publication of Husayn´s book Husayn Fawzi, a French-
trained medical doctor who would later become one of the most significant modern 
historians of Egypt and a pioneer in the genre of modern travel accounts, published 
a book on his voyage to the Indian Ocean which he called ‘A Modern Sindbad: a 
Tour of the Indian Ocean 1938’.8 Fawzi had sailed out on a collaborative mission 
consisting of forty British and Egyptians sailors and scientists. He was then appoint-
ed by the Egyptian government as the medical doctor responsible for the crew. The 
account is written in an anecdotal style and is full of details about the interaction 
between the British crew and the Egyptians. Fawzi provides detailed description of 
the places he visits, but his style reflects a feeling of astonishment and bewilderment 
towards these ‘exotic’ cultures. Fawzi’s nine-month voyage departed from Alexan-
dria, passing Aden, the Hadramawt and Sri Lanka on route to the subcontinent. He 
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also visited Colombo, Kandy, Bombay, and Karachi. What interests us here is both 
Fawzi´s fascination at the Indian civilisation but at the same time his fear and horror 
of the Hindu temples. Fawzi describes at some length the temples he visits in India 
and shares with the reader his thoughts on an ancient and great civilization. Fawzi 
is indeed fascinated by its aesthetics. However, his narrative of India and Hinduism 
is paradoxical because it simultaneously reflects both his fascination and distaste. 
He conveys an image of an oppressive Orient, dwelling on such local horrors as 
widow burning. To Fawzi, Malabar’s temples evoked only nightmares and the fear of 
death. Having thus been led to ponder where the ‘East’ began and where Egyptian 
civilization should locate itself vis-à-vis the East, he concluded that Egypt, its civiliza-
tion, and even he himself, all belong to the Western European world. Like Husayn, 
Fawzi was a firm believer in Western enlightenment and progress. Both believed 
that Western civilization represented the highest level of independent thinking and 
self-critique. Fawzi concluded his account by contrasting Western civilization with 
Hinduism, which to him represented an Oriental and above all alien, despotic cul-
ture. The chapter entitled, ‘The East and the West’ (al-sharq wal-gharb), epitomizes 
the core of this argument. Like Husayn, Fawzi wanted to distance himself from the 
‘East’ by showing that Egypt belonged to the Mediterranean basin. At the same time, 
however, Fawzi was certainly fascinated by Gandhi’s peaceful resistance to British co-
lonialism. He reminds us that Gandhi’s spiritualism was important in pointing to the 
injustice of the Brahman caste system. However, Fawzi insists that the British were 
not entirely harmful in advancing their civilizing mission ideology. Their doctors, for 
example, had introduced vaccination, their engineers the irrigation system.
The respective stances of these two liberal intellectuals tell us much about the 
perceptions of Egyptians towards the vague notion of the ‘Orient’, and their even 
more vague, self-reflexive positions. Asia played a crucial role in the on-going project 
of identity construction. They unconsciously reproduced inherited notions of a 
despotic Orient, which itself was part and parcel of their naive attitude towards 
enlightenment and rationalism. Again, this was not a novel argument. The writings 
of both Husayn and Fawzi were extremely inspiring when they concerned issues of 
self-perception and the Other at the level of South-South intellectualism. These two 
intellectuals constructed a vision of an Orient that was much tainted by the spirit 
of the time. Taha Husayn and Husayn Fawzi were both fervent advocates of the be-
lief that Egypt belonged to the Greco-Roman Mediterranean culture. By taking this 
stance they perpetuated a Western Orientalist perception of an antithetical Orient. 
Both Husayn and Fawzi adopted an uncritical position with respect to the West. 
However it would be unfair to reproach them for such a stance, as some Islamists 
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do today when they attack the advocates of ‘Mediterraneanism’ as ‘unauthentic’ and 
‘Westernized’ intellectuals. That Husayn and Fawzi were naive believers in enlighten-
ment is evident, but perhaps also inevitable, given that many anti-colonial thinkers 
adopted this stance as the only path available for generating social criticism within 
the confines of a reform.
Fawzi and Hussayn were both firm believers in Western enlightenment and 
progress. Both believed that Western civilisation represented the highest level of 
free thinking and inner self-critique. Fawzi concludes his account by counter-posing 
Western civilisation to Hinduism, which he saw as representing an oriental despotic 
culture impossible to identify with. This position, however, changes with Fawzi’s 
second trip to India in 1978.9 In his second account Fawzi re-thinks many of the 
assumptions and biases which he expressed against Hinduism in his earlier work. 
In his introduction Fawzi apologises for his previous, intransigent approach to Hin-
duism that stemmed from ignorance. He reminds us that it was a stand typical of 
careless youth. India was a dear and beloved neighbour to Egypt. The second travel 
account is an apology towards the Indians for his previous stand. It was, of course, 
written during the era of independence, and since writing his first account Fawzi 
had certainly read extensively the works of Indian intellectuals, philosophers and 
post-colonial politicians. He also certainly read the British Orientalists who had 
covered India’s cultural heritage. Most importantly, he had been invited to partici-
pate in a UNESCO conference. In other words, the times had changed. His return 
to India 37 years later is interesting because he asks the same question he had raised 
three decades earlier: was not Egypt part of the Orient? His answer this time is that 
Egypt is located at the crossroads of the East and West, North and South. By virtue 
of its geography and history and through its future, it is to remain open to the four 
directions. It is at once African, Asiatic and Mediterranean.10 
The stance of these two liberal intellectuals tells us a lot about the perceptions 
of the Arabs towards the vague notion of the ‘Orient’, and their even vaguer self-
reflexive position towards their understanding of Asia and the East. They uncon-
sciously reproduced inherited notions of the despotic Orient as part and parcel of an 
enlightened rationalism.  However, the notion of Asia changes in the 1950s and 1960s 
sixties with the rise of the non-aligned movement and the Bandung conference.
It would not be wrong to say that contemporary Arabs are inclined to be rather 
parochial in their views of non-Arabs. In marked contrast to the Arab-centrism of 
their co-religionists in the Middle East, however, Southeast Asian Muslims have de-
veloped an intense curiosity about the Middle East and in particular its educational 
centres. There is a whole industry involved in producing translations from Arabic 
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into Indonesian and Malay, as well as distributing Arabic music and films among 
Southeast Asian Muslims.
In comparing the Islam of the so-called periphery and that of the centre in the 
Middle East one gains the impression that the dissemination of knowledge, whether 
religious or secular, has been rather a one–way relationship. The Middle East seems 
to have played a hegemonic role as a donor of religious supremacy and ‘authentic’ 
culture as exemplified in a domineering orthodox discourse, while Southeast Asians 
remain cast as its syncretistic recipients. In fact, there exists a contemporary Middle 
Eastern gaze towards Southeast Asia, which is deserving of further attention.
Would it be possible to interpret this one-way relationship as a natural outcome 
of the privileged location of the Middle East as the cradle of Islamic scholarship and 
religious faith? Is it because the Islamic centres perpetuate an Arab-centric vision of 
the periphery? This is manifested in the fact that the poles of attraction as exempli-
fied in scholarship and centres of religious learning are located in the Middle East. 
Very little would impress us if we look at the reverse transfer of knowledge. The 
Arabic language is much admired by Southeast Asian Muslims and Arabic intellec-
tual production is very much esteemed there, but could one pass similar value judge-
ments about the Arabs today and their views of non-Western cultures in general? It is 
true that Indian films have gained a certain popularity in the Middle East, but there 
is no such appreciation of Southeast Asian culture, whether popular or otherwise. 
In fact, ‘Southeast Asia’ has appeared only recently as a region in Egyptian political 
jargon, and it has been interchangeably used with a blurred and vague notion of 
‘Asia’. 
Until today, for many Middle Eastern scholars the only “Other” that has been 
worthy of study and with which a dialogical and yet paradoxical discourse has been 
perpetuated, is the West. Certainly, the encounter with the West in the last two 
centuries and the cross-cultural interaction is best exemplified in travel accounts of 
Arabs to Europe and the United States. The archetype of such a genre was Tahtawi´s 
sojourn in France. Rifa ‘a al Tahtawi (1801-1873) was one of the first Egyptian Azhar-
ites to study abroad. He is today referred to in the discourse of Egyptian modernity 
as a founding father of enlightenment. Tahtawi´s five-year of sojourn in Paris (1826-
1831) and his description of the manners and customs of the French epitomizes the 
crossing of boundaries and bridging tradition and modernity. It is possible to argue 
that his work is pioneering in the genre of travel literature
As far as Southeast Asia is concerned a twentieth-century parallel may be found 
in Anees Mansur’s Around the World in 200 Days. This remains one of the most 
popular Egyptian travel accounts, having been reprinted some twenty times. It first 
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appeared in 1962 and the third edition was introduced by the then Dean of Arabic 
culture of Cairo University, Taha Hussayn, whilst the fourth was given a foreword 
by Mahmud Taymur.
We have to be reminded that Mansur travelled during the effervescent period 
of the Bandung conference when Third Worldism was flourishing. It is an account 
embedded in the 1960s middle class Cairene constructions of an imagined and 
perhaps anecdotal and distorted ‘Far East’. Mansur, who was sent as journalist by 
the government, tells us that he has been dispatched to report on the Indian state 
of Kerala, where the Communist Party had won local elections. Mansur started his 
trip in India (Bombay) before going to Tibet to interview the Dalai Lama, to the 
Maldives, Singapore, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bali), Australia, the Philippines, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Hawaii, and ending with the United States.
Mansur’s style shifts between a spoken, colloquial Egyptian which could quite 
often turn to vulgar slang. It is filled with catchy jokes that could be easily interpret-
ed as racist and distasteful.11 It is often lacking in respect for the local population and 
their customs. Although Mansur originates from the South, he is clearly overloaded 
with cultural biases and he reproduces the same stereotypes about ‘Asians’ that he 
must have borrowed from colonial accounts. His passages on Bali could be read as 
indeed revealing a ‘macho’, misogynist and quite biased Middle Eastern perspective, 
where he is constantly chasing women and trying to seduce them. The chapter on 
Bali is titled: ‘I am in the Island of Breasts’. Mansur, no different from Western colo-
nial travellers, seems in his accounts to be fascinated by the strange and the fantastic. 
But he is constantly mocking the countries he is visiting. He, for example, remarks 
that the Indians speak an esoteric English and their accent is awful. He is proud as 
an Egyptian to speak it better than them (which is actually doubtful). But it seems 
that what made this work popular is that he was among the first modern travellers 
to describe Asia in the period of post-colonialism. The paradox of this book is that, 
while overflowing with non-alignment jargon it is also replete with personal observa-
tions about the ‘indigenous’ populations which could have been uttered by a former 
colonial administrator. The book is illustrated with photos of women in ‘exotic’ 
dresses, i.e. Balinese and Hawaiian women dancing, indeed very similar to colonial 
Western travellers’ representations or Hollywood productions. 
While Mansur´s travel account could be understood as a landmark of ‘popular’ 
literature produced in the time of South-South Third Worldist interaction, whereby 
he was sent as a journalist to cover Third World revolutions and progressive move-
ments, reading it produces paradoxical effects. Mansur is full of biases and disrespect 
towards non-Western cultures. For example he displays a total lack of respect during 
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his encounter with the Dalai Lama. As far as Third World solidarity goes there is 
much to be desired in his observations.
Not much has been published on Asia in literary Egyptian circles since Mansur’s 
travel account. The so-called ‘revolutionary’ journalist and the ‘Bandung effect’ have 
been replaced by short-term official, state-sponsored journalist missions which I will 
mention later.
INSTITUTIONS AND RESEARCH ON ‘ASIA’
Until recently, research conducted by Middle Eastern scholars and their interest 
in studying overseas have been tainted by their consciousness of the North-South 
dimension, be it Europe or the United States. Although enjoying a privileged posi-
tion the North is still under-researched by the South. The institutionalisation of 
research programs for the Middle East is very much tied to a North-South dynam-
ics whereby funding is largely dependent on either American or European aid or 
bilateral regional interaction. The weak structural institutions and research bodies 
which are subject to either authoritarian state control or private funding seems to be 
one reason why research in the field of Southeast Asian area studies is suffering in 
the Middle East. In what follows, I describe new research centres in the Middle East 
which are still considered embryonic and new.
If there has been no institutional backing that has led to the enhancement of 
Southeast Asian ‘area studies’ in the Middle East, this does not mean that there is no 
indigenous production of knowledge by Third World intellectuals on other regions, 
or more precisely about the Third World. In fact, area studies should draw attention 
towards South-South longue durée interactions between the Middle East and ‘Asia’. 
If the academic field did not lead to a significant accumulation of knowledge it is 
in other domains such as journalism or what is to be classified under the domain 
of travel literature (adab al-rihla) that a fascinating body of knowledge is manifested. 
Contrary to the prevalent argument that Muslims or Arabs are introverted or paro-
chial, this genre of literature has produced a wide range of accounts of contemporary 
Arabs who have travelled to India, China, Japan and Southeast Asia. Equally, post-
colonialism and the national liberation movements did stimulate a Third World 
internationalism that is well portrayed in Middle Eastern press coverage. 
However, when we speak of Southeast Asian area studies today in the Middle 
East the weakness and discontinuity of institutional support, the strong legacy of 
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authoritarianism and the growing interference of governments in the management 
of science, and the crisis in higher educational national systems are significant pro-
blems. 
The Arab Emirates and Jordan are two other centres in the Middle East that 
have developed a gaze towards Asia. The term ‘Southeast Asia’ is, in fact, hardly 
ever utilised by Middle Eastern scholars. Southeast Asia is simply included under 
the rubric of ‘Asia’. Even though the notion of ‘Southeast Asia’ came into existence 
during World War II for Middle Easterners today the notion of Southeast Asia is still 
quite blurred. Egyptians have most probably inherited and perpetuated an oriental-
ist legacy about Asia, which would encompass Iran, central Asia, the whole of the 
Indian subcontinent, Southeast, Japan and China. In other words, anything east-
wards of the Middle East, non-Arabic speaking and located in the Asian landmass 
is considered to be ‘Asia’. The Arabs perpetuate similar notions about Asia and the 
Far East as Europeans did for the ‘Orient’ as a blurred category. Apart from Egypt, 
for the remainder of the Arab world, with the exception of the Arab Emirates and 
Jordan, it is hard to see where there has developed any deep interest in Asia. If we 
look at the indigenous production of North African scholars in their gaze towards 
the other regions of the Middle East very little indeed could be recorded. Most 
Moroccan or Tunisian scholars, for instance, have produced knowledge only about 
Morocco or Tunisia. Very few, if any, Tunisians or Libyans have written anything on 
Egypt or the Levant.
Certainly, for the majority of the Middle East and Middle Eastern research insti-
tutes and universities, the world of Asia and Southeast Asia are still a terra incognita. 
One wonders if it is even worth talking of Middle East area studies on Southeast 
Asia. There are no well-established institutes, schools or faculties teaching ‘oriental’ 
languages, and in depth research is acutely lacking. Yet there are dialogues and inter-
actions taking place and exchanges worth mentioning. 
During colonial times it was possible to trace specific networks thanks to inter-
national communism, which disseminated information about liberation movements 
in different parts of the world. During the post-colonial era Afro-Asiatism and the 
non-alignment movement were prominent ideologies which triggered an interest in 
development models and liberation movements in Africa and Asia. Egypt created in 
the 1960s the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation. Cairo was in the 1960s a 
centre for many liberation movements. 1963 the Organisation of African Unity was 
created. The Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo published an essay by 
Ahmed Taha Mohammed on Egypt and South-South co-operation.12 Ahmed Taha 
Mohammed limited the existent areas of co-operation to three regions, namely Af-
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rica, Asia and Latin America. Today the Afro-Asian Peoples´ Solidarity Organisation 
has launched a series of dialogues with Japanese and Chinese scholars resulting in 
exchanges of scholars and sojourns of Egyptians to China and Japan.  
The Middle East witnessed the creation of various centres of African studies in 
Rabat, Cairo and Khartoum. The non-aligned movement created a ‘rapprochement’ 
in ideologies and struggles against the colonisers.
With the economic take-off in the 1970s and 1980s, ‘Asia’ for the Arab World, 
in particular Japan, China and Southeast Asia, started to gain prominence as an 
example of non-Western models of development. This fascinated Egyptian intellec-
tuals. The economic success of the Asian tigers triggered a curiosity to study their 
success story. The Asian tigers became an issue of heated debate among Arab intel-
lectuals interested in the possibility of emulating the Asian experience. 
Certainly, there was also a close affinity between Indian and Egyptian national-
ism reflected in the writings of Egyptian Nasserites and nationalists. Historically, the 
Egyptian Wafd nationalist party maintained contact with Indian nationalists. Jawa-
harlal Nehru´s letters to his daughter were translated into Arabic by the late jour-
nalist Ahmed Bahaa al-Din. The book became very popular and was reprinted four 
times. Malek ben Nabi´s writings on the concept of Afro-Asiatism demonstrated a 
great admiration for Gandhi’s non-violent resistance. There are several interesting 
reports on India by Nasserite journalists in the 1960s. We have to be reminded that 
Nasser and Nehru were important symbols as leaders of the first Bandung Con-
ference in April 1955. This led to successive conferences on Afro-Asiatic peoples’ 
solidarity. Also, Egypt coordinated with the former Yugoslavia and India to push for 
Afro-Asian solidarity. This period produced on the level of press coverage interesting 
South-South connections. But also the Soviet and Chinese communist experiences 
attracted a large number of intellectuals who followed the events in these countries 
and reported about them in the Egyptian left-oriented journal, al-Tali`a. On the 
other hand, Gandhi’s philosophy strongly influenced Egyptian nationalists and a 
prominent Egyptian feminist, Doria Shafiq, who went on a hunger strike against 
the Nasserite regime.13 Also, Sukarno was recognised by many as having played a 
considerable role in shaping the nationalist ideology of Nasser.
It was in the spirit of non-alignment and the Bandung conference that the 
Paris-based Egyptian intellectual, Anouar Abdel Malek, who was among the first to 
direct a harsh critique of orientalism, wrote a influential book titled, The Wind from 
the East,14 to remind the Arabs of the significance of ‘looking East’ and encourage 
them to direct their gaze towards the Asian civilisations of China and Japan. Abdel 
Malek argued that these ancient non-Western civilisations shared a lot in common 
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with the Arabs and could be strategic allies against the hegemonic West. Samuel 
Huntington’s thesis on the “Clash of Civilisations”, which divided the world’s civi-
lisations into broad cultural entities was greatly inspired by Abdel Malek’s divisions, 
and he quotes him extensively.
In the academic field it is important to mention the valuable work of Ahmed 
Shalabi, a Cambridge-trained Egyptian who spent many years in Southeast Asia du-
ring the Nasser period as a preacher and academic in Indonesian and Malaysian 
universities. Shalabi was sent to Indonesia in 1955 as a representative of the Islamic 
conference.15 The long years he spent in Southeast Asia led him to write a valuable 
encyclopaedia of the Muslim world consisting of 19 volumes. He dedicated a whole 
volume to the non-Arabic-speaking Muslim world. His work is particularly signifi-
cant for its emphasis on the importance of the field of comparative religion. Shalabi’s 
analysis of Southeast Asian Islam provides a rich insight into and a deep knowledge 
of the history and politics of the region. He also reveals an interesting approach to 
the study of Hindu-Buddhist influences and details about religious education and 
institutions. His work is indeed one of the few valuable historical monographs avail-
able in the Arabic language. The non-Arabic-speaking Muslim countries included in 
his work are Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Muslim minorities in India, China, Russia and the Philippines.16
To argue that there is no Middle Eastern gaze towards Asia and Southeast Asia 
would therefore be erroneous. Historically, these two parts of the Worlds have had a 
long history of religious and cultural exchange through trade routes and the spread 
of the Islamic faith.
Recently a new trend that differentiates Southeast Asia from the rest of Asia 
is to be noticed in the political writings, press coverage, and research institutes of 
the Middle East. The phenomenon of the creation of research centres in the Mid-
dle East is quite recent. The most prominent is the Centre for Asian Studies at the 
Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University. It was founded in 1994 
as a policy-oriented research organisation. It reflects Egyptian interest in Asia and is 
devoted to the implementation of multidisciplinary work on the Asian continent. 
It was also founded in response to the awareness that Asia provided the Egyptian 
academic community with opportunities to widen the scope of its social science 
research by testing its theories in the Asian domain and by generating new social 
science research that investigated Asia’s rich cultural diversity. The Centre’s main 
research is in international studies, economic studies, Korean studies and Japanese 
studies. Its publications are in both Arabic and the English language. The publica-
tions cover India, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan and China. Some of the 
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titles of the books and working papers include, ‘The Impact of Religious Revivalism 
and Islamic Fundamentalism Compared’; ‘Egypt and India in the Post-Cold War’; 
‘The Islamic Movement in Asia’; ‘Democracy and Development in Asia’; ‘The Af-
ghan Question: Regional and International Implication; ‘Democratic Transforma-
tions in Asia’; ‘Korean Investment in Egypt’; ‘The Chechen Problem’; ‘The Image 
of India in Egypt’; ‘Egyptian-Asian Cultural Relations’; ‘The Resurgence of Political 
Islam in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, a Comparative Study’; and ‘Japanese 
Political Culture’. In June 2000 Mahathir Mohamad gave a speech at the centre 
entitled, “Malaysia and the Asian Financial Crisis”, which was later published with 
responses to the lecture by Egyptian intellectuals. An edited book by Mohammed el 
Sayyed Selim and Ibrahim Arafat on Egyptian-Asian relations discusses the bilate-
ral relations between Egypt and Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Korea, Central Asia and Iran. The Cairo University-Sorbonne-trained philosopher 
Hasan Hanafi wrote a paper on Islam in Asia. The centre also publishes a Bian-
nual Bulletin titled Asiana which includes political and economic news on Asia and 
Southeast Asia and advertises recent books on Asia. 
There exists a second Centre for Asian Studies at Zaqaziq University which of-
fers Masters degrees and PhDs in Asian Studies. Chinese, Indian, Persian, Turkish 
and Japanese civilisations are classified under the rubric of Asian civilisations. How-
ever, these centres are embryonic and lack institutional backing. A glance at these 
writings tells us that the quality of the writing could hardly compete with Cornell or 
Leiden Universities or the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. It is hard 
to claim that Egyptian expertise would constitute genuine and valuable knowledge 
on Asia and Southeast Asia. But these centres are important for networking and 
exchanging scholars. Egyptian academics are then sent to various regions in central 
Asia, Japan, or Malaysia and the centres equally host scholars who would like to 
pursue research in Egypt.
With the exception of Japanese language there is no tradition at Egyptian uni-
versities of specialising in the teaching of Southeast Asian languages. Japanese seems 
to be the most established. It has been taught at the Faculty of Letters, Cairo Uni-
versity, for nearly 26 years. The initiative was sponsored by The Japan Foundation. 
Cairo, and Ain Shams Universities have Departments of Oriental languages. The 
Department of Oriental Languages at Cairo University is divided into two sections: 
Islamic and Semitic languages. Pehlewi and Persian, modern Turkish and Ottoman, 
Urdu and Pakistani, are the languages included under the rubric ‘Islamic’. Semitic 
languages include ancient and modern Hebrew, Syrianic and Aramaic and Abyssin-
ian (the Gueze). There has recently been an initiative to introduce Malay language. 
Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia
12
Al-Azhar University, the oldest university-mosque in Egypt if not in the entire Mid-
dle East, has a department of Islamic civilisations where Turkish, Persian and Urdu 
languages are taught as Islamic cultures and civilisations. Hebrew is also taught at 
various Egyptian universities. The various faculties of languages, including Persian, 
Turkish, Urdu and Hebrew, have gained a favourable reputation in recent years for 
teaching these languages. Due to the Arab-Israeli conflict greater attention has been 
given to teaching Hebrew than any other ‘oriental’ language.
In 1987, the Arab Thought Forum, a think-tank similar to the Club of Rome 
based in Amman and sponsored by the then Crown Prince Hassan, launched a 
project with the Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim, founder of the Ibn Khal-
dun Centre in Cairo, on “The Arabs and the World”. It was an initiative by scholars 
and decision-makers to establish an intellectual discourse with other parts of the 
world. This led to a series of dialogues, conferences, mutual travel and exchanges 
with different regions that were of interest to the Forum. As a start the forum di-
vided the regions into the following: Asia, Africa and Latin America. Asia was later 
subdivided into Japan, China, Southeast Asia and the Indian sub-continent. The 
outcome was two monographs published in the late 1980s titled, ‘The Arabs and 
Japan’ and ‘The Arabs and China’.  
Al-Sayâsa al-Dawliyya (International Politics) which first appeared in 1965 is one 
of the main Arabic international politics journals. Its outlook started as an anti-im-
perialist Third Worldist journal disseminating information about liberation move-
ments. In the first issue the topics covered ranged from the crisis of Vietnam in the 
1960s to American imperialism in Latin America to the Chinese Communist Party. 
Afro-Asiatism, Indonesia’s problems with Malaysia, and the Chinese presence in 
Southeast Asia, were among the topics of concern. The journal continues to appear 
until today, though its Third Worldist outlook has vanished. It has become a mere 
summary of international events derived heavily from Western sources.
The al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies recently published two important 
works. An edited volume titled, The Asian Tigers, Experiences in Conquering Underde-
velopment, in 1995. In the introduction Abdel Mon’em Said states that the book is 
the result of a program that attempted to fill the gap and serious lack of information 
about Asia and Southeast Asia. The research was launched in 1993. The articles 
dealt with the following topics, ‘South Korea and Transformations from Authori-
tarianism to Democracy’; ‘The Indonesian Political System: From Authoritarianism 
to Democracy’; ‘Thailand, the Process of Democratisation’; ‘The Cultural and Re-
ligious Dimensions of the Asian Experience; ‘The Cultural Identities of ASEAN’; 
‘Economic Dimensions of the Asian Experience; ‘Lessons to be Learned from the 
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Asian Experience’; and ‘Security and the Military in Southeast Asia’. It is clear that 
the sources used in all these articles are heavily secondary and basically Anglo-Saxon. 
For any American or European specialist in the field the work would hardly count 
as original, but for the Arab reader it could be considered as an extensive review of 
English literature on the region. 
The other book was published by the chief editor of al-Ahram semi-official 
newspaper, Ibrahim Nafe`, with the title, What is Happening in Asia?17 This book 
was a result of a trip undertaken by a team of al-Ahram journalists in July 1998 to 
‘Asia’ starting with Islamabad, New Delhi, Singapore, Jakarta and Peking, in which 
interviews with officials were conducted. Nafe` also published a book on China 
which provides a panorama of its current financial situation and discusses the prob-
lems which Chinese women face concerning domestic violence and divorce. He also 
discusses the Muslims of China and relations between the Arabs and China. It is 
again written in a journalistic style and heavily based on Anglo-Saxon and French 
sources.18
The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research established in 1994 
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, fosters research and conferences in which Asia 
is given a significant space. Iran seems to occupy a large concern as a strategically 
important neighbour. Some of the lectures offered include, ‘The Tajik Conflict: the 
Dialectics of Internal Fragmentation and External Vulnerability, 1991-1994’, ‘Eth-
no-nationalism in Pakistan’, ‘China’s Economic Reforms and their Political Implica-
tions’, ‘International Politics in North East Asia: The China-Japan-United States 
Strategic Triangle’, ‘The East Asian Security Environment’, ‘Iranian Military Ca-
pabilities and Dual Containment’, ‘The Changing Balance of Power in Asia’, ‘The 
GCC and the Development of ASEAN’, and ‘Enhancing Peace and Co-operation in 
West Asia: An Indian Perspective’. The Centre has translated two works into Arabic, 
namely:  Lester Thurow’s Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, 
Europe and America, and Richard Hall’s Empires of Monsoons: A History of the Indian 
Ocean and its Invaders: the Balance of Power in South Asia.
  
INTEREST IN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
The Iranian revolution triggered strong interest among Arab intellectuals. The works 
of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shari`ati were first disseminated in Egypt by the 
Sorbonne-trained philosopher, Hasan Hanafi. Inspired by the Iranian revolution 
Hanafi attempted to promote the idea of an Islamic left (al-yassar al-islami) in which-
Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia
14
Islam would play a progressive role similar to the theology of liberation movement 
in Latin America. Hanafi published the first issue of Left Islam, al-yassar al-islami, in 
1981, in which he introduced the ideas of the Iranian ideologue, Ali Shari`ati. In 
the same issue he wrote an article on Muslims in Asia which is interesting in terms 
of how the regions are perceived. Written in a sweeping, generalising mood and 
in a journalistic rather than an academic style, the article consists of 64 pages and 
includes all Asia’s Muslims. For Hanafi, the term ‘Asian Muslims’ encompasses an 
area starting from Iran, central Asia, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union, India, 
Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and of course Turkey. Two pages 
only are dedicated to the Muslims of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and 
the subtitle is that in this region the Muslims are facing the threat of Christian mis-
sionaries.
In 1979, Ibrahim al-Dessouqi Shetta, a professor of Oriental languages at Cairo 
University, published one of the first works on the Iranian revolution in Arabic lan-
guage which traced the roots of the revolution. He translated texts by ‘Ali Shariati 
and Ayatollah Khomeini.19 Al-Dessouqui Shetta’s innovative perspective lies in the 
fact that he relied extensively on Persian sources and was among the first scholars 
to translate the Shari`ati text, “The Construction of the Revolutionary Self”, into 
the Arabic language. Equally, the Egyptian reporter, Fahmy Huwaydi, published a 
book on the Iranian revolution which he named, “The Iranian Revolution from the 
Inside” (1987, 1991, Cairo al-Ahram). In the 1970s Huwaydi, who was a reporter for 
al-‘Arabi magazine in Kuwait, was given a chance through pro-Khomeini Iranians 
in exile to travel to Iran six times between 1979 and 1986. The book could be read 
as one of the most fascinating anthropological studies undertaken by an Egyptian 
about the Iranian religious clergy. It is catchy in describing the material life of centres 
of learning like Qom. He dwells on interesting details and descriptions of houses, 
the lifestyles of the mullahs and the schools. Huwaydi´s observations are indeed 
rich in depicting Sunni-Shi’a differences and tracing the networks between the Ira-
nian mullah and the Palestinians, for instance. Huwaydi has earned the reputation 
of having established extended networks with several Islamic movements ranging 
from Iran to Malaysia, Indonesia and central Asia. This is reflected in his journalis-
tic writings in al-Ahram daily semi-official newspaper, which provide an interesting 
perspective from an Islamic sympathiser’s perspective. The book on Iran became 
very popular in Egypt and was reprinted four times. It reveals a clear sympathy to-
wards the Iranian revolution and provides a rich insight into the events. Huwaydi 
travelled widely in Iran and conducted extensive interviews with the religious clergy. 
The well-travelled journalist, Hasanayn Haykal, who is considered one of the major 
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ideologues of the Nasser regime, published in 1982 a book titled, The Canons of the 
Ayatollah, a work that appeared first in the UK in the English language and was 
later translated into Arabic. Hasanayn Haykal was among the first Arab reporters to 
cover the Korean War, and in the 1960s he published on Korea, Japan and China. 
He has also published in Arabic a collection of articles that he wrote for Japanese 
newspapers which appeared simultaneously in the Los Angeles Times.20 The Centre 
for Strategic Studies has issued a new publication titled, ‘Persian selections’. These 
are translations of recent political and socio-economic scholarly works from Persian 
into Arabic. The selections consist of interesting political and strategic analyses of 
Iranian and regional politics. They also include portraits of Iranian intellectuals and 
politicians. 
JAPAN IMAGINED21
With the advent of colonialism and the foundation of modern nation-states in the 
Middle East Japan attracted special attention among late nineteenth-century Arab 
reformists. The victory of Imperial Japan over Tsarist Russia in 1905 gave rise to seri-
ous thought among many new nations about the West’s hegemony. Japan was and 
still is a fascinating model. It is the success story of a non-Western culture that has 
maintained its traditions and yet has been able to resist the West. Japan was thus 
used as a mirror for Arab intellectuals to review critically various aspects of Arab 
culture and Muslim nations. The Japanese showed that they could master Western 
technology and challenge Western power. Why was Japan successful but not the 
Muslim nations? This is a major question still posed by modern economic histori-
ans. Japan is thus used as a mirror for Arab intellectuals to review critically various 
aspects of Arab culture and Muslim nations.
The image of Japan for the Arabs can be divided into four types. First, early 
Egyptian reformists expressed a sort of an admiration for Japan in explaining their 
own ‘retardation’ and ‘underdevelopment’. It is no coincidence that the Egyptian 
intellectual, Rifa’a al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), is repeatedly compared to Japanese re-
formists. Professor Nasr Abu Zayd compared Tahtawi to Dr. Nitobe Inazo, the writer 
of the Bushido, while the Egyptian historian Ra´uf Abbas compared him to Fuku-
zawa Yukishi (1835-1901). Abbas drew similarities and differences between them as 
pioneers of enlightenment, progress and education.22 Second, the explanation of 
the success of Japan versus the failure of Egypt extends to pointing out the ‘factors’ 
and conditions which were lacking and thus hampered industrialisation in the Mid-
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dle East. This discourse of alterity manifested itself prominently among economic 
historians and political scientists in the sixties. Third, it is important to highlight 
the significance of Egyptian travel accounts to Japan. Alain Roussillon has looked 
into two of the first Egyptian travel accounts. The first is by Prince Mohammed Ali 
Pasha, the son of Khedive Abbas Helmi II, who travelled as a tourist to Japan in 1910 
starting from Moscow. The second account is by Muhammed Thabit, a professor 
in social science in a secondary school, who undertook a voyage in 1930. Roussil-
lon reads these accounts as raising issues of identity, reformism, strangeness and 
fascination for Japanese culture, nature and landscapes. Yet in judging Japan para-
doxically these Egyptian travellers were strongly influenced by European frames of 
reference. Prince Mohammed Ali Pasha lamented the fact that despite the high level 
of civilization that Japan had reached the Japanese remained unrefined when they 
dealt with foreigners. The Egyptian prince still displays his preference for Europe, its 
commodities, and its distractions compared to the ‘far away’ Japanese exoticism.23 
Finally, it is important to highlight the historical comparative studies of Egypt and 
Japan, in which the values of enlightenment, progress and education are introduced 
by pioneer intellectuals. The Meiji renovation period inspired the early nationalist 
Mustafa Kamel at the beginning of the twentieth century to write his book (see be-
low), and it continues to fascinate contemporary Arab historians.
THE EARLY REFORMISTS
Admiration in the Middle East for Japan was already expressed by the end of the 
nineteenth century in reformist writings. This is clearly manifested in the writings 
of the reformist and pan-Islamic thinker, Jamal ad Din al-Afghani. In discussing 
the issue of the decadence of education and the role of religion in the Ottoman 
empire and Egypt al-Afghani raises the example of Japan’s emphasis on education re-
form and its programme of sending students abroad. Al-Afghani juxtaposes Japan’s 
scheme to the useless missions that were sent from the Middle East. The passages 
on Japan are most interesting in that al-Afghani, one of the first modern religious 
reformists of the nineteenth century, seems to tell us that religion alone was not a 
sufficient element for the elevation of nations. His text on Japan conveys the mes-
sage that the lesson of Japan’s success was that religion had been neutralised. Al-
Afghani’s fascination with Japan was perpetuated by his follower, Rashid Rida, and 
further elaborated with notions of Egyptian nationalism by Mustafa Kamel.
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In discussing the role of religion in the development and progress of modern 
nations al-Afghani argues that for the Arab nation the coming of religion did cer-
tainly unify, civilise and enlighten people. It developed a more just system of govern-
ment and the arts and sciences proliferated. But if someone were to ask whether 
Japan had elevated itself by imitating the Westerners and without the intermediary 
of religion the answer would be yes. The Japanese Oriental nation, which did not 
differ greatly from the Chinese in doctrine and religion and in its norms, ethics and 
language, had grown and progressed. It had done so through imitating the elevated 
elements in civilization and taking what is best.
Briefly al-Afghani argues that the refinement and elevation of this oriental na-
tion took place or was possible because religion did not intervene. The Japanese, 
we are told, left behind pagan traditions and aspired towards scientific knowledge, 
imitating the greatest nations. They introduced in their countries sound civic rules. 
They despised or discarded Western customs that did not suit their habits in the 
East.
Yes, the refinement of the Oriental nations had taken place without the inter-
vention of religion. These nations did not benefit from their pagan religions even 
though they entailed morals and ethical values. In their origins they do not contain 
much that concerned the ordering of mundane life and what was needed in the civil 
sphere. Religion in principle aspires to happiness. If it remains a doctrine alienated 
from practice it loses any influence and becomes useless. By ignoring the practices 
of the origins these nations deteriorate to the worst level.24 What had helped the 
Japanese nation was its geographic remoteness which rescued it from the attentions 
of the West, and the willingness of its emperor to adopt the constitution.
For the reformist Rashid Rida who founded the al-Manar (The Lighthouse) 
magazine in Cairo (from 1886 to 1936), Japan was an example to be emulated. 
When Rashid Rida founded the magazine, he did so in order to spread the ideas of 
his teacher, the Islamic reformer, Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), and al-Afghani. 
The journal originated with ‘Abduh´s interpretation of the Qur´an. Rida was con-
cerned with two major problems, the decadence of the Muslim world and the danger 
of Western domination.25 According to Emad Eldin Shahin, Rida’s main concern 
was to reconcile the desire to preserve old customs and traditions with a modern 
education based on free thinking. Rida’s main zeal with al-Manar was to promote 
the idea that Islam was not in contradiction with modernity, science, reason and 
civilization.26 In fact, Rida was rather accommodative in reconciling modernity and 
Islam. Rida’s novelty was his great admiration for the Japanese model because it 
could blend solutions between old and new.27 His main concern was how to enter 
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the age of modernity. Of the same generation of Rida was the Egyptian nationalist 
Mustafa Kamel, who again referred to the example of modern Japan and wrote The 
Rising Sun (al-shams al-mushriqa, Cairo, 1904). We are told that this work was later 
translated into Malay by the reformer, Enche Abdullah Abdul-Rahman, under the 
title, Matahari memencar: tarikh kerajaan Jepun (The Radiant Sun: a History of the King-
dom of Japan, Singapore, 1906).28
THE DISCOURSE OF ECONOMIC HISTORIANS
When modernization is spoken of and the question is asked why the Arabs failed 
to modernise or industrialize, Japan comes to the forefront as a counter mirror. 
When discussing the ‘failure’ of the Middle East the late Algerian intellectual, Malek 
ben Nabi, the British historian, Roger Owen, the Egyptian economist, Galal Amin, 
the late Charles Issawi29 from Princeton University, the Lebanese political scientist, 
Ghassan Salame, and many others, all bring up the example of Japan. The figures of 
Mohammed Ali in Egypt and Meiji in Japan are frequently compared. In fact, many 
believed that during the first half of the nineteenth century Egypt was doing better 
than Japan. However, to explain the ‘failure’ of Egypt to modernise there is a long 
list of factors which show that Egypt lacked the preconditions for ‘modern economic 
growth’. One common denominator highlighted by economic historians and devel-
opmentalists and all those who have compared the two cultures is the geographical 
remoteness of Japan which gave it the advantage of being able to better avoid the 
encroachment of Western interests. It is interesting to note Roger Owen’s signifi-
cant study, Cotton and the Egyptian Economy,30 which shaped a whole generation of 
economic historians in Egypt and concludes with a comparison of Egypt and Japan. 
He lists the following conditions for Japan’s success: the attitude of the Japanese 
government, which in the years after 1868 made economic development a primary 
national objective; a far-reaching program of modernization; a longer industrial tra-
dition; and a remarkably large number of educated people. Japan benefited not only 
from an increase in agricultural productivity in the second half of the nineteenth 
century but also from the way it increased. The Japanese attitude to both industry 
and land varied considerably from the Egyptians. One of the vital factors underlying 
Meiji development was the appearance of entrepreneurs who were able and willing 
to perform the key functions of innovation, risk-taking, and management.31
In discussing the role and anatomy of the state in the Middle East32 Ghassan 
Salame provides a brilliant summary that epitomizes the fascination of Arab intellec-
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tuals for Japan. He highlights the argument of the Egyptian economist, Galal Amin, 
that the failure of Muhammad ‘Ali´s Egypt and the relative success of a state such as 
Japan in modernisation was due to the centrality of Egypt versus the geographic ex-
clusion of Japan.33 Why did Japan, alone among other the countries of Asia, Africa, 
Latin America, ‘make it’ in the nineteenth and early twentieth century? Why not the 
Arabs? Why not, for instance, Iraq, whose potential was and still is, so great? Or why 
not Egypt, with its homogeneous population, centralised government, substantial 
agricultural surplus, excellent internal waterways, long-established fiscal tradition 
and, by contemporary standards, urbanised society?”34
The question of the influence of the Enlightenment in non-Western societies 
seems to fill a significant space in comparative Egyptian-Japanese studies. Two emi-
nent scholars became interested is the issue, namely the Egyptian historian Ra’uf 
Abbas and the professor of philosophy, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (1943–2010). To 
start with, Ra’uf Abbas was first invited as a fellow to the Institute of Developing 
Countries between 1972 and 1973, and then as a visiting professor to Tokyo Univer-
sity from 1989 to 1990. Abbas had previously published in 1980 a work in Arabic 
titled, Japanese Society during the Meiji Period. It was reprinted in 1996 and 1999. 
This work is considered to be the first scientific study in Arabic language based on 
primary sources. The result of this first study led Abbas to undertake a compara-
tive work titled, The Japanese and Egyptian Enlightenment, A Comparative Study of the 
Biographies of Fukuzawa Yukichi and Rifa ‘a al-Tahtawi.35 These two intellectuals, the 
Japanese Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) and the Egyptian Rifa ‘a al-Tahtawi (1801-
1874), had lived in the same century. Abbas says in the introduction that he checked 
the English sources with the grandson of Fukuzawa Yukishi. The Arabic transla-
tion appeared a decade later. Ra’uf Abbas’s main question was how the birth of 
the modern state and related questions of development became the main concern 
of these two pioneers of enlightenment. These two intellectuals had futuristic vi-
sions about a new society. Both produced interesting travel accounts and translated 
Western culture to their own societies. Both are considered great educators of their 
time and founded schools. Both encouraged women’s education and both created 
important newspapers which shaped the public opinion of that time. Both believed 
in the movement of history and in the evolutionary aspect of civilisations. Both 
were influenced by historians like Guizot and Buckle and had great admiration for 
Western history. Both also wrote about the condition of women and wanted to 
change it. They created schools for educating both women and men. In spite of 
their difference, both were influenced by the Western model and tried to search for 
a pattern that fused tradition with acquired Western ideas. But what interests us is 
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Abbas’s conclusions from his comparison of the two intellectuals that were deeply 
influenced by the development of modern thought, Western enlightenment, ideas 
of progress and evolution. They also inspired a second generation of intellectuals. 
Being influenced by Western liberal thought, they shared the same source and terms 
of reference. Though they openly admired Western ideas and civilisation, they were 
both selective in their approach. Both had an authentic vision of civilisation based 
on the fundamental characteristics of their respective countries.36
Both also shared the same ideas on the issues of equality, human rights, and 
family relationships. Fukuzawa’s merit, however, according to Abbas, was that he was 
more aggressive in his criticism of traditional customs and morals on certain issues 
pertaining to gender and family status and his harsh denunciation of the traditional 
moral system and traditional learning. Fukuzawa clearly attacked Confucianism and 
traditional Chinese learning, in contrast to Tahtawi who was more accommodating 
of Islamic values. In Egypt traditional ethics were correlated to religion and their 
precepts were deeply rooted in Islamic shari`ah due to early training and religious 
consciousness.37 But most significantly Fukuzawa seems to have been much more 
conscious than Tahtawi of the dangers of Western imperialist interests. He there-
fore stressed the need for independence and self-reliance.38 For Abbas, Tahtawi is 
someone who had underestimated the West’s aggression. Here again the Egyptian 
intellectual is depicted as having ‘lacked clairvoyance’ and thus having missed the 
bandwagon of modernisation. 
NASR HAMID ABU ZAYD AND THE BUSHIDO
From 1985 to 1989 during the period of the foundation of the Department of Japa-
nese languages at Cairo University the Leiden-based professor Abu Zayd was invited 
to Japan on a grant funded by the Japanese Foundation. Abu Zayd had been invited 
on an exchange program to Osaka University to teach at the Department of Foreign 
languages. There he taught Arabic language, literature and fiqh in Arabic. Japan 
gave him the opportunity to write two major controversial works which resulted in 
his being accused of apostasy: the Mafhum al-Nass (The Meaning of the Text) and 
Naqd al-Khitab al-Dini (The Critique of the Religious Discourse). While in Japan he 
discovered the significance of the Bushido through the celebrated work of Nitobe 
Inazo (1862-1933).39 Nitobe Inazo had been an educator, cultural interpreter and a 
civil servant. He had studied agricultural economics at the University of Sapporo 
Agricultural College. He later became a Christian and is acknowledged today for 
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having bridged cultures. He described himself as ‘a bridge across the Pacific’.40 Inazo 
studied in the United States for three years and in Germany for another three years. 
He married an American. It was in the United States where he had retired because 
of his poor health that he wrote his famous work, The Bushido. Nasr Abu Zayd be-
came fascinated by Nitobe’s endeavour to explain Japanese culture to a Western 
audience. His life and work teaches us a tremendous amount about cross-cultural 
encounters. Abu Zayd decided to translate it and introduce the work to the Arab 
reader. Japan, for Abu Zayd, offered him the opportunity to observe Shinto and 
Buddhist religions. Abu Zayd even lived in a Shinto temple for a month, and he 
recalls that out of courtesy the monks brought him meat, an unforgettable event in 
terms of Japanese hospitality.41
In the introduction Nasr explains why he translated The Bushido. He argues that 
for so long Arabs have mainly directed their gaze towards Europe. They perpetuate 
a ‘whimsical’ and mythical perception of the ‘East’. Japan, for many Arabs, is simply 
reduced to an affluent, consumer society. Arab-Japanese relations from both sides 
are understood as merely materialistic, although there have been more serious at-
tempts from the Japanese side to understand the Arabs.42 For him, The Bushido was 
written in a clear and simple style. Inazo lived in the United States and cared enough 
to translate his knowledge and culture to non-Japanese. According to Abu Zayd the 
language of the author is honest. For Abu Zayd Arabs have made no effort to under-
stand the Other. The Arabs are ethnocentric and epicentric.
In Japan Abu Zayd also discovered the importance of colour and aesthetics. 
Nasr was fascinated at how the Japanese excelled in the plastic arts and in land-
scapes. Since Arabic culture is a culture of language according to Nasr it lacks such 
qualities. The significance of hair style, dress, and colour, is crucial for the Japanese 
but is largely overlooked by Arabs. By contrast, Japan was not a culture of story 
tellers as was the culture of the Arabs. Nasr travelled all over Japan, even up to the 
far North. He visited Nagasaki and Hiroshima and met eyewitnesses of the war. He 
recalls wandering and often walking daily to his university located far away from his 
house in the countryside. Abu Zayd’s love-affair with Japan is expressed by his claim 
that he had never felt homesick – in contrast to his time in the USA when he had 
spent two years in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he had been sent to study folk-
lore and anthropology between 1978 and 1980. What rescued him in Japan despite 
his lack of Japanese language was the warmth of the village culture which reminded 
him of his own past and upbringing.   
Abu Zayd’s introduction to The Bushido consists of 56 pages. It is an incisive text 
in terms of intercultural exchange between the Arabs and Japan. Abu Zayd expresses 
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great admiration for Japan and respect for its religions and customs. It could be 
argued that the Shinto religion is difficult to compare to monotheistic Islam since 
Shinto does not have a founder nor does it have sacred scriptures like the Bible and 
the Qur´an. We are also told that preaching and propaganda is not common in 
Shinto religion. But Abu Zayd´s endeavour is interested. His comparison of Japa-
nese religion, culture, and traditions with the Arab-Muslim world is tactical. In fact, 
he uses Japan to direct a bitter critique of the misuse of Islamic religious discourse. 
He praises the family system in Japan in order to devalue Egyptian government pro-
paganda during the Sadat regime which instrumentalised the family to further Sa-
dat’s authoritarianism. Abu Zayd admires Japanese architecture and lifestyle because 
he believed it resisted Americanisation. This is certainly not the case, Abu Zayd 
tells us, of the Egyptian middle class. He praises the syncretism of Confucianism, 
Buddhism and Shintoism. He admires the authenticity of Japanese performance of 
rituals in order to contrast them with the double standards of some practices in the 
Middle East. He compares the manipulation of contemporary religious discourse in 
Egypt to the flexibility, sincerity and openness of the Japanese traditions. 
Why did Abu Zayd translate such a work? Why highlight the Japanese model? 
What should we learn from them? Here Abu Zayd tells us that the starting point of 
any cross-cultural encounter is translation, which is the case with this work. In fact 
Abu Zayd notes that this book had indeed been previously translated in 1938, but he 
had only discovered it after having nearly completed his own translation. However, 
that simply confirmed the importance of such a work.43
Abu Zayd informs us that his aim is that ‘We’ Arabs should have a better and 
a more objective perspective about ourselves. In fact, ‘We’ lack any serious effort to 
know ourselves better. It is not only the economic success of Japan which is worth 
studying, but also its spiritual success.44
Abu Zayd reminds us that such a translation contributes to raising issues that 
concern the location of contemporary Arabic culture. Translation is not merely an 
act of copying but is essentially a dialogical endeavour with other cultures. From 
that perspective this book raises a number of pivotal issues, such as the relationship 
between the present and the past, and the limits of individual and social behaviour. 
From that perspective this book interprets modern Japan to the reader, or more 
precisely nineteenth-century Japan, by referring to the cultural and ethical values of 
the feudal system in Japan. 
In Abu Zayd’s commentary on Nitobe’s work he constantly compares Japan 
with the Arab world. He points out that its author emphasises the continuity be-
tween the present and the past, while our Arab societies experience a continuous 
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break between the present and the past. Abu Zayd points to the interesting relation-
ship between European and American culture arguing that what is of interest in this 
book is that it was written in order to defend Japanese culture against Orientalist 
attacks and those who were mocking Japanese culture – especially sarcastic Western-
ers who disparaged Japanese traditions.45
Abu Zayd reminds us that Nitobe had married an American and had been a 
member of missionary groups when he was student in America. Nitobe thus repre-
sents the typical nationalist intellectual who protested against Japan’s opening to 
the West after the treaty of 1853-1854. Abu Zayd reminds us that Japan was equally 
influenced by China, Buddhism and Confucianism, but had been able to efficiently 
absorb all these elements while it did not lose its identity. Abu Zayd then contrasts 
Nitobe to al-Tahtawi who felt an inferiority complex towards the West, that he be-
lieved had begun with Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt and which continued up until 
the defeat in the 1967 war.
For Abu Zayd the Arabs are today infatuated with the West. This has led to a 
total dependency. Since the reign of Khedive Ismail elements of Westernization are 
evident. This is not the case for Japan. The foreigner has to adapt to the Japanese 
lifestyle and their food habits. While many Egyptians would qualify them as under-
developed this is problematic, Abu Zayd argues. If one compares the Egyptian to the 
American household, there would hardly be any difference between middle-class 
American and Egyptian lifestyles. Modernisation in Egypt through migration to the 
oil-producing countries has led to the transformation of architecture in the country-
side. However what has occurred is a mere emulation of European and American 
architecture. This is not the case for the Japanese, who continue to sleep on futon 
beds, eat on the floor and dress in the Kimono. Yet these same people also deal with 
the most complicated technology.46 
CONCLUSION
These are fresh attempts that hint at a burgeoning Middle Eastern gaze towards 
Asia. To be sure, it is an imagined Asia tainted by Middle East-centric visions, but it 
is nevertheless compelling in terms of its alterity. This article has attempted to dwell 
on the field of South-South relations by pondering upon the question of how Arabs 
- or rather more specifically, Egyptians – have perceived “Asia”. What these Egyptian 
travel accounts to the East reveal is that the encounter with the Western world and 
its attendant ideas of progress and enlightenment forced a comparison between an 
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imagined “East” and the European, Greco-Roman world. For clear historical reasons 
Western scholarship has tended to focus on the colonial encounter, leading to a de-
partmentalization and narrowing of area studies. Such studies typically are informed 
by a North-South perspective, or vice versa. I have also attempted to argue that the 
colonial encounter created bodies and institutions of knowledge production which 
have been precisely lacking on the South-South level. Journalism and travel accounts 
are a rich source for documenting these encounters. What requires further atten-
tion is the post-colonial, nationalist impact on South-South encounters. Here the 
“Bandung effect”, and how a Nehru, a Gandhi, or a Sukarno, might have impacted 
on nationalist movements in the Middle East, awaits further research.
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CHAPTER TWO
EGYPT’S INFLUENCE ON THE EDUCATION 
OF THAI MUSLIMS FROM THE NASSER ERA 
TO THE PRESENT
Hasan Mardman
On January 4 1965, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser addressed the crowd gathered to attend the “Celebration of Knowledge Day”:
Dear brothers!
Every time in this Hall (Qa‘ah) when I am here with you for the 
“Celebration of Knowledge Day” (Eid al-‘Ilm) I bring to you a new 
message and place upon your shoulders a vital task that is to be 
carried out by capable cadres on whom their country [Egypt] has 
bestowed the opportunities of distinction and who in return hon-
or their country with academic excellence (al-imtiyazât al-‘ilmiyah).
I stand here from a distance every year to observe a crowd of intel-
lectuals holding up a sacred torchlight of hope. I truly feel as if I 
were looking at a tide of humanity heading towards dignity and 
prosperity, with firm foundations, permanently raised up to open 
horizons with neither boundaries nor walls.1
As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, for the Muslim community of southern Thai-
land the Middle East has had a great impact in the sphere of education and indeed, 
on thinking about education. Among those Middle Eastern countries in the modern 
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period which have had the greatest impact Egypt is the most prominent. During the 
era of the late President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt was a pioneer in providing 
scholarships to students all over the world to study in its educational institutions. 
Between 1955 and 1970 students from all over Southeast Asia, including Indone-
sia, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, 
traveled to Egypt for their education.
This chapter focuses on the importance given to education during the Nasser 
era, and in particular on the educational opportunities given to the tullab al-wafidin 
(foreign students), among them many Thai Muslims, who traveled to study in Cairo 
under the custodianship of the Egyptian government. It will also discuss the living 
conditions and facilities provided to the foreign students living in the Madinat al-
Bu’uth al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Mission City). It assesses the legacy of Thai Muslim 
graduates from Egypt during the Nasser era, both in terms of their impact on Thai-
land’s government, educational and private sectors as well as their significance for 
the reform of Islamic education in Thailand today. It concludes by comparing the 
development of the Islamic education sector in Malaysia with that of Thailand.
EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE ARAB NATION
In assessing the development of Islamic education in Thailand it is impossible to 
overlook the importance of the role played by the late Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, who assumed the presidency of Egypt on 23rd June 1956. Nasser’s great cha-
risma as an Arab nationalist was such that during visits and rallies he would draw 
Egyptian people out onto the streets in crowds waving their hands and cheering their 
leader loudly crying : ya‘iish Nasser,  ya‘iish Nasser, meaning “Long live Nasser! Long 
Live Nasser!”. The enthusiasm and emotion that Nasser inspired in his people has 
long since waned with the passing away of their leader. Few traces remain with either 
of his successors, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. Yet Nasser’s legacy in the field 
of education continues to this day.
As part of his revolutionary nationalist agenda Nasser gave considerable atten-
tion to the issue of education. In the early hours of the morning before daybreak 
people everywhere from upper and lower Egypt would hurry to sit around their 
radios and listen to live broadcasts of their charismatic Za‘im – especially on the oc-
casion of Eid al- ‘Ilm or “Celebration of Knowledge Day”.  In his 1965 address in the 
great hall of the Auditorium of Cairo University the Egyptian leader explained how 
knowledge and education were related to his revolutionary goals:
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The revolution ‘althawrah’ is not an expression of feeling. In its 
true meaning it is knowledge that can be obtained by all. Society 
should not be changed by an emotional reaction, nor should it 
be satisfied with the existing situation. Rather, society should be 
properly cured by solving the problems of the economy and social 
welfare, and to create new structures and new foundations to ben-
efit the nation more broadly.2
For Nasser, education was like “a bright beacon (al-masabih al-kashifah) which we 
carry with us to shine around ourselves in order to seek out our future, to illuminate 
our steps in order to reach the future. Our progress to the future and our movement 
towards it is, in fact, like crawling and groping our way in a swamp of darkness and 
ignorance”.3
THAI MUSLIMS IN EGYPTIAN UNIVERSITIES 
DURING THE NASSER ERA
Nasser’s educational vision was not restricted to his countrymen. During the Nasser 
era young Muslims from various nationalities all over the world received scholar-
ships to study in Egypt at the Ma‘had al-Bu‘ûth al-Islâmiyah institute. Many Arab stu-
dents from other Arab countries would choose Cairo as their destination for higher 
education. Besides al-Azhar University, Cairo University, Ain Shams University, and 
Alexandria University were all crowded with Arab students. From the 1960 Thai 
students also began flocking to Cairo in increasing numbers. The record book of 
the Thai Students’ Association in Cairo provides student figures from its establish-
ment in 1955 to the year 1987. It lists a total of about 750 Thai students, of which 
three hundred students had studied under scholarship.4 By the year 1995 the total 
number of students studying in Egypt was about 1600. According to the President of 
the Thai Students Association in Cairo, by 2005 approximately 1700 persons were 
registered with the Association as students in Egypt.
A significant number of Thai students studying in Egypt were on special schol-
arships (minhat al-dirasah al-islamiah).5 The financial assistance was supported by ei-
ther the Awqaf charitable organization or the Idarah al-Azhar (al-Azhar office). The 
main objective of the scholarships was to prepare students in the Arabic language 
and Islamic subjects. Very few students were sufficiently qualified to immediately 
enter university at first year. Most had to first spend at least two or three years in the 
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Ma‘had al-Bu‘ûth al-Islâmiyah school where they attended special classes (dirasah khas-
sah) on Arabic and Islam. Thai students who had studied at the pondok institutions 
in Thailand were also required to enter this Institute in order to prepare themselves 
in reading and writing in Arabic and especially in speaking skills. Poor Arabic lan-
guage skills would be a severe handicap for students in their subsequent university 
studies.
The Ma‘had al-Bu‘ûth al-Islâmiyah Institute provided a dormitory for men while 
the female students would live at the Dâr al-Mallak guest house in Abbasiah. Most, 
if not all, of the students had to stay at the dormitory. There they were served free 
meals three times a day (Iftar, Ghada’, ‘Asha’). The Thai students would normally 
prepare their own food according to their own tastes on the balcony. Within the 
Islamic Mission City complex numerous student facilities were provided, such as an 
immigration service, a dispensary, a police station, a scholarship section, a student 
affairs section and a masjid complex. Every summer after taking their final exams 
most wafidin students (foreign students) would be taken to the Alexandria seashore 
for a month’s vacation. There many activities were arranged for the students to par-
ticipate in, including football matches, boxing, judo, volley ball, and table tennis. At 
night academic talks were held given mostly by high-ranking figures in Egypt. For ex-
ample, at the Mu ‘tamar Abi Bakr al-Siddiq, a summer camp in Alexandria, Shaykh 
Mahmud al-Shaltut (the then Shayk Al Azhar) presented an address to the wafidin 
students in which he pointed out the importance of the foreign students studying in 
Egypt for the spread of Islam in Africa and Asia:
My children, every year in July Egyptians travel with their fami-
lies to relax on the seashore of Alexandria and enjoy the fresh 
sea breeze. The same thing has been done for you, the ‘wafidin’ 
from Africa and Asia. You have all come here under the care of 
your big brother, Muhammad Tawfiq Uwaidah [the then Secre-
tary General of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (al-Majlis 
al- A‘la’ li-Ashshu’un al-Islamiyah) Cairo, and also the head of the 
Islamic Mission City], who has himself also come here having 
been entrusted by the ummah to bring you to this place to relax 
and recover from the hardships you endured during your stud-
ies. When you finish your studies and return to your homelands 
you will take back with you this knowledge and teach it to your 
people. Islam will thereby be able to spread to every corner of the 
world, as once used to be the case in these two continents.6
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Many of the Thai students studying in Cairo in the 1960s came via Saudi Arabia 
after having performed the Hajj or the Umrah. Some of them received certificates 
after studying in Makkah for some years. Many finished secondary school some from 
Madrasah Dar al-‘Ulum, while others graduated from Aziziah or al-Falah schools. 
Those Thai students who had obtained certificates from these institutions were al-
lowed to enter any university in Egypt, either in the Arts or the Science streams. 
It is often believed that Thai graduates from the Middle East return to Thailand 
to work only in religious fields such as teaching Islam or working as imams in their 
villages. In fact, many graduates find employment in the government, education, or 
private sector. Thai students who finished their high secondary education in the Sci-
ence stream from Makkah would continue their studies either at Cairo University or 
‘Ain Shams University. Among many well-known Thai alumni of Cairo University 
are Pisut Haji Din (Political Science, Cairo University) and Wirat Samadi (Darul 
‘Ulum, Cairo University), who formerly worked for many years as diplomats in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hashem Non-Anan (Medicine, Cairo University), de-
voted himself to a career in managing the Madrasah Ansorussunnah Foundation 
at Pakphayun, Patthalung province. Kasem Ben Alae (Commerce, Cairo University) 
was a senior government official and head of Electric Data Processing, and served 
at the Provincial Electricity Authority, Bemoh, Pattani, until his retirement. Paisal 
Yingsaman (Arts, Cairo University), a former MP of the New Power Party from Yala 
Province, was formerly an English teacher at Yala Secondary School and also served 
as President of the Yala Provincial Administration Committee. His friend, Assistant 
Professor Anant Okriss (Arts, Cairo University) was an English professor in the De-
partment of Foreign Languages at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at 
the Pattani campus of Prince of Songkhla University. Salleh Anas, a graduate from 
the Faculty of Law, Cairo University, is at present an advisor on Arabic and Islam for 
Darussalam School, Tanjongmas, Narathiwat.
Other well-known Thai graduates from Egypt during this period worth men-
tioning include Prasit (Hasbulah) Aminsen (Economics, American University, Cai-
ro), who worked in the Ministry of Education for many years and at the same time 
was also Imam of Masjid Klongton, Bangkok. Sombat Thatsanaprasert (Engineer-
ing, Cairo University) is a businessman. Dr. Boraharn Suwandee, a medical doctor, 
is a graduate from Al-Azhar University, and now serves at a Bangkok hospital. Olan 
Suwandee, an engineer specializing in architecture, is a graduate from Al-Azhar Uni-
versity. Kasidit Srisanga, who graduated in medicine from Al-Azhar University, now 
serves at Bangkok Hospital.  He is also the translator of the book “al-Tibb al-Nabawiy” 
(Healing with the Medicine of the Prophet) by the fourteenth-century theologian 
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Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah. Supoj Wangstang and Sakda Sriruengthong graduated from 
the Faculty of Languages and Translation at Al-Azhar University and worked in the 
United Arab Emirates Embassy in Germany for almost fourteen years. Supoj Wang-
stang is now a senior consultant at the Halal Institute of Thailand (HIT), while Sak-
da Sriruengthong is employed at the United Arab Emirates Embassy in Bangkok.
A significant number of Thai alumni from Al-Azhar have devoted themselves to 
education, either in the Middle East, Thailand, or in neighbouring Malaysia. One of 
them is Professor Dr. Ismail Yakob, who is a former lecturer in Islamic Law at Umm 
al-Qura University in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia. Ustadh Omar Tayyib, an ex-Senator and 
ex-Datok Yuttitham at the Narathiwat Court in southern Thailand, is the founder 
and manager of the Ma‘had attarqiyah al-Islamiyah Foundation. Ustadh Nikdir 
Waba, the founder of Islam Witthaya Saiburi Foundation, is president of the Asso-
ciation of Pondok Institutions in the three southern border provinces of Thailand. 
Abdurrahman Awang, a professor in Comparative Law at the International Islamic 
University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, is a well-known professor to the international 
students, while Professor Dr. Abdul Ghani Yakob, an alumni of Al-Azhar University 
specializing in history teaches at the same institution. Professor Dr. Mariya Abdullah 
teaches Chemistry at the National University of Malaysia, Bangi Selangor. 
Alumni of Al-Azhar working in Bangkok educational institutions include Pro-
fessor Dr. Imron Malulim, a graduate in Shari ‘ah, formerly a professor at Kasetsat 
University and author of numerous books and articles on Islam, Thai Muslims and 
the Middle East, and a  former Senator. Associate Professor Dr. Anat Man-sanit is 
a professor in the Faculty of Arts at Chulalongkorn University. Assistant Professor 
Dr. Samai Jitmuad is a psychology professor at Ramkamhaeng University. Assistant 
Professor Dr. Abdullah Numsuk, a graduate from the Islamic University of Madi-
nah, Saudi Arabia, is a professor in Arabic at Ramkhamhaeng University. Besides 
giving lectures in the classroom these academics also play an active role in Bangkok’s 
Muslim community. Bukhari Ben Raman, a senior lecturer in Islamic law at Ram-
kamhaeng University, is a well-known figure among that university’s humanities and 
political science students. A contemporary of Bukhari is Supon (Shakirin) Boon-
malert, another Al-Azhar graduate, who is now active in translating books on Islam 
in Arabic into Thai language including a translation of a Qur’an interpretation. He 
now works at The Foundation of Islamic Center of Thailand and frequently gives 
lectures to the community as a da‘wah activity. Also at the Islamic Center of Thailand 
in Bangkok is Shafie Napakorn, a graduate in Usuluddin, who is an Imam involved 
in organizing numerous Islamic activities, especially for the Friday khutbah.
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Besides Al-Azhar there are numerous well-known Thai graduates from other 
Egyptian universities. Alumni from ‘Ain Shams University include Abdullatif Ar-
shad Charong (Commerce) who has worked at Radio Broadcasting and Television of 
Malaysia as an announcer in the Arabic Section since 1970, and Pak Cik Shamsud-
din (History) who taught Arabic at Attarqiyah school, Narathiwat. During the 1970s 
a number of Thai students graduated from al-Shubra University, Shubra Khaymah, 
in Cairo, and now work in different careers in Bangkok. These include Narong 
Wongsumit, a businessman and secretary of the Association of Arab Universities 
Alumni; Suwit Samuthkochorn, a banker; and Assistant Professor Dr. Samai Jit-
muad. Al-Ustadh Imam Sanan (Farid) Pechthongkam, a history graduate from Cairo 
University, is a well-known figure in the Muslim community and currently the presi-
dent of the Association of Arab Universities Alumni in Thailand. One of the most 
valuable works ever produced by the Association is the translation of the Qur’an 
into the Thai language. It has become a key reference source for graduate students 
writing their dissertations.
The influence of Egypt on Islamic education in Thailand does not end with 
the graduation of students. Since at least the 1970s there have been on-going links 
with Egyptian educational institutions with the aim of developing Islamic higher 
education in Thailand. In 1974 Mr. Muhammad Tawfiq ‘Uwadah, the then Secre-
tary-General of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in Cairo, accompanied by 
Professor Mohsin Abd al-Rahman Abu Si‘da, Faculty of Languages and Translation 
at Al-Azhar University, visited Prince of Songkhla University (PSU) in Pattani prov-
ince for discussions with university authorities on how to establish Islamic studies in 
the University. This was the beginning of an academic relationship between Prince 
of Songkhla University and Egyptian institutions that eventually led to the founding 
of the Centre for Islamic Studies at PSU.7 More recently, in September 2005 Profes-
sor Krasae Chanawongse, M.D., President of Princess Narathiwat University, led a 
delegation of the Thai Higher Education Commission to visit Al-Azhar University to 
once again hold discussions on educational cooperation. A year earlier, Dr. Surakiat 
Sathianthai, the then Foreign Minister of Thailand, made a four-day visit to Bahrain 
to discuss a proposal by Bahrain to provide technical and academic support for the 
setting up of a university campus in Thailand based on the Azharite system – that is, 
a university that offers a religious syllabus paying special attention to the Qur’anic 
sciences and traditions of the Prophet, and which also teaches all the modern scien-
tific fields. 
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ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN 
THAILAND AND MALAYSIA COMPARED
While the Thai Muslim community in general hoped to see the return of a new 
generation of graduates from Egypt and the Middle East with Arabic competency 
and a more profound knowledge of Islamic Studies, they also longed to have their 
own higher educational institutions offering standard Arabic as the medium of in-
struction in their own country. This would prevent subsequent generations of Thai 
Muslims having to undergo such a long and costly struggle to be educated abroad, 
away from their parents and their motherland. In Thailand there are now qualified 
madrasahs officially called ‘Islamic Private Schools’ (rongrian ekachon son sasana islam), 
whose graduates go on to continue their studies in Islam and Arabic overseas. The 
demand for the establishment of Islamic higher learning institutions in Thailand 
therefore remains very high. In this respect it is worth comparing the development 
of Islamic higher education with that in neighbouring Malaysia, to whom Thailand’s 
ethnic Malay Muslim community in the south often look for example.
Rosnani Hashim has presented a good overview of the process of establishing 
religious schools in the various states of Malaysia.8 She emphasizes how complicated 
this process has been. Religious schools have had to adapt their shape and structure 
while their curriculums have become more standardized and certified by universities 
in the Middle East. The process of moving towards the Middle Eastern equivalent 
has been a gradual one. She demonstrates how essential it is that in the process 
of establishing a concrete foundation for an Islamic college there must be a basic 
foundation at the grass-roots level and a deep appreciation of the importance of Is-
lamic education among the people. Madrasahs or sekolah agama rakyat (state religious 
schools) began to appear throughout the Malay states in the pre- and post-Second 
World War period. Although a shortage of money and facilities posed significant 
challenges at the beginning, donations from the muhsinin (benefactors) were a signifi-
cant factor that enabled the establishment of these madrasahs. Later the madrasahs in 
each state were fully supported by the Majlis Zakat dan Fitrah, with monthly salaries 
also being paid to religious teachers.
Rosnani recounts the origin of the first madrasah in Malaysia, the Madrasah al-
Hadi of Melaka, founded in 1917 by Shaykh Ahmad. Prior to this the first modern 
religious school, Madrasah Al-Iqbal, was founded in Singapore by the same Shaykh. 
Later he moved to Pulau Pinang where he established the Madrasah Masyhur Islamiah, 
which remains one of the most successful and best-known centers of Islamic educa-
tion in the country. The Madrasah Al-Hamidiah was built in Kedah in the year 1908 
37
Egypt’s Influence on the Education of Thai Muslims
from the Nasser Era to the Present
in honour of Sultan Abdul Hamid, then ruler of Kedah. This school was expanded 
in 1935 and later on renamed Al-Maahad al-Mahmud after Tunku Mahmud who had 
laid the foundation stone. In Kelantan, Madrasah Muhammadiah was founded in 
1915 by Majlis Agama dan Adat Istiadat Melayu. The Madrasah Alwiah Diniah of Arau, 
Perlis was established in 1937 through the efforts of Raja Sayyid Alwi. In Terengganu 
the first Madrasah was Madrasah al-‘Arabiah, founded in 1925. In Perak the Madrasah 
Al-Idrisiah was built in 1922. In all the above mentioned madrasahs, Malay language, 
Arabic and English were taught and used as the medium of instruction.
The success of the establishment of madrasahs in Malaysia prompted efforts to 
set up an Islamic college, the Kolej Islam in Klang, in order to further the education 
of graduates of the madrasahs. This initiative was aimed at providing more opportu-
nities for higher education in Malaysia by providing graduates of madrasahs an alter-
native to going abroad to the Middle East, which could be afforded only by relatively 
few Malays. Muslims felt the need for such an institution and so a blue-print for an 
Islamic College was prepared in 1949 and subsequently presented to the Conference 
of Malay Rulers.9
The aims of the Kolej Islam, Klang, were to:
1. Develop a tradition of higher Islamic learning that would be modern;
2. Develop a centre of Islamic education which would serve as a focal point 
for all the religious and Arabic schools with the aim of improving the qua-
lity of teaching and uniting the various systems;
3. Produce qualified religious and Arabic language teachers for the govern-
ment primary and secondary schools;
4. Increase the number of qualified officers in the departments of religion 
and the shari‘ah courts as well as to enlarge their knowledge;
5. Spread the message of Islam by sending graduates to all corners of the 
country.10 
The Islamic College in Klang, Malaysia, finally opened in 1955 with fifty-five 
students. The Sultan of Selangor donated his former palace in Klang as a waqf to 
be converted into the college’s premises. The newly-formed College offered English 
language, science, and mathematics, in addition to the core curriculum of Islamic 
studies and Arabic language. As the years progressed demand for Islamic higher 
education exceeded the number of places available in the Islamic College.11
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As in Thailand, Malaysian alumni of Egyptian universities have played signifi-
cant roles in Malaysia’s education sector. Graduates from the Klang Islamic College 
went on to Al-Azhar University in Cairo to continue their masters and doctoral de-
grees in Shari’ah, Usuluddin, or Arabic language, before returning to Malaysia where 
they often held important positions in Malaysian higher education and government. 
Prominent alumni of the College, to name just a few, include Professor Dr. Harun 
Din (UKM), Professor Ghazali Nawawi (IIUM), Professor Abdul Hamid Othman 
(Office of Prime Minister), Professor Aziz Hanafi (UKM), Mahmud Abdul (UKM), 
Associate Professor Dr. Arshad Taib (UTM), Associate Professor Mohd Yusof Mat 
(UiTM), and Professor Dr. Ismail Hamid (UKM). 
Those alumni who graduated from Madrasah Alwiah Diniah, Arau, Perlis, Malay-
sia, and who went on to Cairo to further their studies at Cairo University and Ain 
Shams University in the late 1950s and early 1960s include Omar Abu (a banker); 
Ahmad Said (a politician); Omar Ismail (a professional); Abdul Kadir Ismail (a lec-
turer); Ramli Ismail (a lecturer); Sayed Hassan Sahil and Ali Mat Isa (lecturers). 
Among the later alumni of the same Madrasah from the early 1960s to 1970s who 
went on to graduate from Al-Azhar University include Professor Dr. Othman Khalid 
(lecturer, UKM); Professor Dr. Harun Din (lecturer, UKM); Professor Dr. Ismail 
Hamid (lecturer, Temple University); Associate Professor Dr. Muhammad Arshad 
Taib (lecturer, UTM), Associate Professor Ahmad Yusof Mat (lecturer, UITM); Dr. 
Muhammad Saad Ali (lecturer); Dr. Aziz Hanafi (lecturer, UKM); Mahmud Abdul 
(lecturer, UKM); Azimat Yahya (lecturer); Mariam Isa (lecturer); Mrs. Radiah Mah-
mud (lecturer) and Syarifah Zainab (lecturer). Most of the Alwiah graduates became 
founding lecturers in the Kolej Islam, Klang, and at the Universiti Kebangsaan 
Bangi, Malaysia, in the early days of its establishment. The development of Islamic 
higher education in this period has had a significant impact on the Malaysian higher 
education system as a whole.
In Thailand, the situation of Islamic schooling and madrasah institutions is 
similar, though much less developed, to that in Malaysia. In Thailand many regis-
tered madrasahs, officially referred to as ‘Islamic Private Schools’ (rongrian ekachon 
son sasana islam), can be found in the south as well as in other parts of the country. 
Hundreds of madrasah graduates continue their studies in Islam and Arabic in vari-
ous countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan and India, not to mention 
those who have had the opportunity to study in the Middle East. Thus the need for 
the establishment of Islamic higher learning centers in Thailand is very high.
After the Second World War progressive Muslim elites of the Patani region 
in southern Thailand began to consider how to adapt their pondoks – a loose and 
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unstructured system of Islamic education – to provide a more systematic method of 
instruction so as to cope with the demands placed upon them by the government. 
Later, during the 1960s, the centralizing education policy of the Thai government 
towards traditional Islamic education institutions caused great concern among Thai 
Muslims in the south. Religious teachers and the owners of the pondoks began to 
consider how to ensure that their traditional educational institutions survived. The 
process of institutional change has led Thai Muslims to becoming much more aware 
of the impact of modern trends on these traditional institutions. Besides being un-
prepared in the modern fields of education traditional Muslims tend to have a dif-
ferent conception of what Islamic education ought to be compared to that of the 
secular education authorities.
The predicament of the pondok schools in Thailand can be said to resemble that 
of traditional Islamic education in Indonesia after independence, which similarly 
had to respond to the demands of a strong, centralizing, secular state. As Lukens-
Bull explains, although Indonesia was the world’s largest Islamic country, it was not 
an Islamic state:
Throughout the Indonesian republic’s existence the ongoing 
question for the Islamic community has been how to create a 
strong, and faithful Islamic society in the context of a moderniz-
ing, globalizing and secular state [...] Through developing a hybrid 
educational system in pesantren, kyai [traditional religious leaders] 
have outwardly supported the national development policies 
while striving to firmly establish Islamic values as the foundation 
for public life in Indonesia.12
The Indonesian government’s attempts to impose a modern system of educa-
tion onto traditional institutions also concerned sections of Indonesia’s Muslim 
community. Rapid growth of the Indonesian economy from the 1980s was widely 
perceived to have led to an erosion of traditional values that were once nurtured in 
the pesantren. In this context the study of Islam was seen as a means of reclaiming 
these lost values. As one pesantren teacher lamented,
  
Indonesia once had established values, as can be seen in the suc-
cessful establishment of Republic of Indonesia. These values were 
the values of 1945. However in the 1980s these values began to be 
lost and are now completely lost […] The Qur’an can guarantee 
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life in the future, the Qur’an can take us back to the values of 
1945.13
Given similar concerns expressed by Thai Muslims about government pressure 
to modernize Islamic education the Thai graduates of Egyptian educational institu-
tions have played an important role. Many Cairo alumni who have returned to Thai-
land with qualifications in Arabic and Islamic subjects have been instrumental in 
the establishment of new madrasah schools providing a systematic curriculum based 
on that of Al-Azhar. Indeed, some of the early pioneers in the establishment of edu-
cational institutions on the madrasah model include Imron Makudee (Kongchok Pat-
tani Witthaya) and Na‘im Kasem from Bangkok (Khlongsip Islam Witthaya); Haji 
Ahmad Bandakaseng from Yala (Ma’had Darul ‘Ulum), Senator Omar Tayib from 
Narathiwat (Ma’had Attarkiah Diniyah), Haji Nik Dir Waba (Saiburi Islam Wit-
thaya) and Haji Abdul Wahhab Abdulwahhab from Pattani (Madrasah Aziz Sataan). 
Students graduating from these schools are qualified in both Thai and religious edu-
cation. Every year many of the students who graduate from these schools continue 
their studies in Egypt. Thus the academic relationship between Thailand’s Muslim 
community and Egypt has grown stronger and stronger.
CONCLUSION
Since Muslim communities in Thailand tend to believe that the public school cur-
riculum does not provide enough Islamic content, Islamic educational institutions 
have a role to play in ensuring that young Muslims learn their innate religious foun-
dations. The Muslim community in Thailand sees the future of religious educa-
tion beyond the national frame. To become learned people well-versed in Islamic 
precepts Muslim students need to continue their studies in institutions of higher 
learning. In order to provide the best opportunities for their children they have at-
tempted to establish Islamic education institutions on the model of the institutions 
in the Middle East. It is here that the great Islamic higher education institutions of 
Egypt have played and continue to play a vital role in the development of Islamic 
higher education in Thailand.
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CHAPTER THREE
FROM IAIN TO UIN: 
ISLAMIC STUDIES IN INDONESIA
Azyumardi Azra 
The transformation in recent years of the five State Institutes for Islamic Studies (IAIN or Institut Agama Islam Negeri) and one State Islamic College (STAIN, 
or Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri) into fully-fledged universities is an historic 
phase in the development of Islamic higher education in Indonesia. The conversion 
of the IAIN to UIN was begun in the late 1970s by a number of high officials of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) and rectors of IAINs, particularly Professor 
Harun Nasution of the IAIN in Jakarta. But political and legal constraints during 
the Soeharto period, as well as purely academic reasons, made the conversion very 
difficult, if not unlikely.
The sudden fall of President Soeharto in May 1998 brought liberalization to 
Indonesia, not only in the political arena, but also in the educational field. Efforts 
within IAIN circles to convert the IAIN to UIN that had intensified since 1997 
gained a stronger impetus. The new paradigm in the higher education introduced 
in 1998 by the Ministry of National Education (MONE) that includes greater au-
tonomy, greater accountability and greater quality assurance for Indonesian state 
universities, also made the IAIN transformation possible.1
It should be acknowledged that the appointment of A Malik Fadjar, profes-
sor of Islamic education at IAIN Jakarta, as Minister of National Education in the 
Megawati Presidency (2001-04), accelerated the transformation. It was during his 
tenure that IAIN Jakarta was converted to UIN (May 20, 2002), followed by IAIN 
Yogyakarta and STAIN Malang (July 21, 2004). Three other IAINs have also been 
converted into UINs during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Presidency. They are 
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now UIN Pekanbaru, UIN Bandung, and UIN Makasar. As a result of the transfor-
mation of Islamic higher learning, there are now six UINs, 14 IAINs and 32 STAINs 
throughout Indonesia.
REINTEGRATION OF THE SCIENCES
The creation of the UINs is the end product of a long struggle within IAIN and 
MORA circles. One of the most important hurdles was legal constraints. According 
to various regulations concerning higher education and particularly the Indonesian 
law of education of 1989, an ‘institut’ (institute) such as IAIN had a limited mandate 
compared to a ‘universitas’ (university). The law states that an ‘institut’ is a higher 
educational institution that is allowed to teach only in a certain field of knowledge, 
while a ‘universitas’ can provide education in virtually all branches of knowledge. For 
this reason the mandate of the IAINs as Islamic higher education institutions since 
the time of their foundation was limited to the so-called ‘Islamic religious sciences’. 
It would consequently be against the law if an IAIN offered academic programs 
outside of the boundaries of the so-called Islamic religious sciences.
However it is important to make clear that even though an IAIN is an institute 
of Islamic religious sciences, it is not a ‘seminary’. It is basically a liberal institute that 
prepares Muslim youths to work as teachers of not only Islamic instruction at ma-
drasahs, pesantrens and public schools, but also of English, for instance. Many IAIN 
graduates also work as social and NGO activists, journalists, political activists, lead-
ers of socio-religious organizations, as well as kyai at pesantren. With the liberalization 
of Indonesian politics following the fall of President Soeharto an ever increasing 
number of IAIN graduates have become leaders of political parties and members of 
legislative bodies at national and local levels.2
In this respect, there is little doubt that the IAIN has played a crucial role in the 
modernization of Indonesian Muslim society. First of all, IAIN has made it possible 
for the children of santri (practising Muslim) families to obtain ‘modern’ Islamic 
higher education that allows them to achieve not only educational mobility but also 
social and economic mobility. IAIN, no doubt, has contributed significantly to the 
so-called ‘intellectual boom’ that has been taking place in Indonesia since the late 
1970s. Furthermore, one can not ignore the role of IAIN graduates in the moderni-
zation of Islamic educational institutions, such as madrasahs, pesantrens, and sekolah 
Islam (Islamic schools), as well as in the development of other Islamic institutions 
such as Islamic courts, Islamic banking and others.
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Despite their important role within IAIN circles there is a great deal of dissatis-
faction with their limited academic mandate that allows them to deal with only the 
so-called Islamic religious sciences. There are a number of important reasons behind 
the efforts to convert IAIN to UIN. First, more and more Muslims have realized that 
the long-standing dichotomy between the Islamic religious sciences and ‘secular’, 
or better, ‘general’ sciences, can no longer be maintained, since essentially there is 
no separation in Islam between the sacred and the profane. The dichotomy—if not 
separation—has created negative consequences for the lives of Muslims as a whole.
Second, the development program that was launched in Indonesia from the 
early 1970s onwards has produced an increasing need for Muslims to play a greater 
role in almost all walks of life. In the popular discourse since the 1970s Muslims 
should not become the ‘objects’ of development; they should become the ‘subject’ 
of national development. But it is clear that they can not fulfill that role satisfactorily 
unless they are better prepared in all branches of knowledge.
Third, the transformation of most of madrasahs into ‘public schools’ with an 
Islamic character as stated by the national education law of 1989 has had far-rea-
ching consequences for the IAIN and STAIN. Now, if the graduates of secondary 
madrasah (Madrasah Aliyah/MA), particularly in the fields of the natural sciences 
and social science, wish to continue their studies in the IAIN, then the IAIN itself 
must provide similar academic programs. But this is of course beyond the traditional 
mandate of the IAIN. As a result, since 1997 the number of prospective students 
and, therefore, students admitted, at the IAIN and STAIN has been decreasing con-
tinuously. 
At a more philosophical level, at least in UIN Jakarta, the conversion of a IAIN 
to a UIN is based on the idea of the reintegration of the so-called Islamic religious 
sciences and ‘secular’ sciences. There is no need here to discuss again the origins of 
this dichotomy in the history of knowledge in Islam.3 What is important is that from 
the UIN Jakarta perspective all sciences epistemologically come from God, the All-
Knowledgeable, through the ‘ayat Qur’aniyyah’ (Qur’anic verses) and the ‘ayat kawni-
yah’, the signs of God that are spread all over the universe. Muslims need to learn the 
‘ayat Qur’aniyyah’ and the ‘ayat kawniyyah’ at the same time, since through the study 
of the two ayats, Muslims will be able to acquire the various kinds of knowledge and 
sciences that are necessary for their lives.
The concept of the reintegration of sciences at the UIN Jakarta is conducted at 
three levels: first, at the philosophical and epistemological levels mentioned above; 
second, at the level of the curriculum; third, at the level of faculty and academic 
programs. 
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It should be clear, therefore, that the conversion is not based on the idea of 
the ‘Islamization of knowledge’ that has been the subject of discussion and debate 
among certain Muslim scholars since the early 1980s. Again, from the UIN Jakarta 
perspective, the idea of the ‘Islamization of knowledge’ is to a large extent question-
able, since all knowledge and sciences are already Islamic. Natural sciences are of 
course already based on universal principles. If certain theories in the social sciences 
and humanities are Western-based, then the need is not to ‘Islamize’ them, but to 
develop theories that are based on Muslim social and cultural realities.
Based on all of the above-mentioned reasons, the idea of conversion of the 
IAIN to UIN has a strong basis. Maintaining the existing form or mandate of IAIN 
will make it very difficult for it to survive. Therefore, the mandate of the IAIN needs 
to be expanded. If direct conversion to UIN is not possible, then the IAIN should 
be given a wider mandate, meaning it maintains its institute status, but at the same 
time is officially allowed by the Ministry of National Education (MONE) to open 
‘non-religious’ academic programs.4 The wider mandate concept was in fact adopted 
by MORA and MONE as ‘bridging’ stages in the transformation of IAIN Jakarta, 
IAIN Yogyakarta, and STAIN Malang to UIN.
The result of the transformation is clear. Taking UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Ja-
karta, the earliest institute to have been converted (May 20th 2002) as an example, 
at present the UIN Jakarta consists of not only religious faculties, but also ‘non-re-
ligious’, or, better, natural and social sciences and humanities faculties. More than 
that, even the traditional religious faculties are a combination of religious and non-
religious departments or programs.
The complete faculties of UIN Jakarta are the following: the Faculty of Tarbiyah 
and Teaching Sciences; the Faculty of Syariah and Law; the Faculty of Ushuluddin 
and Philosophy; the Faculty of Adab and Humanities; the Faculty of Dakwah and 
Communication; the Faculty of Islamic Studies (Dirasat Islamiyyah); the Faculty of 
Psychology; the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences; the Faculty of Science 
and Technology; the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences; and the Faculty of 
Graduate Studies.
With its new status since 2003 UIN Jakarta has participated in the national 
entrance examination (SPMB/Seleksi Penerimaan Mahasiswa Baru) which is car-
ried out by the Indonesian association of state universities, in addition to the local 
entrance examination conducted internally at the UIN Campus. This participation 
allows UIN Jakarta to recruit students more widely, or more precisely, both nation-
ally and internationally. And according to statistics released by the national commit-
tee of SPMB, based on scores achieved by its prospective students, UIN Jakarta in 
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the 2003 SPMB was ranked 14th in natural sciences and 16th in social sciences out 
of 48 participating universities. In 2004, UIN Jakarta was the 5th most competitive 
university among 49 state universities participating in the SPMB in such programs 
as Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Management, Accountancy, 
and Psychology.
Again, a number of consequences of this transformation are clear. The most im-
portant among them is that these UIN have included the opening of new academic 
programs that go beyond the religious sciences that are traditionally taught at IAINs 
and STAINs. These new programs include, for instance, mathematics, biology, com-
puter sciences, medical and health sciences, and other natural and basic sciences.
The decision of the Indonesian government to carry out this crucial transforma-
tion reflects the long-standing aspiration within both government circles and Mus-
lim society generally to have modern Islamic universities that will in turn make a 
greater contribution to the creation of a modern and democratic Indonesia. Greater 
opportunities for Islamic higher education institutions, no doubt, will be possible 
only if the mandate of these institutions is not confined to the religious sciences, 
but includes also other sciences that are necessary for Indonesians to improve their 
lives.
THE TRADITION OF ISLAMIC LEARNING
The appearance of the UIN within the Islamic educational system and institutions 
in Indonesia is also a sign of the emergence of a new view of Islamic studies in the 
country. As far as Islamic studies in Indonesia is concerned, generally speaking there 
are two main traditions: the tradition that originates with the Middle Eastern univer-
sities and the tradition developed at Western universities. Each of these traditions 
has had its influence on the direction and approach of this field of study in Indone-
sia, as reflected at the IAIN. Numerous studies have shown – among them Dhofier 
(1980; 1982), Azra (2004), and Abaza (1994) – that there has been an intense inter-
action between the ‘ulamâ of Indonesia and their counterparts in the Middle East, 
especially in Mecca, Medina, and later in Cairo. 
Consequently, what has been developed in Indonesian Islamic studies cannot 
be separated from the tradition of Islamic learning in the Middle East. More re-
cently, with the return of IAIN graduates from their studies at Western universities, 
such as those in the Netherlands, Canada, the United States, England, Germany, 
France, and Australia, the development of Islamic studies has advanced to an im-
portant stage.   
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The tradition of Islamic learning in Indonesia has a long and rich history. My 
study of the intellectual networks of the Indonesian-Malay ‘ulamâ has shown that, 
from its early period, the development of Islam and the tradition of Islamic learning 
in Indonesia at both the socio-cultural and intellectual levels cannot be separated 
from the religio-intellectual traditions developed in Mecca and Medina.5 This find-
ing suggests that, in many ways, traditions of Islamic learning in Indonesia have 
developed in almost the same way as they have in its land of origin.
Nevertheless, while it is true that Indonesian Islam has close links with the 
intellectual traditions in Mecca and Medina, Islam in Indonesia has not simply du-
plicated them. In the process of its transmission to Indonesia from the holy land and 
later from Cairo, Indonesian Islam has developed a distinctive intellectual tradition. 
Dhofier’s study (1980, 1982) on the network of Javanese kyai in the early nineteenth 
century shows that the kyai of the pesantren in Java developed their own networks, 
which were built in two ways: through intellectual chains of Islamic knowledge and 
learning and through endogamous marriages among their families and relatives. The 
first seems to have been inspired by hadîth transmission, by using isnâd (chains of 
transmitters or authority), which was later also adopted in the silsilah of tariqah. Both 
isnâd and silsilah are, of course, used to prove the legitimacy, validity, and authority 
of the teaching and learning respectively in the hadîth and Sufism one has received. 
The ‘ulamâ network, on the other hand, aimed mostly at preserving the pesantren 
tradition.
Pesantren in Java, as may also be the case with the many other Islamic institu-
tions in the Islamic world, represented a distinctive tradition of Islamic learning in 
Indonesia. A simple example of this is that pesantren used a certain religious language 
that combined Arabic words with local language. The use of Arab-Jawi (Javanese or 
Malay language written in Arabic characters) in pesantren is even considered a unique 
phenomenon.6 Unlike many parts of the Muslim world, especially the Middle East, 
that use Arabic as their main language, Java developed its own intellectual and lin-
guistic traditions while maintaining Arabic as an important language for religious 
studies.
Pesantren education was designed to preserve the conventions of traditional Is-
lamic learning. Therefore, the books used to teach santri (students of pesantren), re-
ferred to in Indonesia as kitab kuning (literally “yellow books”), were those produced 
by ‘ulamâ in the past.7 Furthermore, traditional Islamic rituals practiced in pesantren 
reflect the religious practices of Muslims and are often categorized as belonging to 
traditional Islam. Therefore, it is not suprising that pesantren have been preserved 
by traditional Islam as now represented by the Nahdlatul ‘Ulamâ (NU), the largest 
Muslim organization in Indonesia, established in 1926.
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However, the influence of modern education in Indonesia, which was initially 
introduced by the Dutch, also had an impact on pesantren, significantly changing the 
intellectual tradition of Islam in Java. The pesantren not only began to lose some of 
their specific intellectual language, but to some extent they also lost their distinctive 
educational character. Nevertheless, the adaptations made by pesantren were a neces-
sary condition for their adjustment to social changes, and enabled them to continue 
to play a major role in Islamic studies in Indonesia. The new tradition of pesantren 
adopted over the last two decades is also partly characterized and influenced by con-
temporary social conditions, and in turn is shaping the tradition of Islamic studies 
in Indonesia as a whole.
APPROACHES TO ISLAMIC STUDIES
In order to have a better grasp of recent tendencies in Islamic studies in Indonesia it 
is important to elucidate briefly the history of the development of the IAIN and the 
recent transformation two of them, in Jakarta (2002) and Yogyakarta (2004), into 
fully-fledged universities (State Islamic University or Universitas Islam Negeri/UIN). 
In addition, one State Islamic College (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Negeri/STAIN) in 
Malang was also transformed into a UIN in 2004.
There is no doubt that the IAIN have played a major role in advancing Islamic 
studies through higher education.
 
In fact, the IAIN can fairly be regarded as a barom-
eter of the development of Islamic studies in the Indonesian academic world.8 The 
IAIN is undoubtedly an end-product of Indonesian Muslims’ efforts to establish a 
modern religious institution of higher education. They were officially granted state-
institution status in the late 1950s through the process of merging the two main 
institutions of Islamic higher education: the PTAIN (Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam 
Negeri, or State Islamic Higher Institute) in Yogyakarta and the ADIA (Akademi 
Dinas Ilmu Agama, or Academy of Religious Sciences) in Jakarta. The PTAIN had 
originated in the Faculty of Religious Studies at Indonesia Islamic University (UII), 
the oldest private university in Indonesia, while the ADIA had been designed as an 
academy to provide training for candidates for the civil service with the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs.
After the establishment of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta and IAIN Syarif 
Hidayatullah in Jakarta in the early 1960s, the Ministry of Religious Affairs also 
established other IAINs in a number of capital cities of Indonesian provinces. As a 
result the peak number of IAINs was 14. The number has been reduced recently to 
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12 when IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and IAIN Sunan Kalijaga were converted 
into universities. Now there are three UINs, 12 IAINs and 32 STAIN operating 
under the supervision of Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). It is 
important to mention in passing that STAINs were founded in 1997 as a conversion 
of IAINs’ faculties located in certain towns. Again, all of these Islamic institutions of 
higher learning are responsible to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, while their aca-
demic supervision is carried out together by the Ministry of National Education.
It is important to understand that the establishment and development of the 
UINs, the IAINs and the STAINs, cannot be separated from the struggle of Indone-
sian Muslims to advance and spread Islamic teaching in Indonesia. Among Indone-
sian Muslims there are numerous differences in the practice and understanding of 
Islam. Sometimes conflicts occur over trivial differences, such as the use of intention 
(niyat) before prayer. This particular conflict occurred not only because of a lack of 
proper understanding of Islam, but also because of each school’s fanatic loyalty to 
its respective mode of interpretation (madhhab). So on issues such as these Muslims 
expected that their institutions of higher education would improve Muslims’ under-
standing and practice of Islam.
Since their establishment, therefore, the IAINs have carried on their shoulders 
two fundamental tasks: the advancement of Muslim intellectual discourse and the 
betterment of Muslims’ understanding of their religious practices. In other words, 
the IAIN have undertaken both an academic role (as education institutions aiming 
to improve the quality of Muslim intellectual discourse) and a social role (as religious 
institutions for dakwah).9
 
However, these two expected roles have not always gone 
hand in hand, and have sometimes even come into conflict. On the one hand, as 
an academic institution, the IAIN should treat the study of religion as it does other 
studies, applying to it the same academic and scientific principles. On the other 
hand, the IAIN is expected to act as a dakwah institution, which is more concerned 
with how its people practice Islam.10 
Therefore, in the first decades of its development, Islamic Studies at the IAIN 
was dominated by a substantive and normative approach stemming mainly from 
Islam’s doctrinal aspects. This approach to Islamic studies emphasized the legal and 
formal aspects of Islam which focus on sharî‘ah (Islamic law) and aqîdah (Islamic 
faith). The result of this kind of endeavor has been the emergence of a tendency 
in Islamic studies to associate Islam mainly with practices and rituals, which means 
studying Islam in order to better practice Islam.
Furthermore, in the IAINs’ early decades, Islamic studies tended to be focused 
on a particular religious school (madhhab). As a result, Islamic studies at the IAINs’ 
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did not form part of a wider scientific discourse. The model for Islamic studies in 
the IAIN was the tradition of universities in the Middle East, particularly Al-Azhar 
University, which put more emphasis on a normative-idealistic approach than on 
anything else.
However, social development and changes that have occurred since the early 
1970s have propelled changes in the IAIN. The national development program that 
tended to take modernization as the national goal has led Muslim intellectuals such 
as Nurcholish Madjid, Harun Nasution, and Mukti Ali to reorient the direction of 
Islamic studies in Indonesia. This endeavor was made easier when Harun Nasution, 
a PhD graduate of McGill University, became rector at IAIN Jakarta and Mukti Ali, 
also a graduate of McGill University, was appointed Minister of Religious Affairs. 
Their presence has brought about some significant changes in the IAINs’ orienta-
tion of study.
One obvious change is that the new trend of studying Islam is no longer lim-
ited to only one Islamic school of thought (madhhab). Islam is now seen not from 
the perspective of only one particular madhhab, but from various perspectives. This 
approach encourages students to learn Islam’s academic aspects without obligat-
ing them to follow a certain religious school. As a result, students become more 
open and tolerant toward different religious interpretations. This in turn propels 
the mushrooming of new thoughts on religion, as the sectarianism of holding to 
one madhhab increasingly diminishes. As a result, there has arisen a non-madhhabi 
approach to Islamic studies in Indonesia.
Another important change to Islamic studies in the IAIN has been the shift of 
Islamic studies from a normative approach to a historical, sociological, and empirical 
approach. The normative approach to studying Islam, which tends to neglect human 
socio-historical realities, has led Muslims to see Islam as an idealistic religion. Be-
cause of this idealistic view, Muslims are often trapped into “spiritual satisfaction,” 
which in turn distances Muslims from empirical situations. On the other hand, 
historical and sociological approaches provide a wide range of analysis for the study 
of Islam, bringing social-historical realities into interaction with religious experience. 
As a result, Muslims are now becoming more aware of more mundane problems 
affecting them.
Indonesian scholars who have studied Islam in Western universities have initi-
ated the emergence of historical and sociological approaches to Islamic studies in In-
donesia. If previously the orientation of Islamic studies was by and large taken from 
the great tradition of Middle Eastern universities, the new orientation of Islamic 
studies in Indonesia has come about as a result of the opportunities available for 
52
Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia
fresh IAIN graduates to study in Western universities. Some Indonesian Muslims, 
however, criticize this new orientation within Islamic studies. They question, for in-
stance, how Islam can be studied from the West since Western countries do not have 
an Islamic tradition comparable to that of Middle Eastern countries. Furthermore, 
some Muslims also argue that what Muslims can learn from Western universities is 
only an “Orientalist approach,” which will in the end harm Islam and Muslims.   
These debates demonstrate the existence of differing opinions regarding the 
IAIN’s status as either a religious or an academic institution. Controversy over the 
orientation of Islamic studies has colored the academic tradition of Islam at the 
IAIN. Although the new orientation of Islamic studies leans more toward that of 
Western universities, it has not diminished the desire of Indonesian Muslim stu-
dents to study at Middle Eastern universities. The IAIN has therefore become the 
meeting place for these two orientations within Islamic studies. As a result, we can 
observe that various new modes of study have emerged in the IAIN. One the one 
hand, there is a strong tendency to study Islam using historical and sociological ap-
proaches. Various centers for study have now been established that investigate and 
conduct research on Islam in the context of contemporary ideas such as civil society, 
democracy, gender, and human rights. On the other hand, the influence of Middle 
Eastern studies on the IAIN is also apparent. The textual study of Islam also survives 
despite changes in the IAIN’s study orientation. In the future, the meeting of these 
two great traditions in the IAIN may produce a distinct tradition of Islamic studies.
ISLAMIC STUDIES IN THE LOCAL CONTEXT
By any measure Islam in Indonesia constitutes one of the great branches of the 
family tree of Islam. Not only do Muslims in Indonesia constitute the majority of 
the population – they are as numerous as Arabic-speakers and Urdu-speakers – but 
they also have peculiar traditions that differ from those of Muslims in other parts 
of the Muslim world. However, until the early 1980s Islam in Indonesia had been 
regarded as being outside the mainstream of Islamic traditions. This is because, as 
many scholars have argued, the syncretic nature of Islam in Indonesia is not com-
parable to the supposedly “real Islam” of the Middle East, where Islam originated.11 
Moreover, Islam in Indonesia and Islam in Southeast Asia in general, as Anthony 
Reid has argued, is marginal because Islam in Indonesia “entered the Islamic world 
too late” and thus cannot shape and color Islamic doctrine and civilization.12 When 
Indonesian Muslims began to interact with the Muslim community the seminal 
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ideas of Islamic civilization had already been established. Reid further argues that 
the geographical separation of Indonesia from Middle Eastern Muslim societies had 
distanced Indonesian Muslims from the social and political problems of other Mus-
lim countries.
Studies by Roff (1985), Bulliet (1995), Keddie (1987), Ricklefs (1979; 1998), 
Hefner (1987), and Woodward (1989), to name only a few, have convincingly ar-
gued that it is inappropriate to consider Indonesian Islam “peripheral” – whether 
religiously or intellectually – vis-à-vis Middle Eastern Islam. However, because of 
its distinct social and political environment and its unique religious practices and 
interpretations, Islam in Indonesian has a special position. Mark Woodward, for ex-
ample, in his study of the normative piety and mystical piety of Islam in Java, argues 
that Javanese Islam is exemplary of local Islam, which is interpreted with reference 
to local cultures (1989). If there are some distinct features of Islam in Java compared 
to Islam in Middle Eastern Muslim societies, Woodward argues, it should be viewed 
as part of Javanese Muslims’ contribution to the interpretation of Islam.  
Adopting a different line of argument Kuntowidjoyo maintains that in Indo-
nesia and in Southeast Asia Islam has assumed a new dimension. In responding to 
contemporary ideas developed in the West, such as civil society, democracy, human 
rights, and gender, Indonesian Islam is more advanced than Islam in other Muslim 
societies. Furthermore, Indonesian Muslims are daring to use social sciences such as 
history, sociology, psychology, and anthropology to study Islam. Therefore, Kuntow-
idjoyo concludes, discourses on Islam in Indonesia are richer and more colorful.13
Islam in Indonesia also allows us to observe how Islam is related to the social 
context. As the prominent American historian of Islam, Hodgson, puts it (1974), the 
beautiful mosaic of Islam is reflected in the various forms of local Islam. It is true 
that Islam, when interacting with various cultures, produces local forms of Islam 
that may differ from each other. However, these various forms of local Islam are 
not an indication of a broken tradition of “universal Islam”. Rather, they comprise 
diverse forms within a colorful mosaic.
CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the creation of the UINs will have a far-reaching impact 
both on human resources development among Indonesian Muslims and on the di-
rection of Islamic studies in Indonesia. Islamic studies in Indonesia will be influ-
enced and shaped by various developments not only within the UIN, IAIN, and 
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STAIN but also within Indonesian society in general. However it is clear that the 
future development of Islamic studies will be marked by four major tendencies. 
First, the tradition of Islamic studies will increasingly integrate the so-called 
‘Islamic religious sciences’ with natural sciences, the social sciences, and the hu-
manities. Second, the new tradition of Islamic studies in Indonesia will increasingly 
employ socio-historical approaches and analyses. Third, Islamic studies in Indonesia 
will consider local context – i.e., local cultures and local knowledge – in a more 
distinctive way. Fourth, it will employ a comparative perspective on local Islam in 
order to identify differences and similarities. This means that studying Islam in a 
certain locality, such as in Indonesia, will also necessitate considering Islam in other 
localities. Undoubtedly this kind of comparative approach will continue to gain 
momentum.
These tendencies within UIN, IAIN, STAIN, and within Islamic studies in In-
donesia generally will provide the basis for a new tradition of Islamic studies. Its 
development could be a “perfect” combination of the two great traditions of Islamic 
studies developed in the Middle East and in the West. The end result is clear: the 
emergence of a distinctive Indonesian tradition of Islamic studies.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE DEVELOPMENT AND ROLE OF 
RELIGIOUS STUDIES: SOME INDONESIAN 
REFLECTIONS 
Zainal Abidin Bagir
Irwan Abdullah1
This chapter presents some preliminary reflections about the challenges and op-portunities in developing religious studies as an academic discipline in Indone-
sia, a religiously plural country which is at the same time the world’s largest Muslim 
country. It begins with a description of the history and recent developments in re-
ligious studies in Indonesia. The significance of the new developments is set in the 
context of the situation of religious education at the lower level, relations between 
different religious communities, as well as the main problems facing the nation 
today—all with an emphasis on post-1998 Reformasi developments. The remainder 
of the chapter argues for two roles for religious study in Indonesian religious life. It 
asserts that in this situation the “academic study of religion” cannot—and one may 
argue, should not—remain purely academic. 
THE ACADEMIC STUDY OF RELIGION IN INDONESIA
While the development of contemporary religious studies as an academic disci-
pline in Western universities can be traced back to the years following the Second 
World War the field can be said to have matured only in the 1970s. Since then there 
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have been ups and downs, self-criticisms, and numerous developments which have 
brought it to its present state.2 What is usually understood as “religious studies as 
an academic discipline” is a discipline which utilizes a variety of methods from the 
social sciences and humanities. Religious studies is commonly distinguished from 
theological study by its sense of critical distance and its self-conscious attempt to be 
more “objective”, at least in the minimal sense of being aware of one’s own presup-
positions which inform one’s study of religion. Indeed, questions of objectivity are 
elusive, and the very existence of this discipline, including what goes by the name 
“comparative religion”, has been questioned—not to mention the term “religion” 
itself. As evident in textbooks which introduce the students to this discipline, the 
whole enterprise of religious studies has been constantly reconsidered, and its prac-
titioners, too, have always interrogated themselves and what they purport to do.3 
In Indonesia this field in the form we see it today has developed since the 
1960s.4 The history of the study of religion in Indonesian is usually traced back to 
the time when Mukti Ali became the first chair of the Department of Comparative 
Religion at the Yogyakarta State Institute for Islamic Studies (Institute Agama Islam 
Negeri or IAIN) in 1961, to be later followed by other IAINs. As noted by Karel 
Steenbrink, Ali did not seem to bother making a distinction between the “science 
of religion”, the “history of religion”, or the “comparative study of religion”.5 Some 
scholars are reluctant to call him a scholar of religious studies, since in his treatment 
of other religions he did present himself as a Muslim and occasionally gave assess-
ments of other religions based on his perspective as a Muslim. In addition, he di-
rectly linked his study of comparative religion with efforts to promote interreligious 
dialogue—a project which flourished and was adopted as a matter of governmental 
policy when he later became Minister of Religious Affairs (1971-1978). Even until 
now, many state institutes/universities of Islamic studies in Indonesia still have a 
Department of Comparative Religion, but a very important development has taken 
place: the transformation of several IAINs into fully-fledged universities (called State 
Islamic Universities, or Universitas Islam Negeri/UIN). The transformation means 
that now the universities can offer non-religious sciences, such as sociology, psychol-
ogy, natural sciences, and medicine. Along with this development the Department 
of Comparative Religion in Yogyakarta UIN, for example, is considering changing 
its orientation in the study of religion, and even to changing its name to reflect 
recent developments in religious studies which give a more emphatic treatment of 
other religions and the relationship between religion and contemporary issues. In 
this direction the IAINs/UINs have generally contributed in numerous ways to a 
better understanding between religious communities.6 The present rector of the Yo-
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gyakarta UIN, Amin Abdullah, has described the change of methodological orienta-
tion in the study of religion at UIN as one from ‘normativity to historicity’, which 
emphasizes socio-empirical studies.7
Similar developments, both in terms of incorporating new methods of religious 
studies and contributing to inter-religious understanding, have also taken place in 
Indonesian Christian universities. It may not be a coincidence that in the decade of 
the 1990s, a strong realization of the urgency of a “non-confessional” or “non-doc-
trinal” religious studies emerged. As an illustration we can note the founding of a 
graduate program on Religion and Society at the Satya Wacana Christian University 
(Salatiga, Central Java), a Program on the Study of Religions at Duta Wacana Chris-
tian University (Yogyakarta), and the Study of Religion and Culture at the Catholic-
based Sanata Dharma University (Yogyakarta). These universities were particularly 
strong in their theology departments. As such there was also a strong need to distin-
guish the new programs from theology departments. As with some programs at the 
IAINs/UINs that invite non-Muslim scholars to teach the subject of religions other 
than Islam, the new programs at the Christian universities also have Muslim profes-
sors to teach subjects related to Islam. This obviously demonstrates an aim to present 
a more sympathetic—if not always more objective—study of religion.
Another important development was the founding of the Center for Religious 
and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) at the “secular” or non-religiously affiliated Gad-
jah Mada University (GMU, Yogyakarta), the oldest and largest public university 
in Indonesia. Offering a Master’s degree study program in religious studies, CRCS 
was founded in 2000 with the help of the above religiously-based universities, both 
Islamic and Christian, and in its initial stages was supported by both the Ministry of 
National Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Since there is no under-
graduate level of religious studies at GMU, which means there was no faculty special-
izing in religious studies other than anthropologists or sociologists doing research on 
religions, lecturers from those universities, and many other universities, including 
Buddhist and Hindu universities, were invited to teach courses at CRCS. Initially 
named “Comparative Religious Studies”, in 2002 it changed to its present name 
to better indicate its methodology and the emphasis on broader issues developed 
there. CRCS now has three clusters emphasizing issues developed through the teach-
ing and research: interfaith dialogue, religion and local cultures, and religion and 
contemporary issues. Besides its academic programs the Center also develops public 
education activities related to these issues. The lecturers as well as the students come 
from a variety of religious and ethnic backgrounds from all over Indonesia. The fact 
that it is an international program using English as its language of instruction also 
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enables it to admit a number of international students and, thanks to the many ex-
change programs, international professors. Many of the students come from religious 
educational institutions. Upon graduating they return to their home institutions—be 
they Islamic universities, pesantrens, Christian universities, seminaries and colleges, 
including Buddhist and Hindu colleges. Others are active in NGOs, some of them 
specifically interfaith NGOs. 
Graduate training is the most significant area in which CRCS can contribute. 
Graduates who return to teach at their respective institutions or organizations al-
ready carry with them a more constructive understanding of religion and relations 
between religions. As is clear from the testimony of many of CRCS’s graduates, 
they were able to change, to some extent, the way religion is taught. In its first years, 
CRCS concentrated on developing the teaching activities of the Center. Only in 
the past two years has it seriously developed its research program. In addition to re-
search on religious education at the high school level, currently CRCS is developing 
a cluster of research projects on civic pluralism in Indonesia and religion and natural 
disasters. In different ways, both are pressing issues in today’s Indonesia. 
While initially CRCS held to the principle that a particular religion was to 
be taught by lecturers from that religious background so as to provide an insider’s 
perspective, it soon became clear that it was difficult to maintain this principle in 
the framework of the developing curriculum. Instead, for specific courses, for ex-
ample the World Religions course, one professor would teach the course and invite 
representative scholars from different religious backgrounds to be guest lecturers. 
This kind of course explores the history, doctrines, as well as recent developments 
in religion. In addition to the world religions, there is also specifically a course on 
indigenous religions which focuses mainly on Indonesia. Other courses take up  con-
temporary issues such as Religion and Gender, Religion, Violence and Peacebuild-
ing, Religion and Ecology, Comparative Mysticism, Comparative Scripture, etc. 
A very recent development is the founding in 2006 of the Indonesian Consor-
tium of Religious Studies, an international PhD program, hosted by GMU. This 
initiative is the result of a consortium of three universities—GMU, Duta Wacana 
Christian University, and State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga. The main ad-
vantage this young institution enjoys is the combined resources of three universi-
ties (professors, library, courses offered). This program, partly growing out of the 
interaction of the professors in the three universities at CRCS, is understood by its 
founders to be a kind of dialogue in itself. Indeed, without the trust built over the 
years between the professors in the three universities this would have been impos-
sible. ICRS defines itself as an inter-religious international Ph.D. program, with 
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strong inter-disciplinary characteristics. To make the program truly inter-religious, 
until now each of the courses offered is taught by a team of professors representing 
different disciplinary and religious backgrounds. ICRS develops three areas of stud-
ies: Historical and Cultural Studies of Religion, Hermeneutics, and Religion and 
Contemporary Issues. It receives students from Indonesia as well as abroad.
THE CONTEXTS OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES IN INDONESIA
These new developments in religious studies are very significant in the history of 
study of religion in Indonesia. An awareness of the various contexts in which they 
have taken place is essential to understanding the direction in which the develop-
ment of religious studies in Indonesia should go. First of all, there is the context 
of how religions have been taught at the lower levels of education in this country; 
second, despite a long history of inter-religious tolerance, relations between adher-
ents of different religions are always tested by new social and political developments; 
third, the development of a discipline like religious studies needs to respond to 
developments and problems in the “secular” sectors.
Religious Education in the Schools
Indonesia is known as a religious country, home to the largest population of Mus-
lims in the world, major world religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity, 
as well as a good number of indigenous religions. Religion is a compulsory subject 
for all Indonesian students at all levels of education from primary school to uni-
versity level. But the teaching of religious courses is very limited in the sense that 
in schools Muslims only study Islam, Christians only study Christianity, etc. The 
instruction is quite normative. Even at the university level religion is also studied 
very normatively and with very minimal awareness about other religions. This kind 
of religious instruction is mandated by the national curriculum and followed by 
all public, as well as private schools. Even though many concerns have been voiced 
about the format as well as the effectiveness of this mode of teaching religion, the 
fact is that little has changed. 
Government policy on religious education in Indonesian schools was first im-
plemented soon after the 1945 declaration of independence. Initially the guidelines 
were not as rigid as they later became – where, for example, the present format makes 
religious study mandatory from the first grade of elementary school up to first year 
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university level, and all schools without exception must have a minimum number of 
hours reserved for religious education. Before 1966 some variation was allowed, and 
students (or their parents) could choose to take a course on religion or an alterna-
tive course, eg. moral education.8 The present format, in which the policy is applied 
indiscriminately to all schools and courses are made compulsory for all levels of 
schooling, can be attributed to the political transformation in Indonesia that took 
place in 1966, that is, the bloody September 30, 1965 event. Under the Soeharto 
regime which followed all issues relating to religion underwent significant changes, 
including the policy on religious education.9
In the context of national education religious education is understood as mean-
ing the study of one’s own religion. It is a mono-religious education – some would 
say instruction. Subjects taught in the courses are aimed at getting students to inter-
nalize their own religion. In its implementation in school, during the religion hours 
students are separated into different classrooms based on their religion to receive 
instructions about their own religion. The starting point is therefore explicitly exclu-
sive, and when other religions are taught they tend to be taught from the perspective 
of a particular religion. While this mode of religious education has been challenged, 
especially after the 1998 political reform, as far as government policy is concerned 
there has been no significant change. In fact, some even perceive a move toward 
making the policy even more rigid.10
The post-1998 reform period in general yielded significantly more political and 
social freedoms, prompting some schools to attempt to re-format their religious edu-
cation programs while trying to follow the requirements of the national curriculum. 
These attempts have enjoyed differing degrees of success. In Yogyakarta11, for exam-
ple, a number of schools have tried to hold a single religion class for all students so 
they may learn the universal values of other religions together. In one Islamic school 
there was an experiment at creating a more inclusive religious education subject at 
the high-school level. However the success of this program depended on the particu-
lar teachers who took the initiative, and the program does not seem to have been 
institutionalized. A “religiosity education” program has been developed by the Arch-
bishop of Semarang, Central Java, and was implemented by a few Catholic schools 
in Yogyakarta. Yet there have been some practical problems – for example the new 
course compromised the time for the teaching of the Catholic faith. The same Arch-
bishop has also published a compilation of the teachings of many religions. Some 
schools add field trips to places of worship to the usual religious education curricu-
lum. However, it is yet to be seen whether all these new experiments are ultimately 
successful. In research carried out by CRCS it was found that despite these innova-
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tive attempts the teaching of religion in the schools still shows a discernable degree 
of exclusiveness, i.e. assuming the inherent superiority of a particular religion.12
Relations between Religious Communities
A much publicized problem in Indonesia since 1998 has been the rise of violence 
which, at least on the surface, appears to have been connected with religious mo-
tives. This includes the continuing communal violence in some parts of Indonesia 
such as Ambon and central Sulawesi, as well as the terrorist attacks on places asso- 
ciated with Western interests, such as the bombings in Bali and bomb attacks against 
Western embassies and hotels in Jakarta. Religious leaders have persistently rejected 
the hasty accusations that these violent incidents are religious in nature. However, 
many scholars are worried that especially among Muslims the moderate mainstream 
may be losing ground to the exclusivists. While such an analysis may be debated, one 
thing that is certain is that the religious harmony that both Indonesians as well as 
foreigners have praised in the past is not something that can be taken for granted. 
It is not an inherent essence of Indonesian religious life that cannot disappear, but 
something that requires concerted efforts to maintain. 
That is the least we can say. From this point it would be natural to suggest that 
unless a systematic attempt is made to counter the exclusivist/violent tendencies 
among religious groups—however small such tendencies are at present—there is a real 
danger of broader religious (and one should add, intra-religious) polarization in the 
near future.
Current Socio-Economic Problems
There is another set of problems that are not specifically related to religion. Such 
problems were exacerbated in the period of the transition to democracy following 
the collapse of the New Order in 1998 and the Reformasi movement. They include 
wide-spread corruption (now “decentralized” to local governments, along with great-
er local autonomy), the widening gap between economic classes, poverty, and envi-
ronmental crisis. These problems in combination have now manifested themselves 
in many worrying situations which mostly affect the less privileged groups in the 
population. The many environmental and “natural” disasters, large and small, all 
over Indonesia, are manifestations of the long-neglected problem of environmental 
degradation which has worsened since 1998 due to weaker governmental control. 
The number of casualties in these “natural” disasters is staggering. 
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TWO ROLES OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES
Examining all these problems—the religious, as well as the not specifically religious—
one question which has been asked is whether religion is part of the problem or the 
solution? There are indications that in some instances religions have indeed have 
become part of the problem; the challenge is to make them part of the solution. 
Because of its violent medieval and modern history, the Western world, especially 
Western Europe, realized the ugly potential of religion much earlier, and many have 
given up hope in religion. But this attitude neglects two important points: that reli-
gions have also shown an amazing potential to civilize and humanize; and that reli-
gions are here to stay. So the more interesting challenge is how to make religion part 
of the solution. When we say that religion needs to be part of the solution, we have 
in mind not only problems which can be more immediately connected to religion, 
but also the more “mundane” problems. 
More specifically, what has religious studies as an academic discipline to do 
with these considerations? Academic studies certainly do not develop in a vacuum. 
Whether or not it is acknowledged, socio-economic-political contexts determine to 
a greater or lesser degree the shape of religous studies. Considering the manifold 
problems as illustrated above it would be almost impossible to develop a “purely 
academic” religious study in Indonesia—if such a thing can be said to exist at all. Re-
cent developments in religious studies in higher education in Indonesia as outlined 
above have demonstrated this. Below is a description of the two main roles that reli-
gious studies can play in Indonesia. Some of these roles have already been partially 
achieved, others require further development.
Religious Literacy and Dialogue
People may be religious but not religiously-literate. Religious education which fo-
cuses mainly or even exclusively on normative doctrines of religious teachings may 
make students religious but not necessarily religiously-literate. Religious literacy de-
mands that one understands the place of one’s particular religion in the constella-
tion of other religions living in the society, as well as its roles and limitations relative 
to other forces in social life. Such an understanding in turn demands the study of 
religion in a broader, non-normative way. The study of religion as a human phenom-
enon in a more objective manner—again, while being cautious about the definition 
of “objective”—is the realm of religious studies proper.
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Indeed, as noted by Sunardi, the head of the Religious and Cultural Studies 
(Ilmu Religi dan Budaya) at Sanata Dharma, theology is the most institutionally estab-
lished discipline in the study of religion. But for Sunardi that is precisely the main 
challenge of religious studies: how to transcend the limits of theology. According 
to Sunardi, “in Indonesia the need for different ways of speaking about religion is 
urgent because of the increase in religious experiences characterized by intense and 
rich religious encounter.”13 
It is difficult to deny that there is always a tension between the normative-doc-
trinal and the empirical/historical-critical approach to religion. The adoption of a 
critical attitude as part of that study—or even the mere use of non-theological lan-
guage—can easily lead to accusations that one is weakening the faith. This is a classic 
problem that was also present in the West where contemporary religious studies 
first developed. Just like any other subject of academic study, skepticism and placing 
oneself at a distance from actual religious practice is regarded as one of the hallmarks 
of religious study, though there are criticisms of this approach, as we will discuss it 
later.14
One characteristic of normative religious education is that it tends to focus on 
truth claims. Such an education is thus almost necessarily exclusivist since the focus 
on truth-claims naturally leads to religious exclusivism. This exclusivism has its roots 
in the belief that all, or almost all, fundamental aspects of religion are sacred and 
unchanging. The historical and critical analysis of religion may thus be expected to 
neutralize this ahistorical tendency.15 In fact, for better or worse, the very presupposi-
tions of religious study already have this neutralizing potential. 
The neutralization of such an exclusivist tendency paves the way for genuine 
inter-religious relation. There is a widespread realization that the so-called religious 
harmony that prevailed during the authoritarian regime of Soeharto in fact existed 
only on the surface. Harmony was limited to self-restraint among different religious 
groups, and hard questions about relations between different religions were not 
asked. Deeper understanding was not attained as the relationship is categorized by 
a limited notion of “tolerance”. Religious study opens up the possibility for posing 
hard questions, the exploration of each other’s world of discourse, and thus for a 
genuine dialogue. Otherwise, as Sunardi observes in the context of Indonesia, the 
study of religion may simply be a machine of production of subjective truths about 
the others. That was what happened with the discipline of Islamology in the Indo-
nesian Christian institutions of theology education—the production of Christian 
truths about Islam; and the discipline of “comparative religion” elsewhere – as the 
production of Islamic truths about other religions!16
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There are two responses to this scepticism. First, indeed the early Indonesian 
history of comparative religion can easily engender skepticism; but this kind of scep-
ticism surely is not the monopoly of Indonesia, and ways to rectify this situation 
have been widely discussed. Diana Eck, for example, now takes “comparative study” 
as designating a intellectual perspective to be cultivated in all fields of the study of 
religion—not as its subfield—to be complemented with other perspectives.17 
Second, it is important to also note that taking some distance from one’s own 
presuppositions is only the first step. The next step is to get closer to the religious 
others, while, to continue Eck, interrogating our own location and voice.18 For a sub-
ject as delicate as religion one also needs to start with empathy for others, especially 
with regard to traditions different from their own. One needs to be immersed in a 
certain religious atmosphere to be able to understand that religion. Sometimes it 
even takes a “passing-over” to be able to truly understand others’ beliefs. This and 
other terms that refer to similar ideas have been used by many scholars of religious 
study. The negotiation between the need to be objective and critical of one’s own 
presuppositions needs to be combined with sympathy and closeness to the subject 
of study. This is partly what Eck suggests with her suggestion of a complementary 
perspective in the study of religion, a dialogical perspective. This perspective takes 
into account both our voices as well as the voices of the others with whom we are 
involved in a constant dialogue. “Today, the authority of the Orientalist voice is 
gone, and moving beyond Orientalism means moving into the methodological ter-
rain of dialogue, a way of working in which both the voices of those we study and the 
voices of scholars situated in the contexts we study become integral to the process 
of understanding.”19 
Of course, this is much easier said than done. Regardless of the difficulty, only 
from a position of genuine understanding can an appreciation of others be possible. 
As Kimberley Patton puts it in her analysis of the postmodern fate of comparative 
religion, just because it is hard to do it right, that does not mean that we need to 
surrender the whole enterprise of studying religion.20 The answer is not to surrender, 
but to take a position of humility and being open to criticism—two attitudes that 
actually are needed in all scientific enterprises.
To summarize, religious studies may be expected to create a kind of religious 
literacy, which in turn opens up avenues for dialogue. Religious studies can give 
dialogue between religious communities and traditions a more rigorous grounding 
thus making them more sustainable. In this regard it may be noted that what the 
Indonesian Consortium of Religious Studies aspires to do is described as “inter-
religious studies”. In the words of J. B. Banawiratma, inter-religious studies is the 
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further development of comparative religion and religious studies. It affirms “the 
reality, which is increasingly and more intensely realized, that a study of religions is a 
communication between subjects who are involved and meet in religious interpreta-
tion, experience, or understanding.”21 
There are, of course, objections to a simplistic linking of the academic study 
of religion with dialogue. While espousing dialogue as a perspective in the study 
of religion, Eck makes clear that she does not mean to suggest that scholars need 
to participate in inter-religious dialogue as it is often popularly understood today. 
She insists that, firstly, dialogue does not have to be perceived in terms of an enthu-
siast’s subjective motivation for the promotion of some kind of unity of religions. 
One should thus not be required to sacrifice his or her “objectivity” in pursuing a 
scientific study of religion. Secondly, if “objectivity” is to be understood as having 
no authorial viewpoint, then it is outdated not only in the study of religion but in 
the social sciences in general.22 
As mentioned earlier, Indonesia does have an older example of an attempt to 
link the study of religion with interreligious dialogue in Mukti Ali, the founder 
of the discipline of comparative religion in Indonesia. He has been criticized (and 
indeed discounted as a “scholar”) by the historian of Indonesia B. J. Bolland, partly 
because of his involvement in the promotion of interfaith dialogue.23 Yet this criti-
cism can be understood as being in line with an older epistemology in which objec-
tivity was naïvely understood as a requirement of any study in order to be considered 
“scientific”. Mukti Ali’s work beckons towards theology, which can be understood 
as working against the objectivity of the scholar.24 Eck’s double-sided argument out-
lined above can be regarded as an appropriate response to this criticism.
Yet this was not the only problem with earlier attempts at promoting compara-
tive religion in Indonesia. One should also note Sunardi’s reference to Indonesian 
Muslim comparative religion programs as being akin to the production of Islamic 
truths about other religions (and similar criticisms of Christian Islamology). That 
criticism seems valid in the past, when relations between religions during the colo-
nial and New Order periods were manipulated so as to avoid engagement between 
different religious communities in the name of avoiding conflict, and when religion 
was under the hegemony of the government.  
However, the more important challenge now is how to exorcise these ghosts of 
the past. Fortunately, the post-1998 period of Reformasi provides us with the free-
dom to do this. One crucial enterprise in this regard, to provide an illustration, is to 
interrogate the very use of the term “religion”. What are the meanings of “religion”, 
when the same term appears in quite different contexts - in textbooks on the study 
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of religion, as well as in such political documents as the Indonesian constitution, 
laws on marriage and education, and many kinds of regulations, including on all 
Indonesians’ ID cards? Can we separate the political, the academic, and the theologi-
cal uses of “religion”? For what is supposedly a personal affair is, in fact, loaded with 
political signification.
“Engaged” Religious Study
Religious study may be expected to play another constructive role. A recent trend is 
its more visible engagement with new problems at the societal and even the global 
level. Examples which come readily to mind are the lively discussions we have seen 
in the past few years in the fields of religion and ecology, and religion and bioeth-
ics. Included in this is also the engagement of scholars of religious studies from all 
traditions of world religions in global issues such as gender inequality and economic 
injustice, which, some fear, are exacerbated by political and economic globaliza-
tion. All these potential problems affect mostly the less privileged of the world: the 
poor and women, regardless of their religious background. In this area scholarship 
is sometimes, positively or negatively, difficult to distinguish from “movements”. 
Sometimes the boundaries between academia and social activism are even deliber-
ately blurred. Certainly, religious believers have been concerned with all these issues 
for a considerable time. But it is only a recent development that these concerns 
have been institutionalized as academic fields of study, that is, as an enterprise with 
an explicit methodological awareness, with sufficient academic resources (such as 
journals, textbooks, and encyclopedias), with an academic community working in 
universities and professional associations, and with a set of standards.
We may provide an example of this engagement of religion with contemporary 
concerns from the recently developed enterprise of religion and ecology.25 Since 
its inception, the motives that drove the establishment of “religion and ecology” 
as an area of study were not purely academic but based on both scholarly interests 
and ethical-religious concerns about the degradation of the environment. Scholars 
coming to this multi-disciplinary field are from backgrounds as varied as theology, 
philosophy, anthropology, and environmental science. In the early 1990s religion 
and ecology were recognized as a distinct study group in the American Academy 
of Religion. Another development which started just over a decade ago (1996) was 
the series of conferences titled “Religions of the World and Ecology” at Harvard’s 
prestigious Center for the Study of World Religions. Following the conferences from 
1997 to 2004 ten books (each more than 500 pages) bearing the series title “World 
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Religions and Ecology Series” appeared. Each volume focuses on one religion (Hin-
duism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Jainism, Taoism, 
and Indigenous religions). These conferences culminated with a conference held at 
the United Nations in 1998. The two organizers of this series of conferences, Mary 
Evelyn Tucker and John Grim, now sustain their initiative through the Forum on 
Religion and Ecology (FORE). FORE aims to develop religion and ecology as a 
subject of “academic study and research in universities, colleges, seminaries, and 
other religiously–affiliated institutions”.26 Another interesting development is the 
success of scholars involved in this field in participating in the formulation of the 
Earth Charter, which, despite some criticisms, has been widely promoted all over 
the world.
Nevertheless there are serious criticisms of religion and ecology both from out-
side and inside the field itself. One of the criticisms is that ethical and even religious 
commitment to environmental agenda, however lofty they are, may compromise 
“the critical acumen associated with distanced scholarship”.27 Taylor shows that such 
concerns are not idle; he gives examples of how such concerns have indeed damaged 
the scholarship. This problem, of course, has to be addressed by scholars involved 
in religion and ecology. Regardless, Taylor himself acknowledges that “ideas and 
initiatives incubated, if not given birth to, by religious studies scholars, have played 
an important role in the greening of religion and environmental ethics. They are, 
moreover, beginning to influence global environmental politics, bringing to them an 
important and sometimes innovative religious and ethical dimension”.28
Another example concerns recent biomedical developments which have raised 
questions about the permissibility of family planning, abortion, euthanasia, and 
stem-cell research. These are ethical questions about life and death with which reli-
gion is naturally expected to be engaged. Indeed, engagement with such mundane is-
sues may actually be an avenue for the revitalization of religions. Yet at the same time 
there is a danger that pragmatic considerations may lead to religions being politically 
exploited since religions, with their accepted authority and loyal followers, have an 
enormous potential to create change. Another risk is that such engagement may lead 
to the “religionizing” of non-religious problems. To address that concern we need 
to consider two points. First, it should be understood that in most societies in the 
world people are still religious. Realistically, therefore, there is no escape from speak-
ing using religious language, albeit, one hopes, while restraining the temptation to 
instrumentalize religion. Second, religions do have a genuine potential contribution 
to make to help solve problems. In all societal problems there is always more than 
one option that can be offered as solution. Questions about what choices should 
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be made always involve ethical considerations. In this regard, religion has a role to 
play in reminding us about what is important and what is not in our narratives. For 
example, the values of justice and compassion which tend to be involved in almost 
all kinds of policy-making are strong and persistent themes in all religions. The study 
of religions may contribute fruitful insights in this regard.
In dealing with these new and challenging issues religions re-enter the public 
sphere most productively through ethics—not as competing theological truth-claims. 
How capable are the religions themselves in facing these challenges? How may a 
certain religion assert its ethical preferences in a society that consists of people with 
different religious backgrounds? What are the acceptable avenues for encounters be-
tween religions in the public sphere? These are all examples of legitimate questions 
to which scholars of religious studies may contribute answers.29
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to outline recent developments in the study of religion in 
Indonesia. While this field of study has a long history in the country it has recently 
been undergoing some important transformations. There is a widespread realiza-
tion that the study of religion in Indonesia today must move beyond the normative 
and ought to more deeply explore other methodologies which promise better, more 
objective understandings of the subject. The academic study of religion under this 
new orientation is rapidly growing in Indonesia. Such an orientation would enable 
this discipline to fulfill two important roles: first, to help foster religious literacy 
and inter-religious engagement among Indonesia’s religious believers, and second, 
to contribute to finding solutions to some of the most pressing contemporary prob-
lems facing the country. By engaging with other religions and with real problems, 
moreover, the religions themselves may be revitalized. However, as the illustrations 
discussed above have demonstrated, this process is far from easy. Difficulties stem 
both from methodological issues in the study of religion as well as the nature of the 
problems it seeks to address. Yet the fact that such new programs of religious studies 
are experiencing growth in Indonesia now would suggest that there is no other way 
except to gradually develop these new methodologies that can answer such objec-
tions and, furthermore, fulfil these two roles. This is the most important task facing 
religious studies in Indonesia today.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MAINSTREAMING MADRASAH EDUCATION 
IN THE PHILIPPINES: ISSUES, PROBLEMS 
AND CHALLENGES
Carmen Abu Bakar
INTRODUCTION
Islamic education in the Philippines can be traced back to the period of the Is-lamization of Sulu in the 13th century. It started first in the form of maktab, or 
Qur’anic schools for young children to learn to read and recite the Qur’an. Later, 
a more formal structure known as the madrasah was established teaching the sub-
jects of Theology, Arabic, Jurisprudence, and History. Elementary, secondary and 
much later even collegiate levels were opened. Following the colonial period and the 
opening up of public secular schools the madrasahs (local Islamic schools) suffered a 
decline since they could not compete with government schools in terms of providing 
job opportunities for their graduates. Madrasah graduates from secondary level were 
also unable to enroll in secular universities because the curricular requirements were 
different. To acquire higher degrees, therefore, many madrasah graduates have had to 
leave the country for the Middle East where similar curricula made it easy for them 
to enter the system.
The madrasah has been an important educational institution for Muslims in 
providing young children with religious instruction. It has been responsible for 
transmitting Islamic knowledge, values and culture. Secular public education does 
not provide for this type of knowledge, so children who go to public schools are 
76
Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia 
often ignorant about their religion. Because Muslim parents want their children 
to have employable skills and religious awareness at the same time, children began 
attending regular schools as well as attending the madrasah on weekends. This situ-
ation is hardly conducive to proper learning since children are fully occupied every 
day of the week with schoolwork and have no recreation time. A happy compromise 
should be found which would allow the children to learn both their religion and 
necessary skills in the same school.
The madrasah system operates on the principle of volunteerism. It is usually ad-
ministered by an organization or by a family that has decided to freely provide such 
a service to the community. The system operates independently of others and may 
not even be officially registered at the Department of Education. As such, there is 
no uniform or standardized curriculum. Yet in spite of these flaws or weaknesses the 
madrasah system continues to thrive, which is indicative of the Muslim community’s 
strong desire to ensure that their children receive an Islamic education. 
However since the September 11 2001 attacks on the United States, the in-
dependence of the madrasah in the Philippines has been challenged because of 
government perceptions of the links between madrasah and extremism. In the 
Philippines this has produced various reactions. Some madrasahs have been raid-
ed on suspicions that the schools were being used for terrorist activities. At the 
same time the World Bank has also made funds available for the mainstreaming 
of the madâris. This chapter, reviews some of the research that has been conducted 
on problems facing Muslim education in the Philippines before discussing recent 
attempts to mainstream the madâris into the Philippines public school system. 
PROBLEMS OF THE MADRASAHS
 
A madrasah is usually set up by private individuals or groups to provide Islamic edu-
cation for the children in the community. Since profit is not the essential motive 
for opening the school there is no compulsory payment of fees. Parents pay on a 
voluntary basis depending on what they can afford. Teachers are also volunteers 
and are paid minimal salaries. Operating on a low budget means that the schools 
are often lacking in books and other facilities. This constitutes one of the biggest 
problems for the madrasah. Other problems have to do with teacher competence, 
curriculum, instructional materials and infrastructure. These challenges have been 
the subject of national conferences and consultations over the last three decades, as 
will be detailed below. 
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The  weaknesses in madrasah education in the Philippines began to gain increasing 
attention in the early 1980s. Numerous conferences were organized to discuss these 
problems and to devise ways to address them. On 27-31 October 1980, the First Na-
tional Congress on Muslim Education took place in Marawi City. Although the Ma-
rawi Conference tackled the issue of the general education of Muslims, the subject of 
madrasah education was also taken up. The main problems that were identified were: 
1. Curriculum
2. Inadequate resources
3. Lack of competent teachers
4. Lack of competent administrators
5. Lack of adequate teaching materials (no relevant textbooks and referen-
ces)
6. Lack of school facilities such as buildings, etc.
7. Peace and order as an extraneous factor affecting the normal operation of 
madrasah.
To address these problems the conference recommended:
1. The creation of a committee to formulate a uniform pattern of curriculum 
relevant to the education system of the country;
2. The establishment of a madrasah educational foundation of the Philippines 
to take charge and/or administer donations, etc. from local/foreign sour-
ces;
3. The formulation, development and subsequent implementation of pro-
grams to train and retrain madrasah teachers;
4. Tapping the expertise of agencies for this purpose;
5. That madrasah be considered as institutions that may serve as an effective 
instrument in the quest for peace, national unity and development.1 
This first national assessment of Muslim education in the Philippines was close-
ly followed by the First Policy Conference on Madrasah held on 24-26 May 1982, 
at Western Mindanao University, Zamboanga City. This second conference largely 
reiterated the problems and recommendations discussed two years earlier. On the is-
sue of the management and organization of the madrasah it found that the aims and 
objectives of the madaris were not well-defined and in some cases not supportive of 
national development plans. There was also a lack of supervision and coordination 
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of those involved in the madrasahs, and an absence of guidelines and requirements 
for accreditation. The conference also looked at the production of graduates who 
were proficient in Arabic and English, issues of registration and accreditation of the 
madrasahs, enrichment of the madrasah curriculum, and recognition of the madrasahs 
by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). On the issue of physical facilities 
and the financing of madrasah it was found that the madrasah teachers were com-
pletely dependent on donations, which were often inadequate and did not always 
materialise.2
The Conference resolved that an association of madrasahs be established to be 
known as the Philippine Federation of Madrasahs, which would serve as the body 
through which the interests, well-being, and development of the madrasahs would be 
promoted. The madrasah should be recognized and integrated as part of the private 
education sector in the Philippine education system within framework of the Con-
stitution and Islamic culture. Bodies should be created as necessary to provide assist-
ance for the effective implementation of the madrasah development program. The 
Federation should also assume responsibility for forming appropriate committees 
to prepare, study, and finalize programs and projects necessary to pursue the broad 
objectives of the Federation as listed above.3
A more recent conference on the madrasahs held in Iligan city, June 9-10 2004, 
tackled similar issues, highlighting the problems of the lack of funds, facilities, infra-
structure, accreditation, administration and management of madrasahs. The confer-
ence resolution recommended that a trust fund for the madrasahs be established, 
that training be provided for madrasah administrators, that model Islamic schools be 
set up, and that a Federation in Islamic and Arabic madrasahs be established.4 Ah-
mad Saleh Haririe, Director of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) for Southeast 
Asia and the keynote speaker at the conference, noted that the IDB was venturing 
into professionalizing the madrasah institution and cited the need to modernize the 
curricula to provide science laboratories and computer facilities as priorities.5 
From the data reviewed above it is apparent that while problems with the ma-
drasah were identified some 20 years ago little has been done to adequately address 
these problems. The often-repeated claim of government neglect cannot easily be 
shrugged off, more so since the frenetic activities regarding the madrasah at present 
are due more to external rather than internal pressures.
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PRESENT ISSUES FACING MADRASAH EDUCATION 
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Allegations of Links to Terrorism
Since the September 11 2001 attacks in the United States and the armed insurgency 
of Muslim groups in the southern Philippines the main issue facing madrasah educa-
tion has been the claim that the system fosters extremism than can lead to terrorism. 
Unfortunately, terrorism has become a convenient slogan that can include many 
types of political movement, whether these are for legitimate political ends or not. 
It is by no means clear that it is Islamic education that is responsible for the extrem-
ist nature of such movements. In the case of the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) which has waged an armed struggle against the Philippines government the 
movement’s leaders were mostly secular-educated. The same can be said of the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) leadership, with the exception of the late Hashim 
Salamat. The Moro struggle for national liberation is driven more by the oppressive 
socio-economic situation in which the Moros have found themselves since the co-
lonial era, rather than extremist indoctrination through education. The Abu Sayaff 
group’s kidnapping activities have been rejected by the Moros in general and can be 
attributed not to religious extremism but to the tactical schemes of the late Edwin 
Angeles, who justified these acts as a way of raising funds for the organization. In 
fact, Angeles is believed to have been a “Deep Penetration Agent” of the military 
before he was mysteriously assassinated in Basilan.6
Because of their alleged links to extremism the madrasahs have come to be per-
ceived by some in Philippines government circles to be a security threat. Madrasahs 
have become a target of raids and their credibility as educational institutions has 
been on the line. An additional effect has been to incriminate Islam and implicate 
Muslims generally in international terrorism in the public eye. However the renewed 
attention given to madrasah education has spurred the government to finally take 
concrete actions to develop the madrasah, as evidenced by the various activities of the 
Department of Education and other organs of government. The issue of madrasah 
education and terrorism was addressed in an International Ulama Forum in May 
2004 held at the Dusit Hotel Nikko, Makati City, attended by participants from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia and Thailand. The organization 
of the forum was in direct response to, as one local newspaper put it, “the accusation 
from world leaders as well as from Philippine officials that Islam promotes extrem-
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ism and that Madrasa Education breeds terrorism.”7 The aim of the organizer, Taha 
Basman of the Mindanao Research Institute (MRI), was to show that by inviting 
leading Islamic scholars to join the forum it could be demonstrated that Islam is in 
fact a religion of peace, tolerance and moderation. 
Lack of Support for National Development Plans 
A less controversial issue facing Islamic education in the Philippines has been the 
perception that the madrasah are not sufficiently supportive of the Philippines gov-
ernment’s national development plans. At one level there is a grain of truth in this 
view, since the traditional aim of madrasah education is to teach children to be knowl-
edgeable of their religion and to live as good Muslims. However, at the same time it 
should be admitted that government development plans from the 1960s to the early 
1980s have tended to overlook the development of Muslim communities. In fact, it 
could be argued that the policy of the Philippines government towards the Muslim 
regions in the southern Philippines has been largely one of benign neglect, and that 
this was a contributing factor to the outbreak of the Moro rebellion in the late 1960s. 
Separation of Church and State
 
A further issue obstructing the development of madrasah education is the principle 
regarding the separation of church and state. Government assistance in the form 
of funding to religious schools, whether Islamic or otherwise, has constantly been 
questioned based on this principle. For example, a bill initiated in Congress in 2004 
by Gerry A. Salapuddin, Representative of the Lone District of Basilan, to appropri-
ate funds for madrasah development failed to gain enough support to pass primarily 
due to the argument that government funds cannot be used for religious purposes.8 
Given such obstacles to government financial support it is necessary for madrasah to 
find ways to become financially self-reliant. However this immediately raises the is-
sue of the comparative economic disadvantage of the Muslim regions of the country. 
The Muslim provinces of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 
are recognized as being the poorest in the country. In 1997 poverty incidence in the 
ARMM was at a high rate of 63.1% compared to the overall figure for the Philip-
pines of 37.4%, and the ARMM ranked first among the 14 regions.9 By 2003 there 
had been little improvement in the poverty incidence of four of the ARMM prov-
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inces, with Basilan at 65.6%, Tawi-Tawi at 69.8%, Sulu at 88.8%, and Maguidanao 
at 55.7%.10 As educational institutions, therefore, Philippines madrasah are doubly 
disadvantaged. As religious-based schools they can not depend on government fund-
ing as can the secular schools in the state education sector, while at the same time 
their ability to fund themselves sufficiently is limited by the economic disadvantage 
which is characteristic of the Muslim regions of the southern Philippines.
GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARDS MADRASAH 
Government policies regulating the madrasah over the last three decades can be 
found in many documents, foremost of which is the 1987 Constitution. However 
specific policies regarding the madrasah can also be found in the peace agreements 
signed between the MNLF and the Philippines government. The most important 
of these are the 1976 Tripoli Agreement signed in Tripoli, Libya, between the Moro 
National Liberation Front and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines 
(GRP) under the auspices of the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference); the 
Final Peace Agreement signed in 1996, Manila, Philippines, between the GRP and 
the MNLF, also under the auspices of the OIC; and the Republic Act 9054, which 
lapsed into law in 2001.
Under Article 2, Section 22 of the 1987 Philippines Constitution “the State 
recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the 
framework of national unity and development”. Further constitutional provision 
for Islamic education is effectively guaranteed under Article 14, Section 2.4, which 
states that “the State shall encourage non-formal, informal and indigenous learning 
systems as well as self-learning, independent and out-of school study programs and 
particularly those that respond to community needs” […]; and Section 17: “Further, 
the State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of indigenous cultural com-
munities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall 
consider their rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.”11
The Tripoli Agreement (TA) was signed on 23 December 1976 in Tripoli, Libya, 
between the Philippines government and the Moro National Liberation Front. The 
agreement provided regional autonomy to Regions IX (western Mindanao) and XII 
(central Mindanao) during the period of the Marcos regime, 1972-1986. The MNLF 
claimed that the intent of the TA was to create one autonomous region, not two, 
and refused to participate. Among the issues agreed upon by the two sides was that 
“… Authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have the right 
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to set up schools, colleges and universities, provided that matters pertaining to the 
relationship between these educational and scientific organs and the general educa-
tion system in the state shall be the subject of discussion later on”. 12
On 2 September 1996 the Final Peace Agreement was signed between the Phil-
ippines government and the MNLF during the Ramos administration. The word 
“Final” indicated that the agreement fulfilled all the provisions set forth in the 1976 
Tripoli Agreement. Section C of the Agreement dealt with the issue of education 
and contained as many as 32 clauses (94-125), making it the second-most detailed 
subject of the agreement. Among the most significant clauses are Clause 95, which 
stated that “The Regional Autonomous Government educational system shall, 
among others, perpetuate Filipino and Islamic ideals and aspirations, Islamic values 
and orientations of the Bangsamoro people. It shall develop the total spiritual, intel-
lectual, social, cultural, scientific and physical aspects of the Bangsamoro people to 
make them God-fearing, productive, patriotic citizens, conscious of their Filipino 
and Islamic values and Islamic cultural heritage under the aegis of a just and equita-
ble society”; Clause 101: “The integration of Islamic values in the curriculum should 
be done gradually after researches and studies are conducted; Clause 102: “The 
teaching of Islamic values, as well as Filipino values, shall be incorporated in Good 
Manners and Right conduct in appropriate grade levels including the tertiary level 
subject to agreed norms, academic freedom and legal limitations”; and Clause 103: 
“Muslim culture, mores, customs and traditions which are mainly based on Islam, 
as well as the cultures, mores, customs and traditions of Christians and indigenous 
people, shall be preserved through the regular public and special schools in the Au-
tonomous Region, considering that schools are perpetuating vehicles of the values 
of the people.” On the specific issue of Madrasah education Clause 107 stated that 
“Existing Madaris, including Madari Ulya, shall be under the Regional Autonomous 
Government educational system as presently organized in the area of autonomy”; 
while Clause 117 stipulated that  Madrasah teachers shall receive compensation out 
of the funds of the Regional Autonomous Government provided they are employed 
in the public schools.13
More recently, Republic Act No. 9054, which lapsed into law on 31 March 
2001, provided further guarantees of state support for Madrasah education. Article 
14 of the Act devoted a substantial 14 sections to the issue of education. Among the 
most significant issues dealt with were the supervision of Madrasah schools (Section 
11), recognition of the use of Arabic as a medium of instruction in Madrasahs and 
other Islamic institutions (Section 12), recognition of existing Madrasah and Madaris 
Ulya as parts of the regional educational subsystem (Section 13); and the required 
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qualifications for Madrasah teachers in order to gain permanent appointments to the 
regional educational subsystem, and their compensation (Section 14).14
 
MAINSTREAMING MADRASAH
Mainstreaming madrasah was initially known by the term “integration”. Implemen-
tation of this policy began in 1982 during the government of President Ferdinand 
Marcos through the Letter of Instruction 1221, issued on March 31, 1982, which di-
rected various government offices such the Prime Minister, Members of the Cabinet, 
and the Minister of Education and Culture, “to optimize the development of the 
human resources of the nation, and to […] enhance the nation’s Islamic heritage” by 
pledging to undertake the following: 
1. Formulate and adopt a program for the development of the Madrasah 
schools, at least for the improvement of their teaching staff and instruc-
tional facilities, but priority must be given, wherever possible to their pro-
gressive integration as a sector in the national educational system, with 
enhanced curricula, to the end that their graduates join the mainstream 
of Philippine education, endowing them with the capability to contribute 
to the modernization of their communities within the framework of their 
Islamic faith;
2. Strengthen the development of programs in Islamic Studies in state institu-
tions of higher learning especially in Mindanao, including the accelerated 
strengthening of programs in Shariah law;
3. Establish and strengthen programs in the teaching and learning of the Ara-
bic language which is vital to educational programs in Mindanao, but also 
a valuable field of study and professional education in higher education as 
a required or optional subject, wherever appropriate15
   
However, no further development took place until ten years later in 1992, when 
recommendations regarding basic education for cultural communities were made by 
the National Congress on Education, to wit: 
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•	 The madrasahs. The regular madrasahs (those that offer elementary educa-
tion curriculum required by the DECS (Department of Education, Culture 
and Sports) should be recognized and classified as sectarian private schools; 
while special madrasahs (the truly religious schools) should be left alone;
•	 Provide government support to pupils/students of mission schools of vari-
ous religious denominations (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, etc.) accred-
ited by the DECS, which provide education for cultural communities in 
areas inaccessible at government schools.16
At the same Congress the Summary of Recommendations on Sectoral Targets 
regarding Madaris made the following recommendations:
•	 Integrate only the regular Madrasahs within the public school system. The 
special Madaris are better left alone;
•	 Inject some subjects in the curriculum of the Madrasahs to introduce na-
tional standards in these schools. However, such a step towards mainstream-
ing should be balanced by preservation of the Muslim cultural heritage. It 
would be better to upgrade the Madrasahs curricula and program standards 
rather than to integrate them within the public school system;
•	 Provide special teachers and instructional materials for the Madrasahs. 
Moreover, the curricula (sic) has to be especially designed to suit the needs 
of the pupils because the Muslim culture has not adequately prepared 
them for formal schooling;
•	 The establishment of a middle-of-the-road educational system: a relevant 
Madrasah which incorporates acceptable fundamental elements of the pub-
lic school for purposes of achieving national unity and maintaining peace 
and/or a flexible public school system which teaches concepts consistent 
with the Muslim culture;
•	 Redesigning the Madrasah curriculum for purposes of standardization;
•	 The use of vernacular as a medium of instruction;
•	 The revision of textbook and other learning materials to eliminate passages 
offensive to the Islamic faith and to include the appreciation of Muslim 
art, culture and history, as well as their translation to the vernacular;
•	 Look into the accredited Madâris and assist them so that they will be able to 
comply with the minimum standards set by DECS (Department of Educa-
tion, Culture and Sports). 17                  
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The policy on the integation of madrasah into the public school system was fi-
nally approved through the issuance of implementing guidelines detailed under the 
Department of Education Order no.51 s.2004, executed by its Secretary in August 
15, 2004. The main goal of this order was to establish a curriculum for both private 
and public schools in Muslim-dominated areas. Its aims were to establish a smooth 
transfer from public to private madrasah or vice-versa; to unify the long history of di-
chotomy among Muslims; and to promote Filpino national identity and at the same 
time preserve the Muslims’ cultural heritage.18
At the beginning of the 2005-2006 academic year the Department of Education 
also issued a complementary directive which outlined the operational guidelines for 
the implementation of the new program. There are now special courses for Muslim 
students in public schools in Muslim-dominated areas. Training programs have been 
provided for Muslim teachers to qualify to teach the new programs.19
One of the key ideas associated with integration was the establishment of a 
system of accreditation whereby a madrasah could avail itself of a modified curricu-
lum that incorporated the teaching of Islamic tenets and Muslim cultural heritage 
within the approved public school curriculum. As of 2005, however, out of 1561 ma-
drasahs in the country only 35 had taken up the accreditation scheme implemented 
by Department of Education-ARMM. The Republic Act No. 9054 also required the 
teaching of Arabic language and Islamic values, but this obligation has not been 
uniformly imposed.20
Nevertheless it is clear that positive steps towards the mainstreaming of madrasah 
curriculum have taken place. At the Conference and Workshop on the Unification 
of the Curriculum of Private Madrasahs in May 2002, some 400 madrasah operators 
in the ARMM area expressed their willingness to mainstream their curriculum to 
that of the national educational system.21 This represents a significant change of 
position since the 1980s when integrating Madrasahs was first discussed, when many 
madrasah operators refused to consider participating in a project which they viewed 
as being essentially unwanted interference on the part of the government. It was 
widely believed at the time that changing the curriculum would dilute the mean-
ing and substance of madrasah education and indeed its very identity as a religious 
school.
The objective of the new interpretation of mainstreaming is to allow the ma-
drasah to become fully-fledged educational institutions that offer regular courses 
like other public or private schools. The goal is to make madrasah education in the 
ARMM a component of the National Educational System through the following 
steps: unification of the curriculum of private madrasahs to include basic education 
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curricula as a major first step in the recognition and accreditation by the Depart-
ment of Education-ARMM and the central government; mandatory teaching of Ara-
bic Language and Islamic Values in the public schools as mandated by Republic Act 
No. 9054; strengthening the organizational and funding mechanisms to sustain the 
mainstreaming efforts of the private madrasahs and to provide sustained adequate 
financial support for the teaching of Arabic Language and Islamic Values in public 
schools; and switching or transferability from madrasah to public schools, and vice-
versa.22 
According to Monaros Boransing, Under-Secretary of the Department of Edu-
cation, the mainstreaming of the madrasah curriculum consists of two parts: an “en-
riched curriculum for the public schools for Filipino Muslims”, which essentially 
means that all subjects offered at public schools are adopted with the inclusion of 
Arabic Language and Islamic Values; and a “standard curriculum for private madaris”, 
which provides a unified curriculum for the madrasah in the Philippines. It offers 
three learning areas, namely: the Qur’an, Aqidah and Fiqh, Sirah and Hadith. These 
study programs will be integrated with the secular subjects offered in the public and 
private schools. These two curricula would also mean an increase in the number of 
class hours for Muslim students both in the private and public schools.23 
The implementation of these reforms was divided into three steps and by 2004 
was already underway. In December 2004, 40 ulama had begun preparing new text-
books and other instructional materials, teaching guides, and student workbooks 
from Grades 1 to 6 to be used in the new mainstreamed curriculum. Once finished 
the textbooks and other materials would be printed and copies distributed to the 
schools.24 The second stage of implementation focuses on training the madrasah 
teachers. The training design consists of two phases. Phase I involves training ma-
drasah teachers in the English language and teaching methodology. Phase II requires 
madrasah teachers to earn 18 units of education subjects on the completion of which 
they receive a degree in Education. This qualifies them to take the Licensure Exami-
nations for Teachers (LET). Once they pass these exams they are considered profes-
sional teachers.25 A third phase designed to sustain and institutionalize madrasah 
education is to provide for the offering of a major in Arabic language and Islamic 
Values in the Bachelor of Science in Elementary and Secondary Education.26
Another aspect of the implementation of mainstreaming at present are calls for 
the addition of some parts of a madrasah curriculum to the existing public school 
curriculum. This would appear to be a relatively easy process since it means simply 
selecting what subjects to add without disturbing the substance and content of the 
rest of the subjects or the philosophy and goals of the existing system. For example, 
87
Mainstreaming Madrasah Education in the Philippines:
Issues, Problems and Challenges
in the National Capital Region or Metro-Manila, 1752 Muslim pupils in 51 madrasah 
classes have been organized in various Muslim-populated communities in Grades 1 
and 2. The largest number of madrasah classes was found in Quezon City, with the 
following distribution: three classes with 93 pupils at the North Fairview Elementary 
Schools, nine classes with 291 pupils in Culiat Elementary Schools, three classes 
with 119 pupils at Commonwealth Elementary School, and two classes with 73 pu-
pils at Holy Spirit Elementary Schools.27 According to Department of Education 
records, 50 teachers are now teaching madrasah subjects in Quezon City, Manila, 
Taguig and Pateros, areas which have the highest numbers of Muslim students in 
Metro-Manila.28
To help fund the implementation of these reforms Congress agreed to propose 
appropriating P100 million pesos for the Islamic madrasah school system. According 
to Rep. Rolando Andayam, chair of the House Appropriation Committee, this item 
was included in the Department of Education’s proposed P119 billion budget for 
2006. The money would be used to develop, produce, and distribute textbooks and 
other instructional materials. It would also fund the training of madrasah teachers in 
the subjects of English, Arabic, and Islam, as well as to fund madrasahs outside the 
ARMM. In addition the ARMM budget for 2006 proposed P3.6 billion for its more 
than 600,000 students.29 In the end, however, Congress failed to approve a budget 
for 2006 and the 2005 budget was reenacted instead.30
Reaction to this program from the Muslim community has been largely posi-
tive. Muslim parents are happy that their children are being taught about Islam and 
Arabic language in the public schools. This means that children no longer have to 
attend weekend madrasah. Consequently, they have more time to spend with their 
families as well as time for relaxation. However children taking these programs do 
have to spend a longer time in schools since Arabic and Islamic classes are added to 
their regular schedules. It also means that the children have more subjects to study 
and need more hours to do their assignments. It is too early to determine whether 
this added load will have any adverse effect on the academic performance of the 
children. In his study of the integrated school experiences of selected schools in the 
ARMM Arsad points to a number of shortcomings:
The contributions and additive approaches introduced Islamic 
concepts and courses into the school curriculum. The contribu-
tion approach owes to the occasional feature of Muslim heroes and 
holidays in the school curriculum. The additive approach owes to 
the addition of Arabic language and Islamic Studies subjects to 
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the school curriculum without providing for meaningful curricu-
lum transformation. These have not had the expected impact be-
cause the Islamic subjects are, 1) limited to Arabic language and 
Islamic Studies which are both offered as discrete courses; and 2) 
the scope of both are not as extensive. Islamic Studies is a hybrid 
course of Islamic core subjects which need curricular restructur-
ing and development. Moreover, the subject-centered curriculum 
designs of both schools do not allow for meaningful integration 
across learning areas, even if opportunities arise. Because class 
scheduling is rigid, the additional subjects have lengthened school 
time, thus taxing students. 31     
Judging from the experience of these schools, integration – or “mainstrea-
ming”, as is the preferred term – would appear to require more work than what is 
currently being done. Arsad offers an alternative framework to the current model 
that involves a restructuring of educational foundations, aims, modes of integra-
tion, curriculum and instruction. According to Arsad the successful implementa-
tion of such a framework demands more comprehensive research, planning, prepa-
ration and the sustained involvement of both practitioners and stakeholders.32 
 
CONCLUSION
The problems facing madrasah education in the Philippines are an indication of the 
gap that remains between the government and the Muslim minority communities. 
While legal provisions exist for the protection, preservation and advancement of cul-
tural communities, these laws are more operational on paper than in real life. The 
desire of Muslims to develop their own educational institution stems from the fact 
that their cultural and religious traditions are not always reflected in the national 
system which is secular in orientation and is often seen and interpreted through 
the lenses of the majority culture. Can mainstreaming, as implemented at present, 
achieve this purpose?
In the Philippines many religious communities have been able to set up and 
develop their own schools under the approved public and private school curriculum. 
Muslims are moving in this direction as shown by the new schools that have emerged 
with the new integrated curriculum. The program of mainstreaming madrasah educa-
tion attempts to bridge the gap between secular education and the needs of Muslim 
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children to learn about their religion. On the other hand, some suspicions remain 
that mainstreaming is just another government ploy to manipulate, if not control, 
the “mental set” of young Muslims. This program of curriculum development be-
came more pronounced following the launching of the “War on Terror”, and it can 
hardly be denied that mainstreaming the madrasah system has been regarded as one 
of the solutions to the problem of terrorism in the Philippines. While great efforts 
are being made in the direction of education reform, an equivalent push to remedy 
injustices in the lives of the people is not as evident. This underlying imbalance in 
the search for a solution to the problem of terrorism may in fact work against the 
success of educational reform programs.
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CHAPTER SIX
SALAFI MADRASAHS AND ISLAMIC 
RADICALISM IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA
Noorhaidi Hasan
INTRODUCTION
One impact of the growing influence of the Middle East on the dynamics of In-donesian Islam can be seen from the proliferation of exclusive Islamic teaching 
centres (madrasahs) established by those who explicitly identify themselves as Salafis, 
literally meaning the followers of the pious forefathers, Salaf al-Salih. The presence 
of these madrasahs contributed a great deal to the establishment of the Laskar Ji-
had (Jihad Force), one of the three major Muslim paramilitary organizations which 
emerged in Indonesia in the aftermath of the collapse of the New Order regime in 
May 1998. Side-by-side with the Laskar Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam Force) 
and the Laskar Mujahidin (Holy Warriors Force), Laskar Jihad was active in taking 
to the streets to demand the comprehensive implementation of the Islamic shari’ah 
and conducting razzias (raids) on cafes, discotheques, casinos, brothels and other 
venues reputed to be dens of iniquity. In these actions members criticized the pre-
vailing political, social, and economic system as having failed to save the Indonesian 
Muslim ummah from the on-going multidimensional crisis. When bloody communal 
conflicts flared up in several provinces of Indonesia, they positioned themselves in 
the frontline in stating their determination to raise the banner of jihad. They asserted 
that jihad is necessary to assist Muslims to repel the attacks of Christian enemies. 
The Laskar Jihad emerged as the most prominent radical group in Indonesia at 
that time, and succeeded in mobilizing thousands of voluntary fighters prepared to 
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die on the ‘jihad battlefield’ in Ambon, the provincial capital of the Moluccas, and 
other trouble spots in Indonesia. During the mobilization process that started in 
January 2000 the Salafi madrasahs scattered in a dozen provinces in Indonesia played 
a crucial role. They served as recruitment pools through which aspiring mujahidin 
from the countryside were recruited. At the same time they constituted the main 
link in the chains of the network of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah Wal-
Jama’ah (FKAWJ), the umbrella organization of the Laskar Jihad, responsible for 
coordinating the dispatch of fighters. To provide the preconditions and motivation 
necessary to sustain the costs of action, they independently organized paramilitary 
training and religious lectures explaining the magnificence of jihad and God’s prom-
ise to bestow heaven upon those who die on the jihad battlefield.   
The efflorescence of the Salafi madrasahs is a relatively new phenomenon, de-
spite the fact that Indonesia has long been familiar with the Islamic education in-
stitution called madrasah. In Indonesia the term madrasah refers to Islamic primary 
and secondary schools that adopt a modern system of education in which Islamic 
subjects are taught alongside general subjects. The main aim of the madrasah is to 
produce graduates like those from modern-style ‘secular’ schools, called sekolah, but 
characterized by having a better understanding of Islam. There are more than 37,000 
madrasahs scattered all over Indonesia. Some of them belong to private Islamic or-
ganizations while others are under the control of the government, in this case, the 
Department of Religious Affairs.1 The madrasah is different from the pesantren, a term 
which refers to rural-based Islamic educational institutions which teach predomi-
nantly Islamic subjects using kitab kuning (classical Arabic books) with the main aim 
of producing religious leaders.2 This pesantren are overwhelmingly identified with 
the traditionalist Muslim organization the Nahdhatul Ulama. They have emerged 
as exemplary Islamic teaching centres in which the kyai, the traditional ‘ulama in 
Java, serves as the central figure.3 It should be noted, however, that some modernist 
Muslim organizations, including the Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad and Persis, have also 
developed their own pesantrens, whose prototype is closer to the madrasah.
Although the Salafi madrasahs display some similarities with the (traditional) 
pesantren, they appear to challenge all the aforementioned educational institutions, 
including the sekolah, madrasah and pesantren itself. The system they have adopted 
suggests a rejection of anything regarded as the corrupting influence of Western 
culture and, at the same time, a marked aversion to the traditional corpus of reli-
gious authority. Interestingly perhaps, they construct a particular system of hierarchy 
directly connected to the religious authorities in the Middle East and other parts of 
the Muslim world.
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Given their increasing significance this chapter discusses how the Salafi madras-
ahs have developed in Indonesia and what factors have contributed to their prolifera-
tion. Developments that have occurred both at the domestic and the transnational 
levels will be taken into account. In addition, this chapter will analyse the profile of 
the madrasahs which focuses on three aspects: their physical appearance, their cur-
riculum, and the background of their students. These three aspects will shed light on 
the distinctiveness of these madrasahs even compared with similar puritan madrasahs. 
The chapter concludes by examining the network of the madrasahs that place an ever-
increasing emphasis on their transnational linkages with the Middle East. 
EXPANSION OF THE SALAFIS
The history of the Salafi madrasahs in Indonesia can be traced back to the mid-1980s 
when the Salafi communities were visibly expanding and becoming more assertive. 
Signs of this expansion were first and foremost strikingly seen in the emergence 
of bearded males wearing long flowing robes (jalabiyya), turbans, and ankle-length 
trousers, as well as women wearing a form of enveloping black veil (niqab). Their 
main concern was the question of the purity of the faith, tawhid, which was to be ad-
dressed by the call for a return to strict religious practice and the subsequent moral 
integrity of individuals. A commitment to wear the jalabiyya by men and the niqab 
by women, for instance, was viewed as much more important than taking part in 
political activities. They believe that Muslim society must first be Islamized through 
a gradual evolutionary process that includes tarbiyah (education) and tasfiyyah (puri-
fication) before the implementation of the shari‘ah can be realized. As a strategy to 
reach this end, they are fervently committed to dakwah activities, participating in the 
erection of halqas and dauras.4
There is no doubt that the Salafi movement in Indonesia developed as a con-
sequence of the worldwide expansion of the contemporary Salafi da‘wa movement 
which had been influenced by the most puritanical sect of Islam, Wahhabism. This 
sect evolved from the reformist movement in the Arabian peninsula led by Mu-
hammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) in the eighteenth century. Wahhabism 
emerged roughly one century before what is generally known as Salafism - identical 
with the reformist, modernist ideas disseminated by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-
1898), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) 
- became prominent.5 It is no exaggeration to suggest that the contemporary Salafi 
movement is a form of reconstituted Wahhabism. This is indicated by the determi-
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nation of the proponents of the movement to introduce more systematically the 
ideas formulated by the three main classical references among the Wahhabis, namely 
Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Muhammad ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350), 
and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. The followers of the movement often refer 
to fatwas issued by contemporary Wahhabite authorities, such as ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Abd 
Allah bin Baz (d. 1999) and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999).6
The proliferation of the Salafi dakwah movement is inexorably associated with 
the rising influence of Saudi Arabia in the politics of the Muslim world. It gained 
enormous momentum at the beginning of the 1970s when the kingdom succeeded 
in gaining a crucial position in the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world 
in general as a result of the defeat of Muslim countries in the Arab-Israel War of 
1967.7 This position was reinforced by the explosion in world oil prices in the 1970s. 
Since then, Saudi Arabia has launched an ambitious global campaign for the Wah-
habization of the umma.8 The Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami set up in 1962 is the organi-
zation responsible for this campaign, functioning as the main philanthropic agent in 
the liberal distribution of money to Islamic organizations all over the world.9 
Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical influence in the Muslim world faced a serious chal-
lenge when the Iranian Revolution erupted in 1979 and brought Ayatollah Kho-
meini to power. The Saudi kingdom was haunted by speculation that a similar revo-
lution could possibly wipe out its own monarchical regime. This anxiety was to some 
extent justified when the kingdom witnessed the seizure of the Grand Mosque of 
Mecca by a group of people led by Juhayman al-‘Utaiby in November 1979, which 
was followed by a series of Shi‘ite demonstrations.10 The challenge posed by the 
Iranian Revolution became more apparent when Khomeini proposed that Mecca 
and Medina be granted international status.11 Saudi Arabia tried hard to limit the 
devastating effects of the revolution. At the domestic level it sought to prove its 
commitment to Islam by imposing a stricter enforcement of religious laws. At the 
international level it intensified the spread of Wahhabism, whose doctrines contain 
anti-Shi‘ite sentiments.12
Saudi Arabian influence has come to Indonesia mainly through the Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propaga-
tion), a dakwah organization set up in 1967 by Muhammad Natsir and other former 
leaders of the Masyumi, the first and largest Islamic political party in Indonesia at 
the time. Masyumi had been banned by Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno, in 
1960. As the official representative of the Rabitat the DDII enjoyed Saudi support 
for the expansion of dakwah activities, including the construction of new mosques, 
the founding of madrasahs, distribution of free copies of the Qur’an and religious 
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texts, training of preachers, and similar works. These activities in turn contributed 
to the spread of the spirit of Islamic resurgence. The impact of the intensification of 
Islamic revitalization campaign launched by the DDII was felt most significantly on 
university campuses, which witnessed an increase in students’ readiness to observe 
Islamic obligations.
Profoundly disquieted by the widespread impact of the Iranian Revolution, 
Saudi Arabia attempted to expand its Wahhabi influence in Indonesia by build-
ing on the foundations that had been created by the DDII. The kingdom provided 
support for the setting up the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab 
(LIPIA, Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies) in Jakarta in 1980. This institute 
was initially established as the Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (LPBA, Institute 
of Arabic Teaching), and concentrated on developing the teaching of Arabic. LIPIA 
has succeeded in producing hundreds of graduates who have been able to continue 
their studies in Saudi Arabia.
The appeal for volunteers to wage jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghani-
stan represented the first serious challenge to the foreign students studying in Saudi 
Arabia on grants provided by the kingdom. They were required to prove their com-
mitment to Islam. It is not surprising that after finishing their studies many such 
students decided to take part in the Afghan War. The same holds true for students 
from Indonesia. Some of them preferred not to return to Indonesia directly but 
spend some time in Afghanistan. Participating in the jihad there turned out to be a 
form of fieldwork for them. On the Afghan battlefields they stood shoulder-to-shoul-
der with voluntary fighters from various radical organizations from throughout the 
Muslim world, who found in the Afghan War an arena in which they could channel 
their radical spirit to defend Islam.
THE GROWTH OF THE SALAFI MADRASAHS
The return of LIPIA graduates who had completed their studies in Saudi Arabia and 
who had undergone their baptism of fire in the Afghan War marked the birth of a 
new Wahhabi generation in Indonesia. Among them we can note some remarkable 
names, such as Chamsaha Sofwan or Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin, and Aunur 
Rafiq Ghufron. Given their background it would not be appropriate to characterize 
them as “lumpenintelligentsia”, the term introduced by Oliver Roy in imitation of 
Karl Marx to describe a new generation of poorly educated militants who lack the 
competence to speak of Islam as a political project.13 In fact, these graduates are well 
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educated, enjoy a certain status as preachers and are able to produce a proper dis-
course. They are products of DDII which nurtures the ambition to mould religious 
authorities who are capable of speaking Arabic and reading classical and modern 
Arabic texts. But in contrast to traditional ‘ulama they adopt rigidly puritan views. As 
DDII cadres they are certainly well-acquainted with the Islamist discourses of mod-
ern political Islamic movements. Nevertheless, these fresh graduates can be clearly 
distinguished from their predecessors, DDII cadres who also had the opportunity to 
complete their studies in Saudi Arabia or other Middle Eastern countries, in terms 
of their commitment to the spread of Wahhabism. 
The tendency which developed in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the seizure 
of the Grand Mosque undoubtedly contributed to the birth of this new Wahhabi 
generation. The policy of the Saudi Arabian government to more clearly demon-
strate its commitment to Islam while suppressing radical expressions of political 
Islam, became the catalyst for a widespread Wahhabi resurgence, particularly among 
the youth, university students, and university staff. This phenomenon has been vi-
sible in their enthusiasm to demonstrate a commitment to religious propagation and 
a puritanical life-style while refraining from openly criticizing the government.14 
The Salafi da‘wa movement in Indonesia developed on university campuses. 
Since the early 1990s this movement has gained a new impetus with the arrival of 
other Middle Eastern graduates and Afghan War veterans, including Ja’far Umar 
Thalib, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Yusuf Usman Baisa, Muhammad Yusuf Harun, 
Ahmad Zawawi, and M. Zaitun Rasmin. Their attempts to promote Salafi da’wa 
activities gave rise to Salafi communities in various cities in Indonesia. The prolif-
eration of these communities gave birth to Salafi foundations, such as As-Sunnah, 
Ihyaut Turath, al-Sofwah, Lajnah al-Khairiyyah, Lajnah al-Istiqamah, and Wahdah 
Islamiyyah. The increasing attention paid by funding agencies in Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf countries to supporting the Salafi dakwah activities following the Gulf 
War in 1990 significantly facilitated this development.
Congruent with the efflorescence of the Salafi foundations Salafi madrasahs 
have emerged in various provinces in Indonesia. The oldest Salafi madrasah is the 
Ihyaus Sunnah, established in Yogyakarta in 1994. The founding of this madrasah 
was soon followed by al-Turats al-Islami, which was established in the same city in 
1995. From 1995 to 2000 a dozen other madrasahs emerged, including al-Madinah 
and Imam al-Bukhari in Solo, Minhajus Sunnah in Magelang, Lu’lu wa’l-Marjan 
in Semarang, As-Sunnah in Cirebon and Makassar, al-Athariyah in Temengung, 
Ittiba‘us Sunna in Sukoharjo and Magetan, Al-Salafy in Jember, Ta‘zimus Sunna in 
Ngawi, al-Bayyinah in Gresik, al-Furqan in Cilacap and Pekanbaru, and Ibn Qayyim 
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in Balikpapan. Various other madrasahs have emerged very recently indeed, includ-
ing Bin Baz, al-Ansar, and Difa‘ ‘Anis Sunnah in Yogyakarta and Ibn Taymiyyah in 
Solo.15 
Nevertheless, the rapid development of the Salafi dakwah movement, of which 
the efflorescence of these madrasahs is indisputable evidence, was accompanied by 
disputes among its proponents, the main bone of contention being financial sup-
port from the Middle East. A major division emerged between Abu Nida and Ja’far 
Umar Thalib. The background to this conflict was the Sururiyya issue incited by 
Ja’far Umar Thalib, who accused Abu Nida and like-minded people of being sym-
pathizers of Muhammad ibn Surur bin Nayef Zain al-‘Abidin. He was critical of the 
Saudi Arabian government and its religious establishment following the kingdom’s 
approval to have US troops stationed on its territory to guard the kingdom from the 
apparently imminent invasion by Saddam Hussein. The upshot was that a split de-
veloped among the Indonesian Salafis between the Sururis and the non-Sururis.16 
MADRASAHS AS ‘ENCLAVES’
The conflict among the Indonesian Salafis is outwardly manifested in differences in 
the physical appearance of the madrasahs. The Bin Baz, for instance, looks prosper-
ous and is relatively large with a number of permanent building units consisting 
of study rooms, musalla, office, dormitory, and teachers’ houses. As demonstrated 
by the inscriptions on their walls, these buildings exist thanks to donations given 
by some personalities in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
This madrasah is built on 1 ha. area in Piyungan, Bantul, around 25 kilometres 
to the south of Yogyakarta, on land donated by Sultan Hamengkubowono of the 
Yogyakarta Court. In this madrasah there are 9 teachers responsible for around 300 
(male and female) students divided into three levels, kindergarten, primary, and 
secondary. The majority of them board in a dormitory in which there is a strict 
separation between males and females.17
The Bin Baz madrasah shares many similarities with the Imam al-Bukhari. This 
madrasah looks even better and larger than the Bin Baz. It is built on a roughly 2 
ha. area with a dozen permanent building units, consisting of study rooms, office, 
library, dormitory, teachers’ houses, and a two-floor mosque in the front. Like in the 
Bin Baz every building unit bears and inscription on its wall declaring the main do-
nor who financed its construction. These donors are also from Saudi Arabia and Ku-
wait. The location of this madrasah is in Selokaton, Surakarta, 15 kilometres to the 
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east of Solo, on the main road from Solo to Purwodadi. There are 400 students who 
study at three different levels, kindergarten, primary, and secondary. The number of 
male students is four times that of female students. All of them board in the dormi-
tory which also maintains a partition between males and females. They are taught by 
19 teachers, all of whom live in the teachers’ houses provided by the madrasah.18 
The situation in these two madrasahs is strikingly different from the other madras-
ahs mentioned above. The Ihyaus Sunnah, for instance, appeared to be unadorned 
and poor. This madrasah is located in Degolan, Kaliurang, around 16 kilometres to 
the north of Yogyakarta. It is built on no more than 300 square metres site rented 
for a period of 10 years with a modest mosque as its centre. Around 100 metres from 
this mosque there are two cramped – around 100 square metres – dormitories whose 
walls are made of bamboo and which have dirt floors covered with mats and plastic. 
This madrasah has some 70 students whose ages range from 7 to 17 years old. Some 
of them are ‘day’ students who have lodgings in nearby villages. They are taught by 4 
teachers renting modest houses in the surrounding area. There is no classical system 
as in the Bin Baz and the Imam al-Bukhari. The students are divided into three 
groups in accordance with the difference in their ages.19
A similar situation can be found in the Minhajus Sunnah which is located in 
Magelang. This madrasah has 120 students whose ages range from 7 to 17 years old. 
They occupy an extremely limited space in corners of a modest mosque built on rice-
farming land. All teaching activities take place in the mosque. Around 100 metres 
from the mosque there are a few teachers’ houses and a small office. A radio station 
regularly broadcasts religious sermons of the madrasah ustadhs for a few hours in the 
afternoon. The same conditions are apparent in the al-Madinah, located in a village 
in Boyolali, around 20 kilometres from Solo. Although this madrasah has more than 
100 students, its facilities are extremely limited. A small, modest mosque serves as 
the centre of its activities as well as the dormitory of a dozen of its students, who 
are not accommodated in a small, unfinished dormitory located near the mosque. 
The conditions of the As-Sunnah are even worse. It is located at Baji Rupa, Makas-
sar. A small, modest mosque functions as the centre of all activities with three small 
wooden houses acting as dormitories for its students. This madrasah has almost 50 
students, including the students from the surrounding villages. They are taught by 
4 teachers.20
Although these madrasahs are generally located in areas of settlement, they have 
emerged as exclusive enclaves that draw a firm distinction with the more permissive, 
open society around them. Because of their reputation for exclusiveness surroun-
ding villagers often view them as somewhat strange and unfriendly, and cynically 
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refer to them as “pondok orang berjubah” (jalabiyya-wearing Salafi madrasah). These 
madrasahs do indeed appear to be separate, independent villages that exist within 
real villages. Teachers, students and other members of the madrasahs are bound 
together in the form of tight-knit communities restricting contacts with outsiders. 
Except for certain important reasons the students will not be allowed to have contact 
with the surrounding people. They tend to be suspicious to outsiders. Their life is 
monotonous. The main components of their activities consist of praying, studying 
and memorizing the Qur’an. Students are subject to certain controls over their bo-
dies. They are forced to conform to a homogenous norm.
The recent contribution of Almond, Appleby, and Sivan (2003) demonstrates 
that the spirit of enclave constitutes the core of contemporary Christian, Islamic, 
and Jewish fundamentalist movements. It is ‘the primary impulse that lies behind 
the rise of the tradition so as to forestall the danger of being sucked into the vortex 
of modernity’.21 In what they refer to as ‘enclave culture’, fundamentalists usually 
construct a ‘wall of virtue’ based on moral values. This wall separates the saved, free, 
and morally superior enclave from the hitherto tempting central community. The 
enclave places the oppressive and morally defiled outside society in sharp contrast 
to the community of virtuous insiders. In contrast to the inside anything outside is 
black. It is conceived as a polluted, contagious, and dangerous area.22  The enclave 
is a separate space in which behaviour, language and dress codes are strictly regu-
lated. Such strictness is required to maintain internal order because of the gravity 
posed by the outside danger.23 Here lies the importance of authority as a guide to 
the behaviour of individual members. The specific patterns of behaviour, language 
and dress serve as distinguishing marks from the outside world. In the language of a 
Salafi ustadh, the pattern of behaviour, language, and dress is a question of identity 
that cannot be negotiated:
Whether someone is a true believer or not can be seen from his 
behaviour, language, and dress. A faithful Muslim must behave 
like the Salaf al-Salih, speak with the language of the Quran and 
the Sunna, and wear Islamic dress such as jalabiyya, in order to 
distinguish himself from infidels. Man tashabbaha bi qawm fa 
huwa minhum [Whoever resembles a [infidel] group, he belongs 
to that group].24
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METHOD OF INSTRUCTION AND CURRICULUM
In these madrasahs students study various subjects of Islam. The system of instruc-
tion is conventional in nature except in the case of the madrasahs implementing the 
class system. Every morning around 8 o’clock ustadhs come to the mosque and take 
different positions. The most senior ustadh usually takes a position at the centre of 
the mosque with the other ustadhs in its wings. Groups of students sit around them 
looking at the Arabic books in their own hands while listening to their ustadhs. 
The ustadhs read the books and explain the meaning of each sentence while giv-
ing illustrations and examples. Sometimes they use small blackboards to make their 
explanations clearer. Some students make notes on their books while others only 
listen.25 In the case of the teaching of Arabic the students are drilled repeatedly to 
imitate as fluently as possible the examples of the sentence given by their ustadhs. 
Opportunities to raise questions are given to the students after the ustadhs finish 
their lessons. This activity lasts until the noon prayer. Between the noon prayer and 
the afternoon prayer, students have lunch and then take a rest. After the afternoon 
prayer, they come back to undertake the same activity. This afternoon activity ends 
around one hour before the sunset prayer at 6 o’clock. Between the sunset prayer 
and the evening prayer at 7 p.m. the students read and memorize some parts of the 
Qur’an, prescribed by their ustadhs.
Islamic Theology (‘Aqidah), or more precisely Wahhabite doctrine, is the main 
subject studied in these madrasahs. For this subject students read such works as Al-
Qaul al-Mufid fi Adillat al-Tawhid, which is the summary of the Kitab al-Tawhid by 
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. In some of the madrasahs students are obliged to 
memorize this text by heart as a precondition before continuing on to study other 
books. Having completed this book they are usually required to study the Kitab 
al-Tawhid or its annotated commentaries such as Al Qaul al-Shadid ‘Ala Kitab al-
Tawhid by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Su’udi. Subsequently they should study al-Usul al-
Thalatha by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab before reading al-Aqida al-Wasitiyya 
by Taqiy al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya or its annotated commentary, Sharh al-‘Aqida 
al-Wasitiyya by Salih ibn Fauzan Ali Fauzan. Having mastered these primary books 
students are recommended to read other books, including Nabza fi al-‘Aqida by 
Muhammad bin Salih al-’Uthaimin, Sharh al-‘Aqida al-‘ahawiyya al-Muyassar by Mu-
hammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Khamis, and Kitab al-Firqat al-Najiyat by Muham-
mad bin Jamil Zainu.26
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Given the fact that all these books are in Arabic students are first required to 
study Arabic language. Various aspects of Arabic are taught separately including 
Nahw (Basic Grammar), Sarf (Morphology), Mutala’a (Reading), Imla’ (Writing), Mu-
hadatha (Conversation), and Balagha (Rhetoric). For this subject, they use popular 
books in the traditional pesantren, including, al-Nahw al-Wadih, al-Amthila al-Tasrifiyya, 
Qawa‘id al-Sharf, and al-Balagha al-Wadiha. In addition to these they make use of 
al-‘Arabiyya li al-Nashi’in, a new, comprehensive book of Arabic distributed free of 
charge to various Islamic educational institutions by Saudi Arabian embassies.27
The understanding of the Wahhabite doctrine provides the foundation for the 
students to study other subjects including Qur’anic Exegesis, the Prophetic Tradi-
tions, Islamic Legal Theory, Islamic Jurisprudence, and Dakwah Method. For Qu-
ranic Exegesis they read, among other things, Usul al-Tafsir by Muhammad bin Salih 
al-‘Uthaimin and Aysir al-Tafasir li Kalam al-‘Ali al-Kabir by Abu Bakar Jabir al-Jazairi. 
For the Prophetic Traditions they study al-Arba‘in al-Nawawiyya by Imam al-Nawawi 
or its commentary, al-Arba‘in al-Nawawiyya by Salih al-Shaykh, as well as Muzakkirat 
al-Hadith al-Nabawi by Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, and Darurat al-Ihtimam bi Sunan 
al-Nabawiyyah by Abd al-Salam Abi Barjis Ibn Nasir Abd al-Karim. For Islamic Legal 
Theory the required reading materials include al-Usul al-Fiqh and al-Usul min ‘Ilm al-
Usul by Muhammad bin Salih al-’Uthaimin and al-Waraqat fi Usul al-Fiqh by ‘Abd al-
Malik ibn Juwaini. This subject is taught to support another related subject, namely, 
Islamic Jurisprudence, in which Taysir al-Fiqh by Salih bin Ghanim al-Sadlan, Minhaj 
al-Muslim by Abu Bakr Jabir al-Jazairi, and al-Mulakhkhas al-Fiqhiy by Salih bin Fau-
zan al-Fauzan are the main required reading. For Da‘wa Method the students read 
Dakwah al-Du‘at by Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyya and Al-Da‘watu ila Allah by Ali Hasan 
al-Halaby al-Atsari.
Some of the madrasahs offer special programmes for university students, called 
Tadrib al-Du‘at (training for preachers) and Tarbiyat al-Nisa (education for women). 
These programmes last for a certain period of time, ranging from three months 
to one year. The Tadrib al-Du‘at is designed to produce preachers ready to conduct 
dakwah activities. The subjects taught consist of Islamic Theology, Qur’anic Exegesis, 
the Prophet’s Traditions, Islamic History, Islamic Law, Ethics, and Arabic. The Tar-
biyat al-Nisa is addressed to women and is aimed at forming their personality accord-
ing to the Wahhabite doctrines. In this programme the participants study Islamic 
Theology and Islamic Jurisprudence besides receiving instructions on behaviour, 
fashion, gender relations, and the methods of taking care of husbands and children. 
The materials used are selected from the books required in the aforementioned 
regular programmes.
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ABANGAN CONVERTS
Under the pressures of the poor conditions and a heavy curriculum the students of 
the Salafi madrasahs never seem to lose courage or become drained of their enthusi-
asm to study Islam. They feel that this is part of the struggle that should be endured by 
a Muslim to uphold the dignity of Islam. When asked about their hopes a dispropor-
tionate number want to become Muslim preachers committed to dakwah activities. 
It is of interest here to uncover the puzzle of who they are. From my observations it 
is apparent that they generally come from poor families in the countryside who live 
on low incomes. These include petty merchants, artisans, unskilled workers, factory 
labourers, peasants, and agricultural labourers. They come originally from abangan 
families who have converted to become ‘true Muslims’. Abangan is a term introduced 
by the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1960) to refer to nominal Muslims 
in Java compatible with local customs influenced by Animism, Hinduism and Bud-
dhism. They are contrasted with santri, or the more ‘puritan’ Muslims committed 
to a more or less normative profession of the faith. In Geertz’s analysis the main 
conflict between these two groups is rooted in the santris’ determination to repudiate 
abangan practices which revolve around communal feasts called slametan.28
The interest of abangan people in Islam has developed apace with the intensi-
fication of dakwah activities pioneered by DDII and other Muslim organizations in 
the last three decades. For the abangan coming to knowledge of (orthodox) Islam 
relatively late brings its own consequences. They become directly acquainted with 
a strict, orthodox Islam intermingled with militancy. The zeal of the Islamic resur-
gence in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and the counter-reaction to it by 
the Saudi Arabian government has undoubtedly imparted a striking flavour to this 
form of Islam. Although it offers only two choices, black and white, this form of 
Islam has awakened a certain recognition among some of the discontented abangan. 
It has seemingly offered an appropriate channel for them to find a new anchor in 
their social life, which had been shaken by an accelerated process of modernization 
taking place in villages.
Having become acquainted with orthodox Islam the abangan are urged to trans-
form themselves quickly into true Muslims. The willingness to do so is reflected in 
their spirit of dedication to study various aspects of Islam by participating in the 
halqas and dauras. Even when faced with great difficulties they always appear enthu-
siastic in their studies to recite the Qur’an, and perform the ablutions (wudu’) and 
prayers (salat) properly. Those who can already recite the Qur’an still feel it neces-
sary to be able to recite it better. They are ashamed when they realize their failure 
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to pronounce some letters of the Arabic alphabet, such as ‘ain, correctly (among the 
Javanese ‘ain is usually pronounced as ngain). To polish their pronunciation, they 
are eager to listen to cassettes of Qur’anic recitation (murattal) by well-known reciters 
from Saudi Arabia. 
The next step is to adopt Arab-style dress and let their beards grow long. This 
is usually accompanied by a commitment to distancing themselves from their previ-
ous relationships and environment. By doing so they feel they can more readily as-
sert their claim to be true Muslims. Subsequently these people usually replace their 
abangan names with Arabic (Islamic) names. Javanese names like Sutarto, Hartono, 
Raharjo, Suryanto, Sumarjono and Wardoyo are substituted with names like Ah-
mad Haris, Muhammad Chalid, Hamzah, Ibn Usman, and Ibn Rasyid. Those who 
have children simply adopt their children’s Arabic name and insert Abu before it, 
becoming Abu Khalid, Abu Ahmad, Abu Mash’ab, and Abu Sulaiman. This process 
of disassociation from tradition occurs quickly.  
These abangan converts send their children or other family members to the 
Salafi madrasahs. They believe that the mistakes committed by their parents of letting 
their children live in the darkness of jahiliyya (ie. abangan) culture must not be re-
peated. Through the process of education in the madrasahs it is hoped these children 
will become committed Salafis who are generally more fluent in reciting the Qur’an 
and have a deeper understanding of Islam than their parents.
YEMEN AS A MODEL
The Salafi madrasahs in Indonesia take the Islamic teaching centres attached to Mu-
qbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, one of the most outstanding Salafi authorities in Yemen, 
as their model. The ustadhs of these madrasahs are indeed mostly graduates of those 
Islamic teaching centres. Otherwise they are graduates of Saudi Arabian universities 
or Islamic teaching centres controlled by the Saudi religious authorities, notably 
Muhammad bin Salih al-‘Uthaimin. The relation of these ustadhs with their Middle 
Eastern mentors is relatively close and sustained. They maintain contact through 
correspondence, telephone, and fax machines particularly when they feel a need to 
raise a question or request fatwas to deal with certain delicate problems. This close 
relation often yields opportunities offered by their mentors to send their best stu-
dents to study directly in the Middle East.
Muqbil began receiving recognition as a leading Salafi authority in the early 
1980s in response to his efforts to spread the Salafi dakwah movement in Yemen. His 
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knowledge of Wahhabism was forged by his experience of studying in Saudi Arabia 
for almost two decades. Initially he studied at an Islamic teaching centre in Najran, 
Mecca, run by Muhammad bin Salih al-‘Uthaimin, before seizing an opportunity 
to enroll at the Medina Islamic University. During this period of study he had the 
opportunity to attend the halqas of some prominent Salafi authorities, such as ‘Abd 
al-‘Aziz ‘Abd Allah bin Baz and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani. Following an 
accusation of his involvement in the Juhayman al-‘Utaiby-led attack on the Grand 
Mosque of Mecca, he was arrested. After languishing in a Saudi prison for several 
months he was expelled to his native land.29
Back in Yemen Muqbil began to spread Wahhabism by first establishing the 
Madrasah Dar al-Hadith al-Khayriyya in Dammaj, his native tribal region east of 
Sa‘da. In his efforts to spread Wahhabism various challenges arose, particularly from 
the foes of the Wahhabis, namely, the Shafi’is, Isma’ilis, and Zaydis who have tra-
ditionally dominated Sa‘da. They did not want the doctrines taught by Muqbil to 
prevail and usurp their dominant position. In fact, he had felt the bitterness of the 
challenges posed by his foes, particularly the Zaydi sayyids, even before his departure 
to Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, he survived his detractors because of the support of 
his tribal fellows, the Wadi‘is. He even succeeded in developing his teaching centre 
into one of the most exemplary teaching centres for Salafis all over the world. Tens 
of thousands of students have studied with him, a significant number of whom 
have come from outside Yemen from such diverse places as Algeria, Libya, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Indonesia, as well as Belgium, the United States 
and the United Kingdom.30  
Muqbil’s relations with Saudi Arabia appeared complicated but at the same 
time dynamic. Time spent in a Saudi prison in 1979 was certainly an unforgettable 
nightmare for him. It was said that he had often made harsh criticisms of the Saudi 
Arabian royal family, and once even considered this regime to have been trapped 
into “infidelity”. His concern for spreading Wahhabism, however, brought him close 
to Saudi Arabia. The Holy Mosque Establishment, a charitable organization spon-
sored by the Saudi Arabian government, has officially supported all institutions of 
learning associated with him, including the Damaj centre, the Ma‘abir Centre, the 
Ma‘rib Centre, the al-Hudaida Centre, and al-Khair Mosque.31
In many cases Muqbil adopted a position in favour of Saudi government poli-
cies. He was persistent, for instance, in criticizing the Iranian Revolution, for which 
purpose he wrote a book entitled al-Ilhad al-Khomeini fi Ard al-Haramayn (‘The Impu-
dence of Khomeini on the Earth of the Two Holy Sanctuaries’). Similarly, during the 
civil war in 1994 he mobilized his followers to be active on the battlefronts against 
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the Maxist-Leninist forces. This engagement made his name known on the politi-
cal scene in Yemen. Even when the battle was over his engagement on the Yemeni 
political scene did not lessen. He was involved in cooperation with the al-Islah party, 
which had a mission to break down the remaining powers of the Marxist regime in 
the former South Yemen.32 It must be noted that the Islah party was highly active in 
providing an umbrella for Afghan war veterans.33
Furthermore, Muqbil reinforced his relations with Saudi Arabia by giving Bin 
Baz support and defending him from the attacks of Muhammad ibn Surur al-Nayef 
Zayn al-‘Abidin and like-minded people who condemned his fatwas legitimizing the 
arrival of US troops in the kingdom. Muqbil even inveighed against Muhammad ibn 
Surur, whom he accused of practising takfir. Muslims are required to excommunicate 
any sovereign considered apostate, resorting to violence if necessary. Muqbil’s effort 
to support Bin Baz interlocked him with Bin Baz defenders in Saudi Arabia, includ-
ing Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Muhammad bin Salih al-‘Uthaimin, Rabi’ 
Ibn Hadi al-Madkhali and Zaid Muhammad ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. These figures 
are important Saudi Salafi authorities with whom the ustadhs of the Salafi madrasahs 
have also established linkages.
REPERCUSSIONS OF THE AFGHAN WAR
 
The central position of Yemen in the growth of the Salafi madrasahs in Indonesia is 
undoubtedly related to the Afghan War. This war enabled mujahidin across the world 
to get to know each other and exchange information and experiences in an environ-
ment based on the ethos of jihad. Networks were thereby formed and relations were 
established. Salafis scattered around the world, for instance, were integrated because 
of this war. They became acquainted with the centres of Salafi dakwah movement or 
Salafi Islamic teaching centres which existed in other parts of the Muslim world.
One of the factions of Afghan mujahidin which became the main destination 
of Salafis from all over the world was the Jama‘at al-Da‘wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl al-
Hadith. It was a strict Salafi faction and Saudi Arabian ‘principality’ led by Jamil 
al-Rahman. This faction had special relations with the Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith, a 
reformist movement founded in the Indian Sub-continent in the nineteenth century 
which has many similarities with Wahhabism, particularly in terms of its rejection of 
traditional practices, such as visiting the Prophet’s grave.34 Jamil al-Rahman himself 
is a graduate of a religious school of Ahl al-Hadith in Panjpir sponsored by Saudi 
Arabia. Before establishing this faction he had joined Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami.35
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The Jama‘at al-Da‘wa set up its base in Kunar, an isolated province beyond the 
control of the central authorities. Because of its closeness with Wahhabism many 
jihad volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen preferred to join this fac-
tion. With the support of private sources in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, it evolved 
into a strong faction which was able to seize control of Kunar and establish a Shura 
Council there. Surprisingly, perhaps, it applied the takfir doctrine. Afghans who 
lived in the areas controlled by the government were treated as infidels who were 
subject to the rules of futuhat (conquest), including killing men who resisted and 
taking women and children as prisoners.36
The Jama‘at al-Da‘wa has developed more hostile attitudes towards non-Mus-
lims and the West than any other faction, considering them the enemies of Islam. 
Fighters in this faction have frequently attacked journalists and humanitarian work-
ers, accused them of being agents of the West. But the engagement of this faction on 
the political scene of Afghanistan ended with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, 
following which it retreated from the political quarrel for power. Jamil al-Rahman 
himself then became the target of assassination by his rivals. The faction’s veterans 
devoted their time to conducting what they believed to be dakwah activities. Resort-
ing to iconoclasm they destroyed statues and monuments and attacked local reli-
gious practices considered an anathema to Islam.37
It is likely that the linkage between Indonesian Salafis and Muqbil’s students 
began to develop during the war when they met in the Jama‘at al-Da‘wa faction. 
Indeed, proponents of the Salafi dakwah movement in Indonesia generally claim 
to have joined this faction during their engagement in the war. The importance of 
this faction among them is indicated by the fact that some of the mosques they built 
upon their return to Indonesia have been named Jamil al-Rahman. But this relation-
ship was not reinforced until Ja’far Umar Thalib, a young figure of Hadrami descent, 
decided to leave for Yemen to study directly under Muqbil only one year after his 
return to Indonesia. His decision to study there to some extent revitalized the classi-
cal linkage between Indonesia and Yemen. This decision brought him to a country 
which has long been a source of inspiration for the Indonesian Hadramis. As a di-
asporic community the Hadramis consistently retain some cultural attachment with 
their country of origin. It should be noted that Hadrami immigrants, who began to 
wend their way to the archipelago in the fifteenth century, were partially responsible 
for the development of Islam in Indonesia.38 Yet, their role significantly decreased 
during the twentieth century in the wake of the emergence of indigenous religious 
authorities who had no connection with the Hadramaut. The main success of Ja’far 
as the first Indonesian student of Muqbil was to initiate the cooperation which has 
enabled hundreds of Indonesian Salafis to study there.
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One may question why Ja’far Umar Thalib did not choose to go to Southern 
Yemen, where the majority of Indonesian Hadramis originated. His decision appar-
ently had to do with the changes taking place on the religious map of the Muslim 
world as a consequence of the Saudi Arabian campaign for the Wahhabization of 
the ummah. Because of this campaign, new centres of Islamic reform have sprung up 
with special linkages with Saudi Arabia. One such example was Northern Yemen, 
particularly the area around Dammaj, which emerged as one of the major sites for 
Salafi teaching centres with Muqbil as their central figure. To establish contact with 
Northern Yemen, therefore, means to create a strategic linkage with Saudi Arabia. 
 
CONCLUSION
The growth of the Salafi madrasahs in Indonesia stagnated in the aftermath of the 
11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. Various factors contributed to this 
stagnation. Since the United States’ declaration of its “war on terror” the stream 
of Indonesian students travelling to Yemen has practically dried up. Hundreds of 
students who were still living there at the time the attacks occurred were forced to re-
turn home. Like students from other countries, those who remained were hounded 
by the Yemeni police and intelligence agents on the grounds of suspected linkages 
with Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network. Many were subjected to interroga-
tion and arrest. The campaign against terrorism also created problems for the Salafi 
madrasahs in Indonesia. They also became targets of suspicion by the Indonesian 
police and intelligence forces, as well as the national media. Some of their ustadhs 
claimed to have been interrogated by security agents in the months following Sep-
tember 11. When the world’s attention was directed towards Indonesia in the after-
math of the Bali bombing on October 2002, the Laskar Jihad, which became the 
node of the Salafi madrasahs, was suddenly disbanded. This disbandment paralysed 
the activities of some of the madrasahs. The Ihyaus Sunnah, for instance, was forced 
to close down. More importantly, perhaps, the changed international situation exac-
erbated a serious fragmentation among these madrasahs and within the Indonesian 
Salafi movement generally.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
COLONIAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE 
RESHAPING OF ISLAM, THE MUSLIM AND 
ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN MALAYSIA
Shamsul A. B.
Azmi Aziz
Besides Islam the Southeast Asian region is heir to Hindu and Buddhist tradi-tions as well as to three European colonial systems of government and admin-
istration: British, Dutch and French. It is evident that Islam has not escaped the 
influence of the others. Indeed, in some aspects of life Islam has been considerably 
reformulated by them as a result of having had to embed itself in a pre-Islamic meta-
physical milieu and to undergo a process of reshaping by the rational-scientific logic 
of the European technology of rule. It follows, therefore, that in order to understand 
the state of contemporary Islam, Muslims and Islamic studies in Southeast Asia one 
must begin with materials and data from the region, rather than with some middle-
Eastern and theological formulation of Islam – while at the same time not denying 
that Islam is a universalistic theology originating in the Arabic Middle East. 
The aim of this chapter is to present the Malaysian case, based on the assump-
tion that of all the past influences that have influenced Islam, Muslims and Islamic 
education in Malaysia it is British colonialism that has had the greatest impact. In-
deed, its effects have lasted well into the postcolonial era. It is therefore necessary to 
explore the role of colonial knowledge in reshaping Islamic education both during 
and after the colonial period. However in order to establish the nature of the impact 
of colonization it is imperative first to briefly examine how Islam became embedded 
in the Southeast Asian region during the pre-colonial era. Indeed, numerous studies 
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on Islam and the Muslim in Southeast Asia – Malaysia included – have emphasized 
time and again how critical was the impact of the interaction between Islam and 
pre-Islamic traditions, and how it has shaped the former in the way it is has been 
accepted and practiced as a way of life.
ISLAM EMBEDDED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
THE EMBEDDED THESIS
Discourse about the ontology of Islam in the Malay world has been heavily informed 
by an argument within Southeast Asian studies initiated in the 1960s by Clifford 
Geertz, the American cultural anthropologist, and William Roff, an historian of the 
Malay world of Scottish origin who in the 1970s took issue with Geertz’s argument. 
Both came to create their own niche in the production of knowledge about Islam 
and Muslims in the Malay world.
Geertz made famous the phrase “Islam observed” which he articulated in a 
book of the same title comparing Islam and Muslims in Indonesia with those in 
Morocco.1 Ontologically Geertz’s emphasis is on “Islamic praxis” or “Islam as a lived 
reality amongst Javanese Muslims”. Perhaps his famous cultural reading and observa-
tion was the abangan-priyayi-santri continuum, his typology of Muslims in Java. His 
many writings on Islam as cultural practice in the Sukarno era of Indonesia have 
been widely read and have indeed been influential beyond the world of academia. 
Roff, in an article in the French journal Archipel almost two decades later in-
troduces the phrase “Islam obscured”.2 Although not a direct reaction to Geertz’s 
“Islam observed”, the article nonetheless serves well as a general response to an ana-
lytical trend that had become popular amongst Southeast Asianists both within and 
outside the region which privileges a culturalist perspective in the representation of 
Islam in the region. Roff argues that one must not overemphasise the cultural face of 
Islam to the extent of obscuring its significant political role in shaping the social life 
of Muslims at both the structural and agency levels. In his elaboration of the politi-
cal role of Islam in the Malay world Roff describes the nature of “political Islam”, or 
“Islam as a political system”, in the form of the Malay KERAJAAN,3 the pre-colonial 
Malay feudal polity. Roff thus provides us with an alternative meaning and form of 
the notion of “political Islam”.
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Useful as they may be in their analyses of Islam in the Malay world Geertz and 
Roff narrate only part of the story. As is the case with Hinduism and Buddhism, 
Islam’s original home is not the Malay world. Islam was brought to the region by 
people of foreign origins including merchants and Sufis. When it arrived in the 
Malay world Islam encountered a rich and vibrant Malay civilization that had ex-
perienced a history of at least a thousand years, with indigenous animistic beliefs 
providing the anchor. Anthropologically speaking it is unthinkable that Islam could 
have transformed this civilization overnight. In fact, it took Islam centuries to find a 
comfortable home in the Malay world.4 
The sociological process of settling into this new home, so to speak, involved 
complicated, indeed dialectical, interactions between these foreigners bringing the 
religion of Islam and the locals who eventually embraced the faith. Even amongst the 
locals the “Islamic spread” was evidently uneven. Just as Hinduism and Buddhism 
had to contend with indigenous beliefs and cultural practices, accepting and accom-
modating them into their ontology, Islam too had to contend with all the social 
phenomena that existed upon its arrival. Whether or not we wish to label this whole 
diffusionistic process as “syncretism” (if we are structuralists) or “hybridization” (if 
we are post-structuralists), one rather deceptively simple fact remains. Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Islam all had to go through, for want of a better term, a process of 
“embedment”. 
The Islam that Geertz “observed” and the Islam that Roff felt was “obscured” 
was the Islam that had been truly embedded into the historical and sociological 
contours of the Malay civilisational landscape. However that does not end the on-
tological story. The Islam that the foreigners brought to the Malay world, be it from 
the Arabian Peninsula, India or China, had itself previously undergone in these 
respective regions a complicated process of “embedment”. In other words, ontologi-
cally, the Islam that came to this region was definitely the “embedded form” and not 
the “pristine form”. How do we otherwise explain the many shapes and patterns of 
mosques found in the Malay world? How do we account for the contrast in Mecca 
during the Hajj season of white garments on Muslims from the Malay world with the 
black ones on those from other parts of the world? 
In other words, although there existed a set of Islamic theological universals 
accepted by all Muslims – such as the six articles of faith that promise to bind all 
Muslims together as brothers and sisters – in a lived material reality, these universals 
have been remoulded by local ontologies and sociological conventions. The “embed-
ment” process was in fact more complicated than this. A pendulating movement 
between “dis-embedment” and “re-embedment” occurred when new social forces 
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arrived in the Malay world after Islam. The most significant of these was European 
colonialism. Both Islam and European colonialism, as practised in the region, be-
came reconfigured in a fluctuating social, political, and economic scenario. 
In the context of the European rationalist epistemology that informed the co-
lonial process, Islam and other religions were perceived as non-rationalist and even 
anti-rationalist entities. In the British Empire they became “traditionalised”, “mar-
ginalised” or simply sidelined through the application of the technology of rule and 
official procedures that constitute modern bureaucracy. As a result Hindus became 
separated from Hinduism and Muslims from Islam. This separation was supported 
and legitimised by the construction of “colonial forms of knowledge”. Among these 
was the field of “Malay studies” which focused on the Malay ethnie as a unit of 
analysis and consisted of a corpus of material that detailed and elaborated exotic, 
non-scientific and yet aesthetically-laden “traditional” Malay conventions and mate-
rial culture. This is but one of many examples of what we may call the process of 
“de-embedment” and “re-embedment” that has affected Islam in the Malay world.
Therefore, the Islam that Geertz observed and the Islam that Roff found ob-
scured had  undergone a series of embedment processes within sociological contexts 
and historical circumstances that prevailed before and after the arrival of Islam. We 
wish thus to argue that it is necessary for scholars seeking to characterise or label 
Islam in the Malay world to take a closer look at “embedded Islam” and at the com-
plex process that contributed to that “embeddedness”. In our attempt to understand 
and explain the ontology of Islam in the Malay world and the larger Southeast Asian 
region it will be helpful if we take cognizance of the “Islam embedded” thesis in a 
more serious fashion.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPACT OF ISLAM
IN THE MALAY WORLD
Sociologically, Islam had a tremendous impact upon pre-colonial Southeast Asia. 
The three major aspects of the impact may be divided into (i) spirituality; (ii) intel-
lectual contribution; and (iii) the establishment of new rules for social order through 
the adoption of the shari’ah. It is within this context, which, in turn, involves the said 
three elements, that our contemporary understanding of Islam and the Muslims in 
Southeast Asia has to be firmly located. It is useful, therefore, to briefly examine how 
each of the three elements of Islam has taken root in the region.
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In terms of spirituality Islam in the Malay world is not simply a veneer over the 
structure of the Malay-Indonesia society, as argued by some scholars, but rather it 
has played an enormous role in transforming both the “body” and the “soul” of the 
different societies in the Malay world.5 In particular, Islamic mysticism or tasawwuf 
and its practices of purifying the heart and intellect have been widely influential 
among the societies of the Malay world. Through the efforts of sufis who acted as 
preachers (mubaligh) to the king as well as the masses the nature of Malay spiritua-
lity, as some Muslim scholars have claimed, has been elevated to a higher state. The 
foremost amongst the scholars was Al-Attas.6 He argued that the highly intellectual 
and rationalistic spirit of Islam entered the receptive minds of the Malays of the ar-
chipelago and turned them away from all forms of mythology. Besides, he argues, the 
doctrine of One God and man as essentially His creation, together with the equality 
of spirituality between man and man, gave the ordinary man in the Malay world a 
sense of worth and nobility denied to him in pre-Islamic times. He further argued 
that Islam brought spiritual refinement and knowledge to the people of the Malay 
world through an intellectual and rational impetus, not only to the courts but also 
to the people in general, as evidenced by the fact that not all philosophical treatises 
were written solely for the pleasure of kings.7 The elevation of spirituality among the 
Malays led to the growth and proliferation of the sufi orders (tariqah) which stressed 
the importance of practicing mystical teachings in an organized manner.
The intellectual contribution of Islam to Malay civilization from the fifteenth 
to the seventeenth century provided the epistemological change necessary for the 
establishment of a stronger Islamic-based social order in the Malay polity called the 
KERAJAAN.8 During that period the Malay-Islamic literati, especially mystical poets 
and writers, undertook both missionary and intellectual works to spread Islam. One 
of them was ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-Sinkil (d. 1693) who is recorded as the first Malay 
translator of the Qur’an, together with al-Baydawi’s commentary on it.  However, 
prominent among these missionaries was Hamzah al-Fansuri (h. 1589/1604) a sufi 
poet and writer who belonged to the Qadariyyah Order. He was followed by another 
Malay sufi, Shams al-Din al-Sumatrani, Shikh al-Islam of Aceh, who was intellectu-
ally involved in the mystic doctrine of wujudiyyah. His theosophical concerns were 
shared by another controversial sufi theologian, historian and missionary par excel-
lence from Aceh, Nur al-Din al-Raniri (d. 1666). Al-‘Attas argues that Nur al-Din al-
Raniri’s thought had a tremendous impact in the Malay world. First, he was the first 
man in the region to clarify the distinction between the true and false interpretation 
of sufi theosophy and metaphysics. Second, al-Raniri is known as the first scholar 
to prepare a Malay translation of the best commentary on the creed by al-Nasafi. 
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Third, al-Raniri’s Sirat al-Mustaqim dealing with the essentials of Islam is considered 
a classic. Finally, al-Raniri is also a highly celebrated Malay writer because of his book 
Bustan al-Salatin.9
Without doubt the most significant and central contribution to governance in 
the Malay-Muslim KERAJAAN was the shari’ah.10 One could say that Islamic civi-
lization in Southeast Asia manifested itself by way of enacting the Islamic shari’ah 
holistically, that is, by applying shari’ah as the basis of social order. For example, 
the Malacca sultanate in the 15th century officially applied two forms of shari’ah-
based law, namely, first, the Malacca Digest (Hukum Kanun Melaka) and, second, 
the Maritime Laws of Malacca (Undang-Undang Laut Melaka).11 These two legal codes 
were complimentary in providing solutions to the full range of legal disputes. The 
Malacca Digest comprised all matters of criminal and civil law, family law, the legal 
power of the ruler, rules relating to proper conduct, particularly with regard to sexual 
matters, laws regarding slavery, and penalties for all offences. The Maritime Laws 
consisted entirely of rules, regulations, procedures and codes of conduct which were 
to be used at sea, to be obeyed and respected by Muslim and non-Muslim outsiders 
and insiders.12
Studies by Malaysian historians reveal the tremendous impact of Islam in the 
Malacca legal system by looking into both of these two legal codes.13 For instance, 
in the Maritime Laws of Malacca, the captain of a ship (maalim) was considered an 
imam (leader) and his subjects as ma’mum (followers). Similarly, the Malacca Digest 
contained many provisions based on the shari’ah in order “to follow injunctions in 
the Qur’an and enjoin good and forbid evil (amr bi al-ma’ruf wa-nahy ‘an al-munkar)”. 
The Islamic influence was clearly expressed throughout the legal texts. Many terms 
and concepts have been absorbed and are widely used such as imam, mu’allim, taksir 
fufuli, amanah, hak ta’ala, thayyib, ta’zir and mithqal.
In spite of Islam’s dominance in governance and the social life of Muslims 
under the KERAJAAN polity there are conflicting opinions about Islam and its 
relationship to pre-Islamic custom or adat.14 The continued practice of both the 
matrilineal-based adat pepateh and the patrilineal-based adat temenggong by the Malay-
Muslims has created a measure of tension and conflict with shari’ah. Proponents of 
adat tend to justify the position of adat as not being contradictory to the shari’ah. 
Besides adat other forms of pre-Islamic ritual exist among other non-Islamic cultural 
beliefs and practices such as magic, superstition, spirit worship, taboos, the consulta-
tion of shamans (variously called, pawang, dukun and/or bomoh), as well as the fear of 
jin and iblis (supernatural beings). Such beliefs have long permeated the life of many 
Malays, particularly in the villages.15
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One can conclude that the coming of Islam to the Malay world constituted a 
new era in its history. Undoubtedly, Islam transformed many popular pre-Islamic 
cultural practices and beliefs and imbued them with an Islamic world view. But 
it was an embedded version of Islam, not the ‘pristine form’ practiced by the first 
community of believers in Mecca and Medina. Indeed, each of the influences which 
came from the Middle East, China, and India, was shaped by its own socio-historical 
context. It was already an embedded form of Islam that subsequently reached the 
shores of the Malay Archipelago. The Islam that arrived also brought changes in the 
sphere of Islamic knowledge, with Malacca exercising its special role as the centre of 
Islamic learning throughout the Southeast Asia. It was also Islam that unified the 
Malay sultans in confronting the encroachment of Western imperialism.
FROM ‘KERAJAAN’ TO ‘kerajaan’: ISLAM RE-EMBEDDED 
UNDER COLONIAL RULE
Like Islam before it, British colonialism could only operate and be embraced by the 
populace in Southeast Asia in its embedded form. Indeed, we would like to argue 
that British colonialism embedded itself in the region by drawing a clear line of 
demarcation between the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’, where British colonial rule 
represented the ‘secular.’ Given the separation of state and church in Britain long 
before its colonial expansion it is not surprising that anything to do with ‘religion’ 
and other indigenous beliefs, whether in Europe or in colonised Southeast Asia, 
came to be regarded as ‘traditional’ as opposed to the ‘secular modern’ that colonial-
ism adopted as its central principle of governance and indeed the social system that 
it imposed.
Of all the influences that have impacted upon Islam and Muslims in Southeast 
Asia, especially in Malaya, it is not the ‘religious’ Christianity but the ‘secular’ Bri-
tish colonialism that is the more significant. Socio-geographically its influence on 
the region was not even, and was articulated in numerous versions, but it undoubt-
edly had a lasting effect. The most significant observable impact was in terms of the 
transformation of the nature of governance in the region. The advent of colonial 
rule brought about an important encounter between ‘church’ (read Islam) and ‘state’ 
(British colonial administration). Only this time the encounter took place under 
different empirical circumstances: between ‘Islam the religion and its believers’ and 
the modernizing ‘secular state’ of the colonial government. Malaya was certainly not 
the first British colony to have experienced this. The South Asian countries (India, 
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Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Sikkim and Nepal) experienced British 
rule much earlier than Malaysia.
The American anthropologist of India, Bernard Cohn, has argued that coloni-
alism involves more than just the conquering of physical space. More importantly 
it involves the conquest of indigenous ‘epistemological space’. This involves the dis-
mantling of indigenous thought systems, hence disempowering them of their ability 
to define things, and subsequently replacing them with a foreign one through a 
systematic application of a series of colonial ‘investigative modalities’. According 
to Cohn “an investigative modality includes the definition of a body of informa-
tion that is needed, the procedures by which appropriate knowledge is gathered, 
its ordering and classification, and then how it is transformed into usable forms 
such as published reports, statistical returns, histories, gazetteers, legal codes, and 
encyclopaedias”.16
In the Malay world the colonial conquest of epistemological space through the 
use of various investigative modalities resulted in the reconfiguration and recon-
stitution of the ancient concept of KERAJAAN, from one in which ‘church’ (read 
Islam) and state were fused to another version of kerajaan in which ‘church’ (read 
Islam) and state were separated. The colonial and post-colonial notion of kerajaan 
was divorced from its pre-existing Islamic content. As a result, the indigenous Islamic 
component of the pre-colonial KERAJAAN was systematically ‘traditionalised’ and 
perceived as non-rational. Its position was recast as peripheral to the larger modern-
rationalist complex of the secular colonial state. The process of the transformation 
of this premodern polity from KERAJAAN to kerajaan occurred in at least three 
crucial areas: namely, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and education.
The impact of the British bureaucratic presence and policies in Malaya can 
be clearly discerned in the following events.17 First, the British began establishing 
themselves through an indirect intervention in 1786 when Penang was acquired 
from Kedah, which later led to a widening of its direct involvement upon areas 
traditionally the domain of the Malay Sultans. British residents were stationed first 
in the Federated Malay States (FMS) and later in the Unfederated Malaysian States 
(UFMS). The Pangkor Treaty (1874), which was signed by the Malay sultans, gave full 
authority for the British to control Malaysia. It stipulated that the Sultans receive 
and provide a suitable residence for a British Officer to be called Resident, who was 
accredited to the royal Court, and whose advice must be asked and acted upon on 
in all areas other than those touching upon Malay religion and adat (custom). It 
simply meant that religion was to be clearly separated from secular matters such as 
politics, administration, law, economics, education and so forth. Islamic and Malay 
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customs were recognized as being under the jurisdiction of the sultans, while matters 
of governance were the responsibility of the British (in fact, the British administra-
tion later even violated the so-called “non-interference” policy in Islamic and Malay 
adat).
These bureaucratic changes flowed into the realm of religious administration 
and hence religious judicial matters.18 Despite the fact that the British introduced 
some reforms in the religious aspects of Malay society through the Council of Islam-
ic Affairs and Malay Customs (Majlis Hal Ehwal Islam dan ‘Adat Melayu), this newly 
established institution excluded the role of Islam from all aspects of life except in 
the limited sphere of religious affairs. Hooker argued that the British intention was 
to limit the reach of Islamic law to family law and to introduce its own secular legal 
system. The British policy to exclude shari’ah became evident, for instance, in a court 
decision in the case of Ainan vs. Syed Bakar (1939). The issue in dispute raised in 
this particular case was whether a baby, delivered by Ainan after a marriage of only 
three months, could be considered legitimate. The Syariah court considered the baby 
illegitimate. Nevertheless, as a result of the implementation of the Evidence Enact-
ment Law in the Malaya Court, it was ruled that the law which should be followed 
was the Evidence Enactment Law, not the Shari’ah. Therefore, the disputed baby was 
considered legitimate by the civil law.19 
The religious administrative reform restricted the independence and jurisdic-
tions of the Islamic judges, or qadis. Their power was limited compared to the civil 
judges. They were denied the power to arrest and punish offenders. The British 
administrators only permitted the qadis to become prosecutors in magistrate courts 
for criminal offences. This was a striking contrast to the powerful position of the 
qadis in the pre-colonial period of the Malay sultanates. The laws and regulations 
introduced during the colonial period are taken almost completely from British law. 
The late Ahmad Ibrahim pointed out that the deteriorating position of the syariah 
had mainly been caused by the British misunderstanding of Islam as a religion, since 
the term ugama Islam was equated with the Christian understanding of religion.20 In 
addition, all the senior judges were appointed by the British Resident General with 
the approval of the High Commissioner and were trained in the British system of 
law. It was therefore natural for them to refer to and apply English law. As a result, 
the power wielded by the British in implementing legal policies led to the current 
Malaysian view of the shari’ah as a legal code which was confined to personal law.
In the sphere of education, Islamic education suffered the same fate of being 
peripheralized or transformed into a modern form.21 Before the British educational 
policy was introduced Islamic education had been an extremely important homog-
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enizing and socializing tool because it provided the means by which Islam continued 
to flourish among the Malays. In the past the Arabic script, popularly known as tu-
lisan jawi, had been the written medium used in traditional Islamic traditional edu-
cation. Malay children would begin learning the Qur’an at home (mengaji Qur’an) 
by way of recitation (membaca) and memorization (menghafal). Later, these children 
were sent to specific houses where religious teachers, known as Tok Lebai, taught 
the Qur’an and personal duties (fardu ain). For more advanced studies in religion, 
Malaysian parents sent their children to educational institutions such as pondok and 
madrasah. At the upper level Malay students used kitab jawi, popular religious text-
books written in the Malay language using the Arabic alphabet, for different sub-
jects, ranging from Islamic law (fiqh), to theology (kalam), religious principles (usul 
al-din), Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir), and the prophetic tradition (hadith).
Both pondok and madrasah played important roles in preserving the Islamic iden-
tity of Malays and providing them with the core of Islamic education. Some scholars 
hold the view that the essence of the pondok institution for Malay society was in 
the way they provided a ‘template’ for the transmission of Malay Muslim culture 
from one generation to the next. Beginning in the nineteenth century, Malay society 
witnessed the growth of madrasah, a differentiated version of the pondok system. Ma-
drasah were more formal and organized in terms of administration and curriculum. 
Later, some madrasah began to combine theological subjects with secular academic 
and vocational ones. Important among these schools was the Madrasah al-Hamidi-
yyah in Limbong Kapal, Alor Star, Kedah, founded in 1906.
In this madrasah the curriculum included the study of fiqh, tasawwuf, tafsir, ha-
dith and a comparative study of the four fiqh al-mazahib (for schools of fiqh) at a more 
advanced level. It is interesting to note that in Sekolah al-Diniyyah, which was estab-
lished in 1924 in Kampong Lalang, Padang Rengas, Perak, the school’s curriculum 
included mathematics, history, English and commercial subjects. More importantly 
the students were also taught business, the techniques of rice planting, and even how 
to make soap. Because of its advanced curriculum the Sekolah al-Diniyyah became 
popular. With sixteen students enrolled in 1924 it grew to about 500 pupils in 1941 
and had opened at least eight branches of the school in the surrounding areas.
The strength of Islamic education, as illustrated above, began to deteriorate 
gradually with the direct involvement of the British in educational policy.22 Several 
scholars have noted how the establishment of secular schools during the British pe-
riod contributed to the introduction of elements of secularism into Malay society.23
The first attempt made by the British administrators in the sphere of education 
was to set up English medium schools in urban areas. Only a limited number of 
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Malays were admitted and thereby assured of employment and a high post in the ad-
ministration. Meanwhile the British also established Malay medium and Islamic reli-
gious schools in the rural areas. The purpose of these two types of schools, according 
to George Maxwell, the chief secretary, was to train “the sons of Malay fishermen to 
become better fishermen and the sons of Malay farmers, better farmers.” It is clear 
that the British preferred the English medium school and it became their policy that 
Malay and Islamic education remain of lower quality than English education. Even 
O.T. Dussek, a famous British educator who became the first principal of the Sultan 
Idris Teacher Training College (SITC) in Tanjong Malim, Perak, criticized the system 
of English education for failing to cater to “the needs of the country or the state of 
intellectual development, or to the social culture attained by the inhabitants”.24
Apart from the secularization process incurred by the English medium school, 
the British administrators implemented the same policy in the Malay schools (Se-
kolah Melayu) by initiating the following action. First, the Qur’an could be taught in 
schools but had to be separated from the teaching of the Malay language. Second, 
lessons in the morning concentrated on the teaching of the Malay language. The 
teaching of the Qur’an could be done only informally in the afternoon. Third, teach-
ers’ allowances from the government were meant only for the teaching of the Malay 
language, while parents were obliged to pay for the allowances of those teaching 
Qur’an lessons. 
In 1905, the British administration formed, for the children of the aristocrats, 
the elite Malay College Kuala Kangsar (MCKK), located in a small town called Kuala 
Kangsar in the state of Perak. The formation of this prestigious college strengthened 
the trend of British policy towards secular education in Malay society. The MCKK 
was formed to educate ‘Malays of good families’ and to train them to fill subordinate 
post in government services. While the school produced excellent academic achieve-
ments it also hastened the separation of the Malay traditional leadership from the 
masses. The process of secularization among the Malay students became even more 
complex with the entry of English missionary schools. Although the British offi-
cially forbade Christian missionaries from operating missions in the British Malaya, 
the administration allowed these same Christian preachers to establish missionary 
schools in towns and cities. Malay children were encouraged by the British to attend 
these missionary schools even though some were obliged to enroll against the wishes 
of their parents.
It could be argued therefore, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, with the deepe-
ning influence of secular education in Malaysia the value of a secular education had 
more appeal. Thus the consolidation of British colonial rule led to the rise of both 
124
Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia
religious and secular schools, which dichotomized the dissemination of knowledge 
within the Malay society.
COLONIALISM AND THE MUSLIM RESPONSE IN MALAYSIA
The Muslim response to colonialism in Malaysia was articulated in two major forms. 
The first was an anti-British political movement by different groups within the Malay 
community in Malaysia, conducted at different times and motivated by a variety of 
local religious and political economic motivations. The second response was in the 
emergence and articulation of internal contestations amongst the Malay-Muslims 
themselves. The impact of governance change, namely, from KERAJAAN to kera-
jaan brought about by the epistemological and ontological restructuration carried 
out by the British, undoubtedly played a major role in the second response. These 
internal contestations revolved around three major motivations, namely, conserva-
tism, reformism and nationalism. Some had their socio-historical roots in an ideo-
logy of ‘pristine Islam’ while others developed out of interactions with ‘the modern’ 
brought by British colonialism.
The Anti-British Movement
In Malaysia and other parts of the Malay world the ulama (lit. religious specialist) 
who were trained in traditional Islamic education (especially the oral-based pondok 
tradition), confronted and resisted the encroachment of Western imperialism in the 
spirit of jihad. At the end of the nineteenth century, a number of anti-British move-
ments were nurtured by this spirit. The 1857 murder of the Perak Resident, J.W.W. 
Birch, at Pasir Salak, Perak, proved clearly that there was a strong resistance move-
ment against the presence of the British informed by religious ideas. Muslims in 
Perak where there were a number of religious schools felt that the British administra-
tion was jeopardizing the position of Islam. Harry Ord had wrote a special memoran-
dum in 1876 explaining Birch’s murder in which he claimed that Muslim fanaticism 
had been invoked against the infidel, in this particular instance, the British.25 
In Terengganu the anti-British movement coloured by the spirit of jihad became 
prominent in the 1920s after several well-known ulama opposed the practice of Eng-
lish land law which contradicted the shari’ah’s rulings on individual property. H.W. 
Thomson, the British Resident in Perak who was assigned to study the upheaval in 
Terengganu, noted the strength of the Islamic element in the opposition to British 
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rule: “Religious feeling has always run very high in Terengganu and it is probable 
that the religious leaders made the most of every hardship case.”26 
Internal Contestations: Of Conservatism, Reformism and Nationalism
The so-called Gerakan Pembaharuan (Reform Movement) in Malaya was dominat-
ed by the ‘Middle East Stream’ led by Shaikh Tahir Jalal al-Din, Sayyid Shaikh al-
Hadi, Shaikh Abu Bakr al-Asha’ari and others.27 They were strongly influenced by 
the modernist thought of the Arabic reformists Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1879), 
Shaikh Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), and Rashid Rida (d. 1935). The influence of 
the Arabic newspapers al-‘Urwat al-Wuthqa and al-Manar on the the Malay reformists 
of this era was apparent when Sayyid Shaikh al-Hadi issued a monthly newspaper 
al-Imam in 1906. The impact of that newspaper was clearly felt in the Malay commu-
nity. Al-Imam was described as “a bomb shell on the quiet scene of Islam.”28 Al-Hadi 
warned his community about the need to reform their educational objectives and 
abandon superstitious practices (khurafat). Al-Hadi’s Islamic reformist thinking was 
not without critics, however. In the context of the highly religious and ethical Malay 
society, his famous novel Hikayat Faridah Hanum (the Story of Faridah Hanum), 
which depicted liberal ideas like the emancipation of Malay women and the sexual 
lusts of youth, made him a controversial figure. Shaikh Tahir Jalal al-Din echoed the 
same reformist ideas. His prolific writings in al-Imam (1906-1908), al-Ikhwan (1926-
31), and Saudara (1928-1941) were very religious in content. He insisted that Malay 
society utilize the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions as the best solution to its 
backwardness. In fact, Shaikh Tahir attacked some ulama as being responsible for 
perpetuating deviational adat (Malay customary laws).
In the wave of Islamic reformism, Malay society continued to be engaged in 
heated polemics between the reformists and the traditional ulama. The latter, which 
was categorized as Kaum Tua (traditionalist), began to feel threatened by the greater 
influence of the former, who identified themselves as Kaum Muda (reformist). As 
a result the Kaum Muda accused the Kaum Tua of being the real obstacle to Malay 
progress and even the destroyers of Islam. In response to these charges, the Kaum 
Tua labeled the Kaum Muda as deviants and communists. Despite certain negative 
elements resulting from the conflicts between the two religious groups, the efforts 
of Muslim reformists must not be ignored.29 Their achievements include the fol-
lowing: first, they succeeded in elevating the intellectual horizons of Malay society 
through ijtihad (juridical opinion) and reducing taqlid (imitation) based upon the 
critical understanding of the Qur’an and the Sunnah (Prophetic traditions). Second, 
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educational reforms were made in the religious schools by correcting the content of 
the curriculum.
Utilising Islam as an ideological platform for nationalist movement is common 
throughout the Muslim world, including by Malay-Muslims in Malaysia.30 Move-
ments placing Islam at the forefront of the Malay worldview entered another histori-
cal phase just before Malaya achieved independence in 1957. Broadly speaking, this 
period witnessed the emergence of two patterns of struggle: radical and moderate. 
For example, Haji Wan Ahmad bin Wan Ngah, a famous ‘alim from Perak, was clas-
sified as a radical fighter who advocated the idea of Pan-Islamism. Haji Wan Ahmad 
urged Malaysian pilgrims to strengthen their spiritual bonds with Turkish pilgrims 
during the Haj (Pilgrimage) season. He even strongly urged the Malay-Muslims to 
substitute British colonial rule for the Turkish administration.
Another interesting development during this period was the formation of the 
Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya or PKMM (Malayan Malays Nationalist Party) in 
1945, formed by Mukhtaruddin Laso and Burhanuddin al-Hilmy to oppose British 
colonialism in Malaya.  Despite elements of socialist thinking in the leadership the 
PKMM succeeded in projecting an image of a Muslim political party which had the 
support of the majority of Muslims. Through the PKMM Burhanuddin al-Hilmy 
began to introduce elements of Islamic political thought.
Meanwhile, British administrators made another attempt to maintain their rule 
with the idea of the Malayan Union in 1946. The proposal was perceived as degra-
ding the sovereignty of the Malay society and their Sultans. The ulama and the Malay 
nationalists protested against the proposal by organizing several mass demonstra-
tions. The Malay ulama carried out their own protest by launching a ‘long march’ 
of 46 miles on foot on the northern highway from Seberang Prai to Alor Star, the 
capital state of Kedah. The demonstration had a tremendous impact on Malays 
in British Malaya because the ulama took the opportunity to ‘advertise’ their anti-
Malayan Union campaign by distributing free food, including rice, to villagers and 
pupils from small towns who were watching the procession.
The tense situation surrounding the Malayan Union and the Malay response 
led to the formation of the UMNO (United Malays National Organization) in 
1946.31 UMNO began as a loose grouping of negeri-based Malay-Muslim political 
associations. It was formed in response to the urgent need for Pan-Malaysian unity 
to oppose the British Administration’s imposition of the Malayan Union in 1946. 
Some have argued that the participation of the ulama in UMNO was a show of 
solidarity and not an acceptance of UMNO’s ideology. The majority of the ulama 
were dissatisfied with UMNO’s ideology which placed Islam second to ethnic Malay 
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nationalism. They were also opposed to the leftist ideology of some of the Malay 
leaders. The establishment of Hizb al-Muslimin (HAMIM, the Muslim Party) in 1948 
marked a clear effort to give greater emphasis to the role of Islam. Ideologically, 
the basic aims of HAMIM were to achieve independence, to build an Islamic-based 
society, and to create a dar al-Islam (Islamic state) in Malaysia. In addition to these 
goals HAMIM expressed its readiness to cooperate with other Malay political par-
ties as well as Islamic movements outside the country. HAMIM’s activities gained 
widespread support from the Malay community.
Identifying HAMIM as the greatest threat to British colonialism the British in-
voked the 1948 Emergency Law by detaining seven leaders, including the party chief, 
al-Ustaz Abu Baqir. Ma’had Ihya’ as-Sharif, which based its operation in Gunong Se-
manggol, Perak, advanced the cause of the Islamic struggle in Malaysia, through the 
formation of two Islamic organizations, Pusat Perekonomian SeMalaya (PEPERMAS, 
the Centre of the Pan Malayan Economy) and Majlis Agama Tertinggi Malaya (MATA, 
the Supreme Religious Council of Malaya).
Basically, the main aim of PEPERMAS was to demand the rights of Malays in 
the economic sphere while pushing for a governmental body, elected by the people, 
to administer the economy. MATA, on the other hand, was intended to handle mat-
ters pertaining to the religious aspects of Islam, i.e., arrangements for the Haj, col-
lection and distribution of zakat (tithe) and fixing the date for the E‘id (Muslim feast 
following the end of Ramadan). MATA also demanded that the sultans surrender 
their authority over religious matters, and that elected representatives be given seats 
in all councils in order to safeguard Islamic interests.
The Persatuan Islam SeTanah Melayu (PAS or Pan Malayan Islamic Party) was 
formed in 1951, marking another historical development for Islam in Malaya.32 PAS 
was actually formed by the religious section within UMNO that had decided to 
break away from the party. Ideologically, PAS demanded the creation of an Islamic 
State. As a popular political party PAS managed to maintain its influence among a 
majority of the traditional ulama and ustaz (religious teachers) and students from the 
traditional religious schools who were mainly influenced by Islamic culture. In spite 
of the fact that PAS has not succeeded in its struggle to create an Islamic state, its 
influence remains until today a major force in Malay-Muslim politics.
Following PAS’s launch of its Islamic struggle in Malaya UMNO became its 
arch-rival.  It was, however, UMNO that became the premier Malay political party 
and it successfully formed an alliance with the Chinese and Indian political parties, 
the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), 
respectively. The coalition was called the Alliance Party and in the first national 
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elections in 1955 it proved very successful. Indeed, out of fifty-two contested seats, 
the Alliance won fifty-one. It has continued to control the political scene since 1957, 
admittedly in a larger and expanded coalition called the National Front. In confron-
ting PAS’s ideology UMNO leaders have rejected outright PAS demands that Islam 
should shape matters of state. UMNO leaders expressed their Islamic orientation 
through the Alliance Memorandum to the Reid Constitutional Commission 1956-
57, which advocated that Islam be considered the religion of the country, but that 
religious freedom be guaranteed and the country considered a secular state.
It could be said that any discussion on Islamic-Muslim opposition in Malaysia 
during the colonial period has to take cognizance of the fact that the Malays as 
a community then were not a unified and homogenous social entity. They were 
divided along negeri divisions, theological and non-theological issues, educational 
background, political party affiliations and notions of nations-of-intent.33
Each of these factors led to different forms of response and resistance, both 
towards colonial rule as well as between themselves, which resulted in a divided 
Malay community. Some were informed by fundamentalist teachings of Islam, a few 
by modern political radicalism, and the rest simply by a desire to resist Western, secu-
lar, colonial rule.34 Plurality, not fundamentalism, characterised the Malay-Muslim 
response and resistance to colonialism. This pattern did not change very much after 
Independence in 1957. Indeed, what we observe is the strengthening of kerajaan by 
modern institutions that moulded and conditioned the social life of the Malays and 
Islamic cultural practices in Malaysia.
ISLAM AND ISLAMIC EDUCATION 
IN POSTCOLONIAL MALAYSIA
It could be said that the Malaysian Constitution became the single most important 
modern institutional tool that has moulded and conditioned Malaysian Islam, in-
cluding Islamic education. The Constitution has defined the socio-political space of 
Islam in Malaysian government and politics. This delineation of the ‘Islamic/Mus-
lim’ socio-political space, as we observe today, into a rather special space, is rooted in 
a straightforward constitutional provision in which every Malay person is automati-
cally defined as a Muslim. In other words, religion (read Islam) became the ethnic 
identifier for the Malays. As a result Malay politics has inevitably become an intra-
Muslim factional contestation. Inter-ethnic politics between the Malay, Chinese and 
Indian and Indian communities since Independence has taken on the character of 
a struggle over identity politics. 
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The special position of Islam as provided in the Malaysian Constitution of 1957 
is as follows: 
•	 Islam	is	the	religion	of	the	Federation;
•	 There	is	no	religious	head	for	the	whole	Federation.	The	King	continues	
to be the head of the Muslim religion in his own negeri and it is provided 
that he shall be the head of the Muslim religion in Malacca, Penang, in the 
Federal Territory and in Sabah and Sarawak. Each of the other states has 
its own ruler as the head of the Islamic religion in that state;
•	 Negeri law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine 
or belief among persons professing the Islamic religion;
•	 Other	religions	may	be	practiced	in	peace	and	harmony	in	any	part	of	the	
Federation. This means that every religious group has the right to manage 
its own religious affairs; to establish and maintain institutions for religious 
and charitable purposes; and to acquire and own property and hold and 
administer it in accordance with the law.
In spite of being given a special position Islamic law is in practice subordinate to 
the civil law. Its scope is limited to family law and Muslim religious offences. Hence 
the Shari’ah courts have a limited jurisdiction.35 There is no provision in the Malay-
sian Constitution for the jurisdiction and powers of the Shari’ah courts or for the 
appointment and discipline of their judicial and legal officers. It is therefore clear 
that in Malaysia, Islamic law is not applied to the whole community nor is it applied 
in its pure form. Various negeri legislations in Malaysia, in the main, deal with the 
administration of Muslim laws and not with the substantive Islamic laws.36 It could 
thus be said that the status of Shari’ah law in Malaysia since Independence is largely 
symbolic, rather than substantive. It fulfils a bureaucratic purpose but not as a set of 
laws that function to inculcate fundamental Islamic values and way of life. 
Furthermore, because the administration of Islamic matters and Malay customs 
is not centralised at the Federal level but is under the jurisdiction of each negeri reli-
gious bureaucracy and its ruler, the interpretation of some parts of the Shari’ah laws 
differs from negeri to negeri.37 This independence is fiercely guarded by each negeri to 
the extent that there have been occasions when the commencement date of the Ra-
madan fasting has differed in the various negeri because each used different methods 
to ascertain the arrival of the new moon; some used astronomical techniques while 
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others chose to physically sight the new moon. It could be said that the legal position 
of Islam in post-colonial Malaysia is thus characterised by fragmentation and plurali-
zation. However this pluralization has a ‘colonial-modern’, not an ‘Islamic’ origin.
The plurality of Islamic teachings and legal practices in Malaysia is further com-
plicated by an equally pluralistic Islamic education system available in the country. 
Interest in Islamic education has been dominated by the belief that such education 
has a direct bearing on the future of the ummah, or Muslim community. Accor-
dingly the federal government and the negeri governments have developed their own 
separate official policies for Islamic education, supposedly serving the interests of 
each entity. 
In the national education system since 1956 Islam has been taught as single 
subject, namely ‘Islamic Religious Knowledge.’38 It was, however, not a compulsory 
subject. However it has been observed that the subject has three major weaknesses. 
First, it lacks a comprehensive examination on the subject in an integrated man-
ner, including cognitive, attitudinal and practical knowledge which has made it a 
‘lightweight’ subject; second, it lacks a coherent and integrated, syllabus of what 
should be taught as “Islamic Religious Knowledge”, including the ritual aspects such 
as prayer, zakat, pilgrimage and the other basic articles of faith; and third, there is a 
lack of comparative religious study. In short, teaching the subject is seen as paying 
lip service to the Federal government. Hence the ironic situation has developed 
in which a course on Islamic religious knowledge is absent of any Islamic religious 
instruction.
 From the 1950s and 1960s at the negeri level both pondok and madrasah began 
to lose their influence in many parts of the country, particularly in the Malay-domi-
nated negeri of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis. However, the more perti-
nent factors that thus far have not been investigated and elaborated are the internal 
workings of the different religious schools in the various negeri. These include the 
details of their organization, the type of pedagogy applied, the curriculum and syl-
labuses that have been adopted, the kinds of textbooks made available, the teachers’ 
training and the employment opportunities of the school-leavers. This lacuna both 
in facts and analyses has rendered most discussions of Islamic education weak and 
hovering at a superficial, general level, as Rosnani Hashim has argued.39 The internal 
working of these religious schools at the grassroots is more complex and complicated 
than most have imagined. Apart from weaknesses in the curriculum, Malay parents 
are less willing to send their children to these schools because better job opportuni-
ties are available to their children through education offered by the government. It 
appears that only those who have failed the national education system tend to enroll 
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in these schools. In other words, Islamic religious education is regarded as having 
less value compared to other secular subjects. 
Yet at the same time there is an opposite trend. Since the 1970s with the revival 
of interest in Islam and eventually in the 1980s through a conscious effort at ‘Islami-
zation’ conducted by the Malaysian government since the 1980s, Islamic religious 
education, both at the federal and negeri level, has received an unprecedented boost. 
The number of government-funded primary and secondary religious schools has 
increased many fold. Tertiary Islamic education has expanded, Islamic faculties in 
local public universities have been enlarged, and new Islamic university colleges spe-
cialising in Islamic education have been established to cater for the growing student 
population. This trend has reduced considerably the number of Malaysian students 
enrolling in Islamic tertiary institutions in the Middle East and South Asia.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Islam in the Malay world in general and Malaysia, in particular,  like elsewhere in the 
world, is an embedded form, in the sense that it is not in the pristine form that was 
practiced in Mecca and Medinah during Muhammad’s time or during the rule of 
the four Caliphs that followed after Muhammad’s demise. The embedding process is 
a complex one because when it first arrived around the 12th century the indigenous 
peoples of the Malay world were already practitioners of animist beliefs, Hinduism 
and Buddhism, all of which have become intertwined and hybridized articulating 
local Malay world features, both in their tangible forms (such as architecture) and 
intangible forms (spoken in the Malay language). Islam entered into the lives of 
the peoples of the region and was inevitably shaped and reshaped by the extant 
historical-structural mould.
The teaching of Islam at the early initial stages of its introduction in most parts 
of the world has always been very strongly dependent on the ‘oral method’–reading 
aloud the Qur’an, memorizing, oral interpretation, and open discussion. Indeed, 
the faith was originally communicated in this way by Muhammad, could not read or 
write but was nonetheless able to build a large number of followers in a short time. 
It could be said that Islam was suited to the illiterate who subsequently learnt to 
read and write the Arabic alphabets which would enable them to read the Qur’an 
and other Islamic texts. This, in turn, through the use of the same Arabic alphabet, 
would lead to the creation of texts in Persian, Urdu and Malay, that would unify mil-
lions of followers in those linguistic constituencies under the same faith.
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The pondok school tradition in the Malay world, especially in Malaysia, is largely 
oral-based and teaches Islamic theology. Besides memorizing the Qur’an to become 
a hafiz, students came to also learn Jawi (the Arabic script used for Malay language) 
and eventually to read the Qur’an and other kitab.
The teaching of Islam in the written form developed much later in the Malay 
world. During the colonial period madrasahs were established which taught Islamic 
theological subjects along with modern science and mathematics. The combination 
of theological subjects and modern ones was the result of both administrative and 
market demand. Graduates from such schools were employed in the public service 
and especially in the religious offices of every province or state. They served the 
colonial state as well as the Muslim population.
In the postcolonial period in Malaysia there has been a huge expansion of Islam-
ic education combined with modern subjects, which has led to the establishment of 
Islamic Faculties in local universities and the setting up of the International Islamic 
University Malaysia in 1983. In the 1990s Islamic education was mainstreamed with 
Islamic economics, banking and finance. Shari’ah lawyers serving the Shari’ah courts 
have also increased in number. Those studying law in Malaysia today can opt to 
specialize in Islamic law irrespective of one’s religion. Islamic financial institutions 
are now viewed as a viable alternative to conventional ones. In 1997 the University 
College Islam was established, and in 2007 it was up-graded to a fully-fledged uni-
versity.
The re-embedding of Islam into the colonial mould was the turning point in the 
expansion and transformation of Islamic education in Malaysia. From a purely theo-
logical focus it has become ‘modernised’ and mainstreamed with secular subjects. 
Both the size of the student population and the number of schools and institutions 
of higher education specializing in Islamic education have also expanded. More sig-
nificant is the fact that their content and curriculum have become rather pluralized 
and their graduates more employable in the job market.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
ISLAMIC STUDIES PROGRAMS 
IN MALAYSIA’S HIGHER LEARNING 
INSTITUTIONS: RESPONSES TO
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES OF 
MODERNITY, GLOBALIZATION AND POST 9/11
Muhammad Nur Manuty
Modernity, globalization and the international situation following September 11 2001 have been the focus of intense debate among Malaysian scholars of Islam 
in recent years. Countless conferences, seminars, and workshops discussing these 
issues have been organized. While the administrators of Islamic Studies programs in 
Malaysia’s institutions of higher learning have a history of being generally quite dy-
namic and pragmatic, nonetheless these recent global changes have prompted them 
to again review some of the programs and courses offered in Islamic Studies so as 
to ensure that a new breed of Muslim scholars or `ulama can be produced who are 
able meet these new challenges. This chapter will outline some of the changes that 
have taken place in Islamic Studies in a number of Malaysia’s leading higher educa-
tion institutions, drawing on the observations of the administrators of some of the 
programs themselves.
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ISLAMIC STUDIES PROGRAMS IN MALAYSIAN UNIVERSITIES
The term “Islamic Studies” as employed in this paper denotes the systematic study 
of Islam both as a religion (al-din) and as a civilization (al-hadarah) through the in-
tegration of the major disciplines of Usul al-Din (Islamic theology), Shari`ah (divine 
law), Akhlaq (ethics), with dakwah (Islamic missionary work), Arabic language and 
its literature, Islamic history and civilization. It includes study programs offered at 
the undergraduate and postgraduate level in a university, faculty, institute, college 
or academy.1 
Historically, an Islamic Studies program was first introduced in then indepen-
dent Malaya at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, with the formation of the 
Department of Islamic Studies in 1959. Professor Dr. Muhammad ‘Abdul Rauf, a 
renowned Islamic scholar from Egypt, was appointed as the first head of this depart-
ment. Later, in 1981, the University of Malaya expanded its Islamic Studies program 
from a departmental level program into a full fledged faculty known as the Acad-
emy of Islamic Studies, University of Malaya (AISMU). The academy comprised 
the following faculties - Shari`ah, Usul al-Din, Islamic Education and a Pre-Academy 
Program in Nilam Puri, Kelantan. AISMU offers BA degrees in Shari`ah, Usul al-Din 
and Islamic education. It started its MA programs several years ago, which was fol-
lowed by a PhD program a few years later.2  
The second Islamic Studies program in Malaysia, established in 1970, was the 
Faculty of Islamic Studies at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia in Petaling Jaya, Se-
langor. This faculty is made up of five departments, namely Usuluddin and Philoso-
phy, Shari`ah, Arabic Studies and Islamic Civilization, Qur’an and Sunnah Studies, 
Da`wah and Leadership Studies. It also offers MA and PhD programs in addition 
to the BA. From its formation Malay language (Bahasa Malaysia) was the official 
language of instruction. Nevertheless, the use of Arabic has remained important 
until today.3  
Another significant development in the Islamic Studies programs in Malaysia 
was the establishment of the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) 
in June 1983. A new mode of studying Islam was conceived and actualized in the 
university’s Kulliyyah (Faculty) of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences. 
From 1983 until 1990 Islamic Studies became a core university subject which com-
pelled all IIUM students from various faculties to study fundamental subjects in 
Islam such as Qur’an, Hadith, sirah (Biography of the Prophet Muhammad), Islamic 
theology, shari’ah, and akhlaq, in the Center for Fundamental Knowledge, better 
known as CFK. Professor Mohd. Kamal Hasan became the First Dean of CFK. In 
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1990, Dr. Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, one of the founders of the International In-
stitute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), an Islamic think-tank based in Virginia, USA, be-
came the second Rector of IIUM (1990-2000). Abdul Hamid introduced a new type 
of Islamic Studies program which he named Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowl-
edge and Human Sciences under his supervision was oriented towards the idea of 
the Islamization of knowledge, namely, that revealed knowledge subjects such as 
the Qur’an, the Sunnah and Sirah, must become the principle guidance for human 
sciences subjects which are in their essence heavily influenced by Western rational 
philosophy and methodology.4 Meanwhile, Abdul Hamid asserted the importance 
of the methodological study of subjects of Islamic revealed knowledge based on both 
the Qur’an and Sunnah sources, and the critical examination of the classical works. 
Only through proper Islamic methodological study could IRK students produce new 
thinking (tajdid al-fikry). Abdul Hamid also declared that the three core departments 
in IRK, namely, the Department of Qur’an and Sunnah, the Department of Usu-
luddin and Comparative Religion, and the Department of Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh 
(the Department of Islamic Ruling and the Science of Jurisprudence), did not aim 
to follow the models of al-Azhar, Egypt, or Madinah al-Munuwwarah, Saudi Arabia. 
The Kulliyyah’s M.A and PhD programs have been offered for over a decade now and 
some important academic research has been carried out by postgraduate students, 
such as the importance of understanding maqasid shari’ah (purposes of shari’ah), new 
thinking in the study of Tawhid as the guiding principle for the Islamization of 
knowledge, new methodologies in the study of tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis) and relating 
studies to modern necessities.5  
Another important development in Islamic Studies programs in Malaysia was 
the establishment in 1987 of the “Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization”, 
better known as ISTAC. It was founded by Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib al-
Attas, a prominent Malaysian Islamic scholar and philosopher. From its inception 
ISTAC aimed at providing a postgraduate studies and research program with the 
objective of training scholars and intellectual leaders to play creative roles in the 
restoration of Islamic thought and civilization to its rightful place.6 
In 1997 the Ministry of Education set up another Islamic Studies program, the 
College University of Islam Malaysia, better known in Bahasa Malaysia as the “Kolej 
Universiti Islam Malaysia” or KUIM, in Nilai, Negeri Sembilan. In 2007 KUIM 
changed its name and status to become USIM, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia. Ori-
ginally USIM planned to focus on producing purely scholars from the Islamic Stud-
ies program, following the pattern of the al-Azhar University model. However USIM 
finally revised its academic programs. USIM now follows almost the same model 
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as IIUM, Gombak, Selangor. Unlike IIUM, however, USIM admits only religious 
stream students. Yet these students are not only enrolled in Islamic Studies programs 
but are also taking law, medicine, dentistry, business and management, information 
technology and computer science, and languages. Another important niche of the 
USIM is their establishment of the Institute of the World Fatwa (INFAD) which 
aims at examining fatwas (Islamic rulings) from all parts in the world.7
SOME SELECTED ISLAMIC STUDIES PROGRAMS: 
A BRIEF SURVEY
In what follows I will outline the structure of a number of academic programs in Is-
lamic Studies (mainly at the undergraduate level) offered by a selection of Malaysian 
higher education institutions as a way of demonstrating an overall picture of the 
dynamism and practicality in the study of Islam in Malaysia.
The Islamic Academy, University of Malaya (AISMU)
The Islamic Academy of the University of Malaya (UM) is based on the teaching 
philosophy that the best form of academic training for their students is an integrated 
academic program with Arabic language as its primary medium. As a case in point, 
for students specializing in the BA Shari`ah, apart from the completion of 15 credit 
hours in courses such as Islamic Civilization and Asian Civilization, he or she also 
has to take another 30 credit hours in compulsory Shari’ah core courses, i.e., Intro-
duction to Shari`ah, Nazariyyat al-Hukum (theories on Islamic Legal Rulings), Fiqh 
al’Ibadat (Fiqh of Islamic Rituals), etc. One of the unique features in Shrai’ah studies 
is specialization in the following programs: i) Department of Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh; 
ii) Department of Shari`ah and Law; iii) Department of Shari’ah and Economy; iv) 
Department of Shari`ah and Management; v) Department of Siyasah Shar`iyyah (Reli-
gious Political Science); and vi) Department of Falak (Astronomy).8 Students specia-
lizing in courses offered in the Department of Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh, for instance, are 
required to take fundamental courses (51 credit hours) as part of their specialization. 
Among these courses are the following: Manahaj al-Fuqaha’ (Methodology of Muslim 
Jurists), Fiqh al-Jinayat (Fiqh on Criminology), Fiqh al-Zakat (Fiqh on Alms Giving), 
Studies on Hudud Laws, etc. Yet it should be noted that students are given the op-
portunity to select up to 15 credit hours in other related courses, such as Fiqh on 
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Women’s Affairs, Fiqh on Consumerism, and Fiqh on al-Ikhtilaf (Fiqh on Conflict 
of Opinion).9 
In AISMU’s Department of Shari`ah and Laws, among the compulsory subjects 
for students are the following: Introduction to the Legal System of Malaysia, Ma-
laysian Islamic Administration Laws, Criminal Law, Contract Law, Islamic Family 
Administration Law, etc. At the same time students also have the opportunity to 
select 15 credit hours in courses such as Islamic Law and Gender, Law and Violence 
towards Women, the Islamic Judicial system, etc. As for programs in the Department 
of Shari’ah and Economy, students have to take a number of compulsory subjects, 
such as Introduction to Islamic Economics, Introduction to Economics, the Islamic 
Banking System, Principals of Accountancy, the Malaysian Economy and Contem-
porary Issues, and others. In the elective courses for non-compulsory subjects, stu-
dents are able to select courses such as Conventional Economic Thought, Islamic 
Principles of Taxation, the Islamic Capital Market, Econometrics and Issues in Is-
lamic Economics.10  Based on this overview of the wide range of Shari’ah programs 
in AISMU, the Islamic Studies curriculum designers in this institution seem to have 
the aim of making Shari’ah subjects more acceptable to the local and global market.
Faculty of Islamic Studies, National University of Malaysia
From its inception the Faculty of Islamic Studies at the National University of Malay-
sia (NUM)11 had two principal objectives: (1) to produce well-trained graduates with 
skills in the field of Islamic Studies; and (2) to create a new generation whose under-
standing of Islam is sound and comprehensive, who have a healthy way of thinking, 
commitment, and sense of responsibility towards the nation and desire to create a 
disciplined society in line with the principles of Islam and its philosophy.12
Based on the above objectives the Faculty of Islamic Studies has introduced a 
wide range of courses. Let us examine the academic programs offered by the De-
partment of Usuluddin and Philosophy. For the B.A. degree, students have to take 
about 60 courses totalling 110 credit hours. Apart from taking foundation courses in 
Islamic Studies, such as Usuluddin (Islamic Theology), Akhlaq (morals) and Tasawwuf 
(mysticism), Fiqh `Ibadah (Ritual Fiqh) and Mu`amalat (Social Transaction), Metho-
dology of Fiqh, Methodology of the Qur’an and al-Hadith, Contemporary Islamic 
Thought, Islamic Leadership and Islamic Management, undergraduate students are 
also required to take foundation courses offered by the department. These compul-
sory courses comprise the following: the Study of Qur’anic Exegesis, Islamic Philoso-
phy, the Study of Hadith, `Ilmu Kalam (Islamic Theology), Comparative Religion, 
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Modern Philosophy, Contemporary Study of the Qur’an, and Logic and Critical 
Thinking. Apart from these courses a student specializing in Usuluddin and Phi-
losophy also has to take the normal compulsory university courses, namely, Islamic 
Civilisation and Kenegaraan (Nationhood) and General Studies (Pengajian Umum). 
Students are also required to choose a number of elective courses related to the study 
of religion, such as the Sociology of Religion, the Anthropology of Religion, and the 
Contemporary Study of Religion.13
Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences (IIUM)
The International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) set up its Kulliyyah of Islam-
ic Revealed Knowledge and Heritage in 1990. It offered three academic programs at 
the BA and postgraduate levels, namely, Islamic Theology and Comparative Religion, 
Fiqh (Islamic Legal Rulings) and Usul al-Fiqh (the Science of Islamic Jurisprudence) 
and Qur’an and Sunnah studies. For the BA program in Islamic Theology and Islamic 
Thought an undergraduate student has to take 36 credit hours or 12 subjects in 
foundation courses such as the Qur’an, the Islamic ‘Aqidah, Islamic Ethics, Sciences 
of the Qur’an, Sciences of the Hadith, Creative Thinking and Problem-Solving, etc. 
Apart from these subjects students are required to take another 20 subjects which 
are equivalent to 60 credit hours. Among these courses are the following: Issues 
in Tasawwuf, al-Firaq (sectarianism), Usuluddin 1 & 2, Contemporary Moral Issues, 
Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought, Critical Review of Philosophy in Islam, 
History of Western Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Science. Students must also 
choose 4 courses (12 credit hours) in elective courses such as Introduction to Eco-
nomics, Introduction to Law, Parenting, and the Geography of the Muslim World. 
Finally, students also take 4 subjects in general skills courses.14
In the Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization or ISTAC (also at IIUM), 
the majority of courses offered follows the previous curriculum established in the 
time of Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib al-‘Attas, who founded ISTAC in 1987 
and was its First Founder-Director. The present curriculum provides postgraduate 
areas of research and concentration comprising Islamic and other Civilizations, Phi-
losophy, Theology, Ethics and Contemporary Issues, Islamic Spirituality and Con-
temporary Society, Islamic Science and the Contemporary Muslim World: Regions 
and Issues. The strong feature of ISTAC’s academic curriculum is reflected in its 
ability to provide famous academics who have a high international reputation.15 
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Faculty of Leadership and Management (USIM)
At the Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia (USIM) several integrated courses have been 
introduced as in other Islamic higher education institutions. Perhaps one can exa-
mine the present Faculty of Leadership and Management (FLM). Normally, Islamic 
higher learning institutions like to repeat the da’wah programs in some Middle Eas-
tern universities. Nevertheless, at USIM the main idea of the FLM is to produce 
Muslim preachers (du’at) who are well equipped with specific skills like communica-
tion, management, psychology, etc. According to Professor Mat Asin Dollah, one 
of the founders of FLM, USIM believes that FLM’s academic programs are able to 
produce resilient Muslim preachers who are able to face the onslaught of modern 
and global challenges.16
 
RESPONSES BY MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS
TO THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC 
STUDIES PROGRAMS
Although numerous prominent Malaysian scholars in Islamic Studies have recently 
devoted considerable attention to issues of modernity, globalization, and the post-
September 11 2001 international situation, it should not be forgotten that debate 
about the necessity for change in Islamic Studies curricula offered by Malaysia’s high-
er education institutions has been taking place since the early 1980s, and even ear-
lier. In an important paper delivered in 1978 the prominent Islamic Studies scholar 
and current Rector of IIUM, Professor Mohd. Kamal Hasan, addressed the issue of 
the place of Islamic Studies in contemporary Malaysia.17 He called on the authori-
ties not to posit Islamic Studies at the periphery of Malaysian education and society 
since its main purpose was to serve the Creator (Allah swt). He argued that courses 
on Islam for students of Islamic Studies had to clearly explain the relationship be-
tween the universe, man, society, historical change, and contemporary reality. The 
approach of such courses must take into consideration prevailing thought patterns 
and categories of thought within their rational, secular, and empirical setting.18 
Almost two decades later in 1997 Professor Mohd. Kamal Hasan delivered an-
other impressive paper discussing the direction of Islamic Studies in contemporary 
Southeast Asia at an international conference on Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia, 
organized by the newly established College of Islamic Studies at Prince of Songkhla 
University in southern Thailand. He declared the necessity for scholars of Islamic 
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Studies to carry out several levels of reform and renewal so that Islamic Studies could 
play a more effective role within Muslim Southeast Asia. Among the most important 
steps that needed to be immediately taken were the following. First, Islamic Stu-
dies needed to produce not only a profound critique of the conventional ideology 
of development (or of “catching up with the West”) but also more up-to-date and 
relevant courses of al-mu`amalat (transactions). Second, fiqh al-siyasah (the science of 
governance in Islam) required reform as a result of the global movement for democ-
ratization, human rights, and the empowerment of oppressed sections of human 
society. The world has left behind the classical classifications and formulations of 
dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam), dar al-harb (the abode of war), and dar al-‘ahd (the 
abode of covenant) and new realities were forcing Muslim scholars to theorize new 
conceptualizations of Islamic jurisprudence, such as fiqh jadid (new approaches to 
the study of fiqh). New subjects were being developed, such as fiqh of priorities (fiqh 
al-awlawiyyat), a discipline which emphasizes the importance of learning and doing 
things which are important to the current Muslim situation. For example, forming 
a knowledge-based society is considered more important than implementing hudud 
law. Another new subject of fiqh is fiqh for minorities (fiqh aqalliyyat), which focuses 
on issues of rulings and principles where Muslims are a minority in non-Islamic 
countries. There is also what is known as fiqh siyasah shar’iyyah, a comprehensive 
discipline which explains different principles in dealing with many contemporary 
aspects such as politics, administration, economy, society, and so forth.19
The recent phenomenon of globalization has caught the attention of another 
prominent Malaysian scholar of Islamic studies, Siddiq Fadzil, the present Rector 
of the College of Darul Hikmah, a private Islamic college run by ABIM (one of the 
leading Islamic movements in Malaysia).20 Discussing the dangers of globalization 
for the education sector Siddiq Fadzil predicted that the current trend towards the 
commercialization of higher education would eventually result in intellectual centers 
becoming irrelevant to the aspirations of the ummah. Institutions of higher learning 
were becoming out of touch with the Muslim community because they served only 
the capitalists. Consequently, the thinking of the ummah is being moulded not by 
scholarship in the intellectual domain but rather by media propaganda.21 Another 
negative effect of globalization was the missing dimension of the close relationship 
between teachers and students. Siddiq Fadzil posed the following question to advo-
cates of globalization: what would happen to future generations of Malaysians when 
the student-teacher relationship no longer involved eye-to-eye contact? He pointed 
out the concerns of the noted social forecaster John Naisbitt, who argued that the 
present phenomenon of “high tech” without “high touch” was harmful to the dig-
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nity of man as intoxication with technology risked rendering man ignorant of his 
own tastes and consciousness.22
Undeniably the aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks on the United 
States has been a shock to scholars of Islamic Studies in Malaysia and to the field it-
self. Siddiq Fazil predicted that the tragic event would have unfortunate implications 
for Islamic Studies programs in the West, particularly in the United States. Some 
scholars worry that their hopes to see a new, more objective form of Orientalism 
emerge in the West may have been dashed. Rather, as the late Edward Said predict-
ed, it appears that a new form of Orientalism may be taking hold, which serves the 
interests of American neo-colonialism. In the face of these bleak events and the chal-
lenges that they pose a new paradigm of thinking must be sought in Islamic Studies, 
where programs must be strong, relevant to present realities, responsive to economic 
development, have strong appeal at the global level, and, most importantly, have 
the ability to reveal the true beauty of Islam. To realize this task there is an urgent 
need to develop a framework of Occidentalism (al-istighrab) with a healthy knowledge 
methodology in order to marginalize the present trend towards neo-Orientalism.23
Emeritus Professor Dr. Osman Bakar, a well known Muslim scientist and phi-
losopher, has expressed similar concerns to those of Siddiq Fadzil. He argues that 
it is our duty to give special attention to this American agenda. He has suggested 
that Islamic Studies programs ought to maintain their traditional curricula while at 
the same time offering more courses on contemporary subjects, including special 
courses on Islam and the West. With this kind of curriculum we can defend the Is-
lamic identity of the ummah which is under constant attack. In reality, the condition 
for success is having confidence in our own Islamic identity.24  
In sum, it is clear that contemporary scholars in Islamic Studies face great chal-
lenges in designing strong, sustainable Islamic Studies curricula in the mist of the 
apparently unstoppable wave of globalization. Many conditions must be fulfilled in 
order to ensure success. Among these are those pointed out by Kamal Hassan in 
his call for the reform of Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia: “the reform agenda of 
Islamic Studies obviously is contingent upon a tajdid frame of mind, a determina-
tion to achieve quality of higher education and research output despite the odds, a 
redesign of curriculum, a reinventing of the academician and an anchorage in a new 
culture of quality and excellence.”25 Now, we will examine briefly some of the efforts 
developed by these Islamic Studies institutions in reforming their Islamic Studies 
curricula. 
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Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Heritage, IIUM
Wan Sobri Wan Yusuf, the Deputy Dean (Student Affairs) of the Kulliyyah of Islamic 
Revealed Knowledge and Heritage (IRKH) at the International Islamic University 
of Malaysia (IIUM), was in the first batch of graduates from IIUM in 1987. He 
echoes the thinking of Kamal Hassan. According to Wan Sobri, courses in IRKH are 
designed to specifically address modern ideological problems and challenges. One 
of the main priorities of IRKH is how to actualize the vision of the Islamization of 
knowledge in the human sciences through human sciences departments. Wan Sobri 
sees many courses offered in IRKH as being dynamic in nature. The innovative 
nature of the program is such that it could even be said that such courses are not 
available in the established traditional Islamic universities in the Arab world, such as 
al-Azhar in Cairo or the Islamic University of Madinah, Saudi Arabia. For instance, 
IIUM requires all of its students to take a university-wide course called Tawhid and 
Methodology of Sciences. Clearly, this course is important in teaching the idea of 
tawhid (unity of God) and its relation to revealed knowledge (‘ulum naqliyy) and ac-
quired knowledge (‘ulum ‘aqliyy).26 
According to Wan Sobri, the strength of the IRKH curriculum lies in its multi-
disciplinary approach, where the integration of knowledge becomes the main objec-
tive. Wan Sobri is fully confident that graduates of IRKH can adjust themselves to 
whatever societal settings. It is very encouraging to see graduates of IRKH in the 
process of making their names as ‘ulama and Muslim professionals with versatile 
Islamic features not only in the local scene but more and more in the international 
arena. Today, graduates of IRKH (IIUM) have been incorporated as executive offi-
cers in the Malaysian Civil Service and Diplomatic Service because of their com-
mand of English and Arabic. Another encouraging development is that some IRKH 
graduates, particularly foreigners, have been able to get excellent jobs in their res-
pective countries. One foreign IRKH graduate has been recognized as one of the 
most respectable scholars on Islamic shari`ah and is a member of many important 
international fatwa committees.27  
With regard to the issue of postmodernism in the Muslim world Wan Sobri is 
confident that IRKH courses have the ability to face up to such fashionable trends. 
He makes no apology for reaffirming that authority in religion must be entrusted to 
the ‘ulama as prescribed in the Qur’an and Hadith. However, Wan Sobri also recog-
nizes the fact that ‘ulama today cannot monopolize their religious knowledge with-
out listening to scholars from different disciplines, i.e. economics, finance, biology, 
etc. Academicians who have no proper training in the social sciences are therefore 
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required to undergo special courses, while academic staff in the social sciences are 
reciprocally required to attend special advanced classes in Islamic Studies.28
Wan Sobri points out that the IRKH Curriculum Committee is tasked to com-
prehensively review its curriculum every two years, during which it seeks academic 
advice from prominent Islamic scholars in different subjects from different parts 
of the world. In spite of these academic achievements Wan Sobri admits that some 
courses in IRKH, such as the study of the Qur’an and Sunnah, require more specific 
attention. Some issues relating to the classical study of these two foundational sub-
jects, as discussed by certain prominent scholars such as the late Shaikh Muhammad 
al-Ghazali, Shaikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, Syaikh Taha Jabir al-‘Ilwani, Fazlur Rahman 
and others, need to be widely exposed to students. According to Wan Sobri, these 
two important subjects must be studied using a contextual framework, rather than 
through history alone.29
Another important contribution of IRKH according to Wan Sabri is in the 
field of comparative religion. In fact, IRKH graduates are equipped with a strong 
foundation in comparative religious study. There are both intellectual and practi-
cal justifications for this program. First, it is in line with the Islamic intellectual 
tradition in which noted Muslim scholars were also scholars of other religions, such 
as al-Biruni, Ibn Hazm, al-Naubakhti, among others. The IRKH has also drawn in-
spiration from a number of prominent contemporary Muslim scholars who have 
established programs in comparative religious studies, such as the late Isma’il Raji al-
Faruqi of Temple University, Fazlur Rahman of Chicago University, Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr of George Washington University, Mahmoud Ayoub from Temple University, 
and others. Second, Malaysia is a multi-racial and multi-religious country and is thus 
in a unique position for scholars of Islamic Studies to easily study at first hand local 
religious traditions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Sikhism, and Christian-
ity. It is hoped that through this comparative religious studies program a healthy 
tradition of comparative religions may one day flourish in Malaysia, as was once the 
case in Andalusia.30    
Muddathir ‘Abdel Rahim, Professor of Islamic Political Thought at ISTAC, re-
gards ISTAC’s curriculum as perhaps one of the best programs in post-graduate stu-
dies in the Islamic world. Having taught in many universities in the Middle East and 
Western universities Muddathir attributes this dynamism to the academic leadership 
of Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib al-‘Attas, the Founder Director of ISTAC. He 
views the curriculum’s strengths as lying in its core courses in Theology, Islamic Phi-
losophy, Islamic Culture, Islamic Civilization and the Social Sciences. During the 
directorship of Al-‘Attas ISTAC managed to attract many prominent international 
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Islamic scholars. In response to criticisms of ISTAC from some quarters that it is 
a fortress of classical Islamic thought, Muddathir defends ISTAC for the way it has 
produced what he regards as a remarkable academic achievement in blending  con-
temporary issues with the traditional study of the Islamic classical works, whereby 
postgraduate students are able to master the appropriate methodology in Islamic 
Sciences. They too, says Muddathir, are competing in reading and understanding 
selected great Islamic classical works such as Hujjatul Islam al-Ghazali, Imam al-
As’ari, Al-Razi, al-Biruni, Imam al-Shafi’e, Ibn Rushd and so forth. As a result of 
this policy ISTAC’s academic contributions have been internationally recognized 
as one of the most prestigious institutions for postgraduate Islamic Studies in the 
world. ISTAC has been able to produce a number of excellent Islamic scholars in 
various fields. Among the names that can be mentioned here are Mustafa Cerich, 
an Islamic scholar in Islamic theology who is now Rais al-‘Ulama to the Government 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kamar Oniah Kamaruzzaman, an Islamic scholar of com-
parative religion in IRKH, IIUM, and Ugi Suharto, a well-known Islamic scholar in 
the History of Islamic Economics at IIUM, Gombak, Selangor. In addition, ISTAC 
has published a considerable amount of high quality scholarship in Islamic Studies 
produced by their scholars in various disciplines, some of which has been translated 
into world languages.31
In response to the issues of modernity ISTAC successfully organized a major 
international symposium on “Islam and the Challenge of Modernity” in August, 
1994 which Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib al-‘Attas, the then Founder-Director 
of ISTAC, described as unique not only in this region of Southeast Asia, but perhaps 
also in the contemporary Muslim world. The symposium brought together diverse 
scholars from different theological, legal, and intellectual leanings both from within 
and outside the Islamic tradition.32
Faculty of Islamic Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University 
of Malaysia) 
In illustrating the achievements of the Faculty of Islamic Studies (FIS) at Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), one of the faculty’s founders, Faisal Othman, pointed 
out that the Faculty has been successfully producing Muslim professionals since 
1974, many of whom currently occupy influential posts in Malaysia’s public sector. 
In retrospect, the Faculty’s decision in its early days to make the Islamic Studies 
curriculum flexible, in contrast to the rigidity of some traditional institutions, has 
been proved to have been correct. It has ensured that many of its graduates who are 
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at present scholars of Islamic Studies were exposed to Western methodologies in the 
social sciences. Today the command of such methodologies is clearly recognized as 
an asset to graduates of Islamic Studies.33
At the same time, however, the FIS does have a number of concerns about 
certain aspects of the FIS’s programs. For example, Faisal admitted the fact that 
declining standards in Arabic language among the present FIS undergraduates has 
tarnished the image of FIS. He also pointed out that in his opinion it is not neces-
sary to design new courses to face the challenges of globalization, modernity and 
post-9/11. For him, students must command the Arabic language since Arabic is 
the most important tool in understanding the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and other aspects 
of the Islamic heritage. Nevertheless, Faisal admitted the importance of knowing 
English in order to give undergraduate students the confidence and courage to be in 
the mainstream of national and international affairs. He expressed his deep concern 
about the somewhat simplistic attitudes towards current global events among the 
Faculty members which may hinder the healthy on-going process towards reforming 
the Islamic Studies curriculum. For example, the contemporary challenges of mo-
dernity, globalization and post-9/11 have seemingly not stimulated some scholars to 
thinking beyond the oft-repeated but simplistic mantra that “Islam is the solution” 
(al-Islam huwa al-hallu). This sort of thinking is all too apparent when they dismiss cat-
egorically the modern thinking expounded by some contemporary modern Muslim 
scholars such as Isma’il Raji al-Faruqi (USA), Fazlur Rahman (USA), Hassan Hanafi 
(Egypt), Mohammad Fathi Osman (USA), and others as kufr. Although a legitimate 
criticism can be made that there are some fundamental flaws in the arguments of 
some of these scholars from a Qur’anic and Hadith point of view, nevertheless, some 
of their critiques have some legitimacy. Such simplistic dismissals of important argu-
ments suggest that these academicians in FIS may lack both courage and a sound 
Islamic methodology.34
Faisal also mentioned that the FIS in UKM and other Islamic studies institu-
tions in the country had been pressured indirectly by some concerned quarters, 
both outside and inside the country, to review some Islamic Studies subjects such 
as jihad in the context of Qur’anic and Sunnah studies. This was in response to the 
aftermath of the September 11 2001 and the international “war on terror” led by the 
USA and its allies. Faisal reaffirmed his conviction that the doctrine of jihad taught 
in FIS is strictly in line with the teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The princi-
ples are clear, and scholars in Islamic Studies have not in any way been required to 
change their teachings on jihad because of pressures from outsiders. On the bigger 
issue of the challenge of globalization to the FIS, Faisal seems unconcerned. The 
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Faculty’s main focus, as he sees it, is not to produce a large number of ‘ulama for 
the global market but rather for local consumption. Faisal justified his argument on 
this point with a verse from the Qur’an in which God says: “And it is not proper for the 
believers to go out to fight (jihad) all together. Of every troop of them, a party only should go 
forth, that they (who are left behind), may get instructions in (Islamic religion), and that they 
may warn their people when they return to them, so that they may be aware (of evil).” (Surah 
al-Taubah: 122).35    
The Academy of Islamic Studies, University of Malaya
The Academy of Islamic Studies at the University of Malaya (AISMU) is recognized 
as one of the most advanced higher learning institutions of its kind in Malaysia. 
Over a considerable period of time it has been providing new and innovative pro-
grams in Islamic Studies to its students. It currently offers four BA degrees with 
16 specializations, including the recent BA degree in Applied Science and Islamic 
Studies. Ruzman Md. Noor, presently Deputy Dean for Undergraduate and Student 
Affairs at the Academy, explains that the rationale of AISMU’s dynamic curriculum 
is to enable its students to acquire a command of courses in Islamic heritage (al-
turath al-Islami) through the use of classical and modern Arabic language, while at the 
same time ensuring that students also take numerous applied courses. The ability 
of AISMU to repeatedly develop original courses in different faculties demonstrates 
a considerable degree of creative thinking among its academic staff. For example, 
AISMU is the only Islamic higher learning institution in the country to offer a spe-
cial course on Islam and Gender. Some new courses are deeply rooted in the local 
context, such as Islam and Malay Society and Culture, Political Islam in Malaysia, 
Politics and Malaysian Society, etc.36 
Ruzman attributes the success of this integrated approach in AISMU’s Islamic 
Studies program to its academic integrity. In spite of the fact that their academic 
staff come from both traditional and modern backgrounds, they have been able to 
cooperate to produce a practical model of Islamic Studies that is relevant to contem-
porary Malaysian society. That is, neither the model of al-Azhar, in Cairo, Egypt nor 
al-Madinah al-Munawwarah in Saudi Arabia, is absorbed completely into AISMU’s 
curriculum. Rather, the curriculum takes into account the distinct social, political, 
and religious setting in Malaysia. As for the issue of the Salafi orientation among 
some lecturers who are graduates from Madinah al-Munawwarah University, Ruz-
man believes that these lecturers have not created major problems among students, 
particularly in the sphere of Islamic theology. Despite the fact that the Salafi have 
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some reservations about the thought of certain famous Muslim theologians such as 
Imam al-Asy’ari, Imam al-Ghazali, Imam al-Juwayni and others, they acknowledge 
the fact that the views on Islamic theology of such famous Muslim theologians have 
been adopted in Malaysia a long time ago within Islamic Studies centers, both tradi-
tional and modern. Ruzman believes that AISMU has the potential to train compe-
tent ‘ulama imbued with the spirit of tajdid (renewal) in their thinking and actions. 
This conviction can be attributed to the fact that AISMU provides ample time for 
its students to master Arabic language in the AISMU’s Preparatory Islamic Stud-
ies Center located in Kota Bharu in the state of Kelantan. In addition, AISMU’s 
shari`ah program is also strong in terms of content and methodology and is recog-
nized by many prominent scholars of shari`ah studies as highly progressive.37
Faculty of Leadership and Management (USIM) 
Another institution that has introduced an integrated curriculum in its program is 
the Faculty of Leadership and Management (FLM) at the University Sains Islam Ma-
laysia (USIM), Nilai, Negeri Sembilan. The BA degree in Dakwah (Islamic Mission-
ary Work) is tied up with courses in modern management. Apart from the compul-
sory university courses, Faculty foundational courses and elective courses, students 
must complete 60 credit hours in core courses offered in the Faculty. Some of these 
courses include, Principles and Theory of Leadership, Islam and Contemporary 
Issues, Human Resources Management, Islamic Work Ethics and Organizational 
Management, Planning and Strategy. One of the main objectives of USIM’s FLM is 
to create a competitive spirit among its preachers (du`at), instill strong and progres-
sive leadership qualities, and enable them to empower human resources.38 In our 
opinion, this kind of integrated program has been widely accepted in the public and 
private sectors where graduates from USIM have been able to obtain attractive jobs 
as professionals and executives.39 
IMPROVING THE PRESENT CURRICULUM 
OF ISLAMIC STUDIES
It is clear, then, that calls for reform in Islamic Studies programs and courses well 
predate the present concerns related to globalization and the aftermath of the Sep-
tember 11 2001 tragedy. As a matter of fact, the Islamic Studies curriculum experts 
152
Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia
in Malaysia designed this program from as far back as the early 1970s. Moreover, 
these calls have met with positive and often very dynamic responses from the vari-
ous programs in Islamic Studies offered by Malaysian higher education institutions. 
Much progress has been made in reformulating usuluddin (Islamic theology), shari’ah 
(Islamic law) and dakwah (Islamic missionary) courses taking into account Malaysia’s 
distinct social environment. Nonetheless, in view of the unprecedented nature of 
the contemporary challenge to Islamic Studies programs it is timely for scholars of 
Islamic Studies to seriously consider the urgent calls for reform made by Professor 
Mohd. Kamal Hassan. First and foremost at this critical juncture in the development 
of Islamic Studies programs one must give serious thought about new thinking in the 
study of fiqh. Perhaps, one can agree with the view of Shaikh Yusuf al-Qardawi who 
has coined the special term for fiqh of the priorities (fiqh al-awlawiyyat).40 This new 
disciple must become one of the major courses which determines the overall design 
of courses in shari’ah studies. In the context of Usuluddin subjects, for instance, there 
is a pressing need to see its courses deal with the latest developments in philosophy, 
the natural sciences, the social sciences and comparative religions. Despite the fact 
that all the Islamic Studies programs in the Islamic higher learning institutions have 
incorporated these ideas into some of their courses, it is essential that the content of 
such courses should always reflect the highest academic standards.
In addition it can perhaps be said that courses on shari`ah have advanced much 
more than in other disciplines. It is interesting today that the subject of mu`amalat 
(transactions) appears to be very popular among students because it deals with the 
idea of Islamic financial products, and thus has direct relevance to the job market 
in the growing industry of Islamic finance. However, despite these encouraging de-
velopments shari`ah courses ought to be more dynamic in nature since recently the 
question of shari`a and its relation to modernity and change has caught the attention 
of many people in Malaysia – both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, professionals, 
politicians, administrators, NGO leaders and others. In this connection new courses 
that relate the study of Islam to issues of human rights, democracy, civil society, plu-
ral society, non-violence, freedom of expression, conflict resolution, international 
and strategic studies, contemporary economic thought, globalization, etc., should 
be considered a priority. Some of these courses are addressed specifically in the 
Department of Siyasah Shari’iyyah (the Islamic principle of governance) at AISMU. 
Meanwhile, the subject of usul al-fiqh, as one of the most important methodologies 
in shari’ah studies, should also be given a new orientation since conventional theo-
ries of usul fiqh in certain areas require revision. Therefore, there is a pressing need 
to develop new principles of usul al-fiqh. This is in line with the opinions of some 
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prominent scholars in usul al-fiqh such as Hassan al-Turabi of Sudan, Muhammad 
‘Ali Jumu`aah, the present Mufti of Egypt, and others.
 With regard to dakwah studies, despite the fact that USIM’s Faculty of Leader-
ship and Management has succeeded in introducing modern courses in contempo-
rary management studies in order to prevent da’wah studies from becoming static, 
the FLM of USIM are seemingly still not able to produce a substantial academic 
literature pertaining to the science of leadership and management from an Islamic 
perspective. Moreover, the courses currently offered in traditional dakwah subjects 
appear somewhat artificial in that they are still heavily influenced by the Kulliyyah 
of Dawah wal Wa’z wal-Irshad (the Faculty of Islamic Missionary Work, Advice and 
Guidance) model from Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. Perhaps one can be-
gin to look into the importance of “cross-cultural” dakwah as a new subject to be 
thought out, since it is imperative for students in dakwah programs to know the 
multi-religious and multi-cultural setting in this region so that they can have a bet-
ter understanding and awareness of other religions, traditions, and cultures while 
remaining Muslims in their own religious tradition.41  
In addition, the authentic science of Islamic leadership and management seems 
to be missing from this otherwise convincing picture. Thus, it is imperative for the 
Malaysian experts in Islamic Studies curricula to redesign the program to produce 
a more systematic course of study in the science of Islamic leadership and manage-
ment. FLM should also seriously consider designing new courses that examine the 
roles of NGOs in society as NGOs become more vital globally.
On a broader level two important courses that ought to be introduced imme-
diately into contemporary Islamic Studies programs are Inter-Civilization Dialogue 
and the Study of Occidentalism. Such courses are needed not only at an intellectual 
but also a practical level, because they will help instill confidence in graduates of Is-
lamic Studies that they can play important roles not only in a pluralistic society such 
as Malaysia, but equally importantly as participants in the global scene.
Besides this, in more specific terms it is timely for the Islamic Studies programs 
in Malaysia to review some of the approaches to the conventional study of kalam 
(scholastic theology), philosophy, tafsir and hadith disciplines. Top priority should 
be given to the critical scholarship on how to develop new methodologies for ‘ilm 
al-Kalam as well as the Islamic critiques of modernism and postmodernism. It is 
also important that the contemporary mufassir and muhaddith are reexamined with 
a critical view to some of the classical interpretations.42 In recent years many liberal-
minded Muslim scholars such as Mohammed Arkoun, Hassan Hanafi, Nasr Hamid 
Abu Zaid, Ibrahim Musa and others have challenged the authenticity of classical 
154
Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia
mufassir and muhaddith in dealing with some of the most pressing problems of mod-
ern times. It is essential that Islamic Studies programs respond to these criticisms by 
contributing to the intellectual discourse, rather than disengaging from such debate 
or adopting passive thinking. 
CONCLUSION
Despite the challenges currently facing the field of Islamic Studies in Malaysia’s 
institutions of higher learning the orientation for change is clear. But the kinds of 
change being considered and carried out by Malaysian scholars of Islam are certainly 
not a spontaneous reaction to recent new threats to the field, nor a response to out-
side pressures. Rather, such change and development has been taking place over a 
long period and has its own natural momentum. Yet scholars in the field maintain a 
strong conviction that the nature of Islamic Studies courses and the Islamic heritage 
on which it is based – the Qur’an and Sunnah – has its own strength. Islamic Studies 
will confidently face and overcome whatever challenges the future may bring. Per-
haps this sort of self-belief can be traced to a source of wisdom found in the Islamic 
philosophy of science: 
“Forming new Islamic thinking by way of blending the past Is-
lamic heritage with the present realities and using the legitimate 
methodology of knowledge based on the Qur’an and Sunnah”43
Adhering to this philosophy one can be certain that Islamic Studies will not be 
marginalized by the present global situation. Rather, as a field of scholarship it will 
continue to be creative, innovative, and responsive to the rapidly changing world.
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CHAPTER NINE
ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN MAINLAND 
SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE DILEMMAS OF 
MUSLIM MINORITIES1
Omar Farouk Bajunid
INTRODUCTION
Education is fundamental to Islam.2 Theoretically, Islam is supposed to be inse-parable from knowledge and education. Muslim scholars will cite sources from 
the Qur’an and showing that Islam is symbiotically and inseparably linked to knowl-
edge and education. The full realization of one’s obligations and indeed potential 
to observe Islam cannot possibly be realized without a strong foundation in Islamic 
knowledge. The concept of knowledge in Islam is both holistic and practical. Edu-
cation in Islam is supposed to promote human dignity and enhance the human 
personality. Islamic literacy defined broadly as the ability to read and understand 
the Qur’an and to know the basic Islamic principles and practices to facilitate prac-
tice of the faith is obligatory for Muslims regardless of their background. Likewise, 
the principle of individual accountability in Islam requires Muslims to account for 
everything they do in their daily lives; what they do or fail to do, what they say or 
not say, what they eat and what they think. It is obvious that Muslims need guidance 
through knowledge and education to help them face their daily lives.
Muslim scholars will argue that, as made explicit in several Qur’anic injunc-
tions, the status of those who possess knowledge and those who do not cannot pos-
sibly be the same.3 Thus, in an important sense although Muslims may claim that 
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Islam is egalitarian in character, in terms of giving every individual Muslim the op-
portunity to seek knowledge and to apply it in the pursuit of good deeds, in reality, 
the Muslim ummah will be a hierarchical community because of the different levels 
of knowledge and piety that different people acquire. The ‘ulama, as the custodians 
of knowledge and the Islamic tradition and as promoters of education, have a special 
role in Islam and are usually recognized as exemplary leaders. 
Islam also cannot be understood just as a religion in the narrow sense of the 
word as it is not simply about rites, rituals, rules and doctrines. Islam too, is not just 
about spirituality but also encompasses every aspect of human life. Islamic education 
is designed to empower every individual believer with the appropriate knowledge 
and means to seek and find the right answers to life. Thus, Muslims across time 
and space need to learn about the fundamental principles of Islam, its worldview, 
laws, practices, history, languages and of course, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which 
constitute the foundation of Islam. At the same time they must relate to the broader 
spectrum of knowledge in every known and new field, including those which relate 
to worldly matters, that emerges with each rising generation. 
From the foregoing it seems obvious that for Muslims to be able to harness 
the full potential of their Islamic faith they will not only need a firm grounding in 
Islamic education conceptualized in the broadest sense but also have to secure the 
right conditions which will grant them the freedom and ability to practise their faith 
unimpeded. But this is where the contradictions between the Islamic ideals and 
the realities on the ground begin to appear, especially when Muslims, as has often 
been the case, may not be in full control of the wider social, cultural, and political 
environments to which they belong and the events which have overtaken them. The 
peculiarities of the specific contexts in which Muslim communities exist invariably 
tend to affect the way in which they are able to meet their religious obligations as 
Muslims without undermining their position as members of the wider society. Thus, 
the external environmental variables cannot be underestimated in any attempt to 
evaluate how Muslim minorities try to reconcile the comprehensive demands of 
their faith with the practical realities of their immediate contexts which may or may 
not have anything to do with Islam at all. The situation of the Muslims in mainland 
Southeast Asia also has to be seen and understood within this perspective. 
This chapter examines the educational dilemmas facing the Muslim minorities 
of mainland Southeast Asia.4 It takes the view that these dilemmas cannot be sepa-
rated from the political dilemmas confronting them. There is a need, therefore, to 
understand the different national, social, cultural, economic, ethnic, historical, and 
demographic contexts within which Muslim minorities have to operate in order to 
161
Islamic Education in Mainland Southeast Asia:
The Dilemmas of Muslim Minorities
appreciate the dilemmas that they face collectively or as religious minorities of their 
respective nations. Likewise, the internal constraints within the respective Muslim 
communities, including their inability to develop a more liberal, constructive, and 
imaginative understanding of their religion and its demands, as well as the appropri-
ate responses to the challenges of modernity and change, have also compounded 
their dilemmas. The chapter holds the view that the Muslim minorities of mainland 
Southeast Asia have always assumed a significant role in their respective polities. For 
centuries they were able to co-exist with other cultures and peoples in the region 
peacefully and amicably. The problems that Muslims face as citizens of their respec-
tive countries have always been a function of the interplay of many factors beyond 
their control. However, the Muslims have also never been a monolithic group. They 
have always been and continue to be characterized by diversity, but within this more 
pluralistic setting they also share common characteristics and have developed over-
lapping networks to reinforce their collective religious and cultural identity which 
cuts across different countries. 
The Muslims of mainland Southeast Asia are an integral part of the Jawi tradi-
tion that has emerged to give Islam in Southeast Asia its distinctive feature.5 Sym-
bolically and functionally the Jawi tradition developed its own identity which was 
distinctively indigenous without undermining its Islamic character and cognitive 
characteristics. Although the Jawi tradition is often associated mainly with Malay 
culture, it actually goes beyond this to also include other vernacular cultures like the 
Cham. Historically, the Jawi network developed in many regional centres, but for 
centuries the Patani region on the Malay peninsula was one of its principal centres. 
It is partly the attempt to try to sustain the relevance of the Jawi tradition in its new 
form that appears to have aggravated the political difficulties for Muslims in that 
part of Thailand today.6 For the Muslims of southern Thailand today, not to try to 
keep that tradition alive would be tantamount to rejecting their past existence and 
cultural heritage. Their problems have been compounded by the fact that recent 
political developments have made it extremely unlikely that they would be able to 
set the agenda for educational change independently without the political sanction 
of the state and its agenda. The nature of the new nation-states that have emerged in 
mainland Southeast Asia as well as their political systems, regimes and policies have 
become critical factors in determining the options that are available to the Muslim 
minorities in their attempts to preserve their religion and their socio-religious iden-
tity.
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This chapter discusses the comparative national contexts within which the role 
of Islam has evolved in Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. It surveys the va- ri-
ous dimensions of the Islamic educational scenario in the region. The significance 
and symbolism of the Jawi tradition will then be evaluated. The concluding part of 
the chapter will consider the most pressing educational problems that confront the 
Muslim minorities today, and the options that they may have before them.
COMPARATIVE NATIONAL CONTEXTS
The nation-state in mainland Southeast Asia is a recent phenomenon. The way it 
has evolved, especially in its early formative years, has greatly affected the position of 
Muslims in their respective countries. In terms of size, population, ethnic composi-
tion, political system, and recent history there are significant differences between 
Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The position of Theravada Buddhism is 
dominant in Thailand and Cambodia.7 Both have a constitutional monarchy and 
practise a form of parliamentary democracy. Both Laos and Vietnam also have a 
large Buddhist population (the former Theravada Buddhist, the latter predominant-
ly Mahayana) but it is the atheistic doctrine of communism which is the sole political 
ideology of these states. With a population of over 80 million people Vietnam is the 
most populous country in mainland Southeast Asia, followed by Thailand with ap-
proximately 65 million, Cambodia with about 13.5 million, and Laos with almost 6 
million. Each of these countries is multi-ethnic and multi-religious.
The national experiences of the countries of mainland Southeast Asia appear 
to differ from one to the other, but all experienced the political turmoil that affected 
the region during the Cold War. Today, although Thailand and Cambodia have 
adopted parliamentary democracy, their political development has been significant-
ly different. For most of its modern history Thailand has wavered between military 
dictatorship and democracy. Only between 1992 and 2006 did Thailand enjoy an 
uninterrupted period of democratic rule, although from time to time there were 
rumours of an impending military coup. In September 2006, democratic rule was 
indeed dislocated by a military coup. Following the adoption of a new constitution 
in 2007 and a new general election, Thailand reverted to civilian rule. But for over 
one year subsequently Thailand had to go through a period of intense political tur-
bulence which saw three Prime Ministers until the most recent appointment of Ab-
bhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the Democrat Party, as Premier in December 2008.8
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Cambodia was a democratic constitutional monarchy from the time of its in-
dependence in 1954 until 1970. Following a military coup the monarchy was abo-
lished and a democratic republic was declared, before the Khmer Rouge came to 
power in 1975 and implemented a severe form of revolutionary communism. It 
was the Khmer Rouge that adopted and pursued the genocidal policy towards the 
Muslims in Cambodia. Tens of thousands of Muslims were massacred, representing 
almost half of their total population. A whole generation of Cambodian ‘ulama was 
eliminated, tens of thousands of Muslims made destitute and turned into refugees, 
and the Islamic educational infrastructure in the country was destroyed.9 In the 
last week of December 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia and installed a puppet 
regime, throwing the country into civil war for over a decade. Following the United 
Nations interim administration and supervised Constituent Assembly elections par-
liamentary democracy was restored to Cambodia and the constitutional monarchy 
reinstituted. The resuscitated democratic system in Cambodia also underwent politi-
cal turbulence in its first decade of revival and was still fraught with problems. In 
the post-1993 era there have been three general elections, with the latest one held 
in mid-2008 returning the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to power with a greater 
majority than ever before. The political turmoil that the country went through from 
the 1970s to the 1990s destroyed much of the country, devastated its economy, killed 
millions of its citizens, impoverished its people and resulted in hundreds of thou-
sands of Cambodians fleeing the country as refugees. 
While Laos and Vietnam are now communist states both Laos and South Vi-
etnam at one time experimented with democracy. Historically, the present Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam which was established in 1975 following the unification of 
North and South Vietnam has never been territorially and politically integrated 
in this manner in the past. Even in terms of government policies there have been 
noticeable changes to the situation three decades ago. In reality Vietnam is now not 
only unified but also communist. What is even more important, perhaps, is not 
just the political system that it has adopted but the violent path that it has had to 
negotiate to reach its current status. The two major wars that erupted, first between 
the Vietnamese and the French and then between the North Vietnamese and the 
South Vietnamese, supported by the Americans, brought about not only widespread 
physical destruction to the country and the near collapse of its economy but also the 
deaths and displacement of millions of Vietnamese, including those of the Muslim 
faith.
It is against the backdrop of these dramatic and traumatic political develop-
ments that the role of Islam in mainland Southeast Asia in the contemporary period 
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has been defined. The Muslims in all of the above countries, like their counterparts 
from the other religions, have been directly affected by the events that had unfolded 
before them. They have had to re-adjust their role accordingly to take into account 
the changed and changing realities. Muslims have had to be continually sensitive 
and responsive to such change to ensure that their interests were safeguarded. Thus 
the educational dilemmas of the Muslims are also attributable to the changing con-
texts of their immediate realities. 
Historically, numerically and politically, the Muslims of Thailand are the most 
significant group in all of mainland Southeast Asia. Islam is given both royal and 
official patronage in Thailand today and the Muslims have, by and large, become an 
integral part of Thailand.10 Islam has been embedded in Thai public life in a variety 
of ways such that its compatibility with predominantly Buddhist Thailand is never 
under serious doubt. There are now over 3,000 mosques throughout Thailand.11 
The fact that Thailand enjoys observer status at the Organization of Islamic Confer-
ence is ample testimony to the respect it has been accorded by the 56 or so Muslim 
member countries that make up the organization.12 Estimates of the Muslim popula-
tion in Thailand vary. Most sources believe that there are between 3 and 5 million 
Muslims in Thailand spread throughout the kingdom.13 Therefore, by any calcula-
tion Muslims represent a very large national constituency in Thailand. Thailand’s 
Muslims, in fact, comprise many ethnic groups although the official designation 
given to all of them is ‘Thai Muslim’. A close scrutiny of Thai Muslim society will 
reveal that broadly speaking they can be categorized into two groups14 The first is the 
well-integrated Thai Muslims who unquestioningly give their political and cultural 
loyalty to Thailand and who are in most respects virtually indistinguishable from the 
other Thais except for their religious belief and practice. The other group is Muslims 
of Malay ethnicity, who socialize principally in the Malay language and whose attach-
ment to the Jawi tradition is still strong. They are found primarily in the provinces 
of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat in the extreme south of the country, contiguous to 
the northern states of Malaysia, where the primacy of Malay language and culture is 
still much in evidence.15 The distinction between these two groups of Thai Muslims 
adds a complex dimension to the national characteristics of the Muslim population 
in Thailand. In fact, the boundaries between the two Muslim groups have become 
more permeable in recent years. Politically, the Muslims as a whole have benefited 
greatly from the democratic development in Thailand. It was the democratic decade 
of the post-1992 period and the political liberalization it ushered in that has enabled 
Thailand’s Muslims to acquire a highly visible public profile.16 It was also the process 
of democratization of that period that witnessed a proliferation of educational in-
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stitutions in the Malay-Muslim provinces, which aimed not only to develop Islamic 
education but also to promote the Malay language and the Jawi tradition.17
Thailand’s Malay south has been tainted by a long history of chronic unrest 
that is attributable to a mix of separatist insurgency, local banditry, crime and politi-
cal violence, endemic corruption, ethnic prejudice, bureaucratic tyranny, and poor 
governance.18 The lack of democracy and hence avenues for the redress of perceived 
injustices and bureaucratic wrong-doings have also contributed to the problem in 
the south. The renewed outbreak of conflict in the region that has occurred since 
January 2004 is also traceable to the constriction of the democratic space. As a result 
of this there now exists a high level of mutual suspicion and distrust between the 
government – especially the local officialdom – and the local Muslim population.19 
The domination of the local bureaucracy by Thai-Buddhists from other provinces of 
Thailand, who are unfamiliar with the local history, customs, culture, and language 
of the Muslims of the deep south, has created a wedge between them and the locals. 
On their part the Muslims in this region tend to cling to their traditional Malay-
Muslim identity in a manner that often raises official anxieties about their political 
loyalty to Thailand. The extensive kinship and other links that the Malays of the 
southern border provinces maintain with their ethnic cousins across the border in 
Malaysia tend to give the wrong impression of their real intentions. Islam is not 
necessarily the cause of the friction or the suspicions between the Muslims and the 
Thai State, but it certainly has been used and abused by both parties to advance their 
respective interests. 
After Thailand, Cambodia has the largest number of Muslims in mainland 
Southeast Asia. It is estimated that Muslims make up approximately 5 percent of the 
population of the kingdom, representing about 650,000 people.20 There are now 
about 400 mosques in Cambodia, most of which have been reconstructed only in 
the last decade or so.21 The significance of Islam in Cambodia is not just the high 
number of its adherents today but also because it has historically been an integral 
feature of Cambodia for many centuries. The Muslims in Cambodia are character-
ized by diversity but the Chams are indeed the most important ethnic category be-
cause in the context of Cambodia all Chams are Muslims. The Chams are, however, 
made up of two major groups, namely the Cham Shariat (i.e. Chams who observe 
the Shari‘ah, or Islamic law in the Shafi’i school of Islam) and the Jahed or “Kaum 
Hakekat”, also known as “Kaum Jumaat” or “Cham Bani”. It is the Cham Shariat 
which is the dominant and dynamic group.22 The principal denominators of their 
identity are basically knowledge of the Cham language, continued practice of Cham 
culture, a common Cham ethnic ancestry, and a strong sense of attachment to or-
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thodox Islam. Their Islamic identity has become an inseparable part of their ethnic 
identity. Perhaps more importantly the persistence of the traditional cultural and 
religious ties that continue to connect the Cambodian Muslims in general and the 
Cham Muslims in particular with their co-religionists in the wider Southeast Asian 
Jawi networks have given them a critical cultural lifeline in the region.23 During the 
Khmer Rouge period it was their distinctive Islamic and ethnic identity that made 
them the target of the regime’s genocidal policy. Their traumatic experiences under 
the Khmer Rouge and during the period of the Cambodian civil war have critically 
affected the way in which the Cham have tried to reshape their lives today. Like 
the situation in Thailand it was also in the post-conflict era of democratization in 
Cambodia since the 1990s that the Cham and Cambodia’s Muslims generally have 
been able to reorganize themselves, in the process assuming an enhanced political 
role and visibility.24 It was also this period which stimulated the re-generation of the 
Jawi tradition in Cambodia.
Despite the fact that Vietnam is a communist state whose official policy rele-
gates religion to the private sphere Islam in Vietnam today is in fact rather dynamic. 
This is due to at least two reasons. The first relates to Vietnam’s successful diplo-
matic maneuvering since the early 1990s to improve relations with Arab and Muslim 
countries, with the result that it now maintains excellent relations with the Muslim 
world. The second is due to the fact that since the overwhelming majority of the 
estimated 100,000 or so Muslims in Vietnam are Chams, and constitutionally the 
Chams are recognized as one of Vietnam’s 54 officially recognized ethnic minorities, 
the position of Islam as an indigenous culture has also become legitimized.25 This is 
further helped by the existence of Vietnamese Muslims. The biggest concentration 
of Muslims in Vietnam is in Chau duc, An Giang province, in the Mekong delta 
close to the Vietnamese-Cambodian border.26 There are also Muslim settlements in 
the provinces of Ninh Thuan, Dong Nai, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Binh Phuoc, as 
well as in Ho Chi Minh City and its vicinity. In all of Vietnam there are about 38 
mosques and 24 suraus. Vietnam’s policy of economic liberalization and its mem-
bership of ASEAN since 1995 have enabled the Muslims of Vietnam to revive ties 
with their co-religionists in the region. The old Jawi network which used to link Vi-
etnam’s Muslims to the Muslim world of Southeast Asia has also been resuscitated. 
Nevertheless, the religious activities of the Muslims in Vietnam, including in the 
sphere of education, are closely monitored by the state and the Communist Party, 
whose attitude towards Islam remains one of caution and suspicion. 
Laos has the smallest number of Muslims amongst Southeast Asian countries, 
believed to number only slightly over 10,000. In the capital, Vientiane, there are 
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only two mosques.27 Half of the Muslim population in Laos is made up of ethnic 
Chams with links across the border in Cambodia and beyond. They thus constitute 
a part of the wider Cham and Jawi world of mainland Southeast Asia. Like Vietnam, 
Laos does not condone the public role of religion but does officially recognize ethnic 
minorities, including the Chams. Although the Muslims of mainland Southeast 
Asia constitute a sizeable group numerically and enjoy varying degrees of official rec-
ognition, their socio-economic status is generally low. The situation in Thailand may 
be a little different from that of the other countries, but only marginally so. As the 
overwhelming majority of the Muslims in this region are dependent on agriculture, 
fishing, vendoring, and more recently, factory employment, their income level is 
generally low. This situation has undermined their capacity to fully develop even the 
basic infrastructure required for a decent standard of living, which thus makes them 
disproportionately dependent either on state support or the generosity of others.
THE SCENARIO OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION
Islamic education in mainland Southeast Asia has been primarily determined by 
a combination of political, economic, cultural and social factors briefly sketched 
above. Yet despite the inherent and obvious handicaps the region’s Muslims face in 
their daily lives, Islamic education is still given utmost priority. To the Muslims of 
mainland Southeast Asia Islamic education is viewed as obligatory as it is seen as the 
primary vehicle of their religious socialization. It is only through Islamic education 
that Islamic values and lifestyle can be transmitted to the younger generation and 
Islamic identity protected and preserved. But essentially the level of Islamic educa-
tion acquired in mainland Southeast Asia is very basic. 
The most important institution at the base of the Islamic educational structure 
is the home. Islamic socialization takes place in Muslim homes all over mainland 
Southeast Asia with parents or other family members helping to reinforce the basic 
teachings of Islam through formal as well as informal instruction, including group 
participation in obligatory rites like prayer and fasting. Recitation of the Qur’an is 
a regular religious activity that is undertaken in Muslim homes for all kinds of oc-
casions and purposes. Generally Muslims keep the Muqaddam or at least the Surah 
Yasin (Chapter 36 of the Qur’an), if not the Qur’an itself, in their homes.28 
Although the home is the basic pillar of Islamic socialization and education, it 
is actually the mosque or the surau that serves as its communal nerve-centre.29 The 
mosque in particular is usually used for a whole range of religious activities includ-
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ing the conduct of daily congregational prayers; Friday prayers; prayers during the 
month of Ramadan (tarâwih); funeral services; Qur’anic classes; religious instruc-
tion; religious festivities, and even marriage ceremonies. It is, however, its sociali-
zational or educational function that stands out. As almost invariably the mosque 
will also accommodate a madrasah either within the outer section of its main prayer 
hall or in a separate building in close proximity to it, formal religious instruction 
assumes a routine function in practically every mosque or surau. Children of vari-
ous ages, usually beginning from five to six, learn to recite the Qur’an at the local 
mosque or surau. They are usually initially introduced to the Arabic alphabet which 
they must learn by heart. Normally too, the principal and exclusive text used for this 
purpose is the Muqaddam, which essentially contains the basic Arabic characters and 
the method of reading and forming words with them, followed by Surah al-Fatihah, 
the opening chapter of the Qur’an, short Surahs beginning from Surah An-Nas, the 
last chapter of the Qur’an, Chapter 114, to Surah An-Nabaa, Chapter 78 and finally, 
pictorial illustrations of both the rite of wudhu or ablution and the rite of prayer or 
salah. These short Surahs together with Surah al-Fatihah, are known collectively as 
Juz Amma, the thirtieth section of the Qur’an, which contains all the short verses 
that are supposed to address miscellaneous issues. Since mastering the Muqaddam 
is considered essential before proceeding to the Qur’an proper it is the Muqaddam 
lessons given in mosques and suraus throughout mainland Southeast Asia that serve 
as the basic pillar of Qur’anic education. Students learn by rote to recognize the 
29 alphabets of the Arabic script and to read them with a combination of different 
vowels. Once they are able to establish basic Arabic literacy they will then be able 
to read the Muqaddam. After they complete the Muqaddam stage of learning if they 
demonstrate an acceptable level of fluency in reading they will be allowed to proceed 
to the Qur’an proper.30
In the Cham enclaves of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos it is usually at this new 
level of instruction when students begin to learn to recite the Qur’an proper that 
they will also be introduced to the written Jawi language using the basic Arabic letters 
which they have already learned combined with an additional 6 improvised letters 
which are not available in Arabic. Students learn to spell words in Cham and Malay 
(or sometimes both) depending on the enclave they come from. As the backbone 
of the Muslim community in Cambodia the Chams find it easier, more practical, 
and even desirable to learn the Cham language.31 Others may have a preference for 
Malay or even both. But, the fact that not all Muslims are Cham-speaking indicates 
that it is not the common or preferred language in certain quarters. Once reading 
proficiency in Cham and Malay is achieved then the fundamentals of Islam or fardhu 
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ain, will be taught. Cham is widely used as the oral as well as written language of 
instruction in the Cham enclaves. Among the non-Chams Malay assumes the above 
role, although increasingly Khmer too has emerged to become an important lan-
guage of basic Islamic religious instruction in Cambodia.32 In Vietnam, Vietnamese 
has assumed this role among the non-Chams. Thai has already been established as 
a language of Islamic religious instruction in most of Thailand outside the Malay 
cultural belt in the south.
Essentially it is the mosque and to a lesser extent the surau that create the en-
vironment in which Arabic and Jawi are seen to be continually relevant, practical 
and useful. The mosque and the surau invariably also serve as a library for Islamic 
literature which is essentially Jawi-based in the broad sense of the term. It would 
be inconceivable for a mosque anywhere in the region not to have copies of the 
Qur’an and other basic religious reading materials like the Surah Yasin, kept within 
its premises for public use. Surah Yasin, which is usually produced in a booklet form, 
would usually also contain a Malay translation along with the Arabic text. In Cambo-
dia, Laos, and Vietnam, Islamic literature is severely limited although a Vietnamese 
translation of the Qur’an has been published by an American of Vietnamese-Cham 
background.33 Thailand, by contrast, has a growing corpus of Islamic literature writ-
ten in Thai, as well as a substantial literature in Malay. In most cases the religious 
books that are found in most mosques throughout mainland Southeast Asia are usu-
ally donations from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and other Muslim countries.
In addition to the institutions of the home and the mosques or suraus, proper 
madrasahs or Islamic religious schools have also been established to cater to the spe-
cial needs of the Muslim students who want to go beyond the basics of Islamic 
education. The pondok school system in Thailand is perhaps the most developed 
indigenous educational system that caters to the needs of the Muslims. It is within 
the pondok system that related Islamic educational concepts and practices have been 
developed, such as the halaqa method of teaching and the residential system of edu-
cation which emphasizes holistic learning. In Thailand since the 1960s the pondok 
system has been adapted to accommodate the Thai-language although the original 
Malay or Jawi-based system continues to exist, albeit under more demanding condi-
tions.34 
A landmark development for Muslim minorities in the region has been the 
development of Islamic schools or madrasahs which have tried to blend the holistic 
Islamic educational model with modern approaches to educational organization and 
management. These fully-fledged religious schools which are managed in a mod-
ern way in terms of infrastructure, financial resources, curricula, staff training, and 
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selection of students, show that a systematic and sustainable level of institutional 
development of Islamic education has been achieved in Thailand and to a lesser 
extent also in Cambodia. It also demonstrates that a new, pluralistic educational sce-
nario is evolving in the region which tries to meet the needs of special communities. 
Educational reform is one of the clearest signs of innovation taking place among the 
Muslim minorities. In Thailand particularly, this type of institution has also facili-
tated the greater use of the Thai language as the principal medium of instruction, 
which has resulted in the increasing acceptance of Thai among a wider section of 
the Muslim community in Thailand. In Cambodia, the growing use of the Khmer 
language is also noticeable. At the same time the place of Arabic in the Islamic 
educational curriculum has also been reinforced. This development of the madrasah 
system has paved the way for the emergence of tertiary Islamic educational institu-
tions, whose graduates are of a sufficiently high standard that they are able to enter 
colleges and universities abroad.35 In 1998 a Saudi-based Muslim group established 
a formal Islamic boarding school, Ummul Qura, in Kandaal Province, Cambodia, 
complete with modern facilities and foreign-trained teachers, using Arabic, Khmer, 
and English as the medium of education. The Ummul Qura Islamic School was 
to serve as a feeder institution for universities in the Middle East and the Muslim 
world, and was opened with great fanfare by the Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun 
Sen. Initially this development represented a breakthrough for the Cambodian Mus-
lim community.36 However in 2003 the school was closed. Three of its teachers, an 
Egyptian and two Thais, were detained, and all the other expatriates sent home to 
their countries for their alleged involvement with the Al-Qaeda-affiliated regional 
terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiyyah.37 At around the same time in Thailand 
similar accusations were made by the government against many pondok and other 
Islamic religious school teachers.38
Notwithstanding the above development it is obvious that the role of Jawi script 
has been instrumental in the educational empowerment of the Cham communities 
in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. It has helped to elevate the status of the Cham 
language as an Islamic language with its own script and to promote the wider usage 
of Malay. Education in the medium of Jawi has also made it possible for Muslims to 
pursue their further education in pondoks located in other countries in the region 
outside of Cambodia, especially in Thailand. The growth in the demand for pondok 
education in Cambodia, and to a lesser extent also in Vietnam and Laos, means 
that pondok education in southern Thailand continues to be relevant to Muslims 
in the region. It has reinforced the importance of Malay as a medium of Islamic 
religious instruction. Although the Thai language is increasingly used to teach and 
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disseminate Islamic knowledge, because the Thai script is unrelated to Jawi and 
also due to the continued friction between the Thai government and its Malay mi-
nority in the south, as a medium of religious instruction the Thai language conti-
nues to have significant limitations in terms of its appeal to the Malay-Muslims. It 
is interesting to note that the National Reconciliation Commission of Thailand 
which was established to explore ways to understand and overcome the escalation 
of violence in the Malay-Muslim region of Southern Thailand specifically identified 
the need to declare Patani Malay as an additional working language in the south-
ern border provinces, acknowledging its indispensability in that part of Thailand.39 
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND SYMBOLISM OF JAWI
Originally the term ‘Jawi’ had a limited meaning, basically referring to the Arabic 
script. However, the expanding symbiotic relationship between Jawi, Arabic, and the 
vernacular languages of the Muslims of mainland Southeast Asia means that Jawi 
has a special significance in the development of the Islamic traditions of Southeast 
Asia. The use of the Jawi script in mainland Southeast Asia represents the phenom-
enon of the localization of Islam. It therefore acquires a potent relationship with 
Islam often emerging as the symbol of Islam in the local context. Among the Malays 
and the Chams of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, Jawi has emerged as a core feature 
of their religious and cultural identity. This is even more true for the Malay-Muslims 
of Southern Thailand who perceive Jawi as their definitive and irreducible historic 
identity.
Historically, culturally, socially, and politically, the Jawi tradition has always 
been intrinsically connected to Islam. It is principally Islam that is Jawi’s raison d’être 
in Southeast Asia. The traditional links between the various Muslim groups in the 
Muslim world of Southeast Asia constituted a region-wide Jawi network which has 
been principally inspired and facilitated by Islam. Jawi continues to be perceived as 
being relevant and useful for the following reasons:
1. It is the basic tool to acquire reading proficiency in Arabic with a view to 
achieving Qur’anic literacy. As it is incumbent on every Muslim to be able 
to recite the Qur’an, Jawi-literacy, which in its most fundamental sense 
simply means the ability to recognize and read basic Arabic letters, is uni-
versally seen as a desirable and even mandatory goal of every Muslim fa-
mily. Proficiency in Jawi will also enable one to recite do‘a [supplications] 
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and other Qur’anic expressions which are obligatory in Muslim prayers, 
which must be learned in other ways, usually through prescribed texts. For 
the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Southeast Asia Qur’anic literacy 
has traditionally been achieved through literacy in Jawi. Usually once basic 
Arabic literacy is acquired it becomes almost natural to proceed from that 
point to achieve, through a measure of improvisation, literacy in the other 
vernacular languages of the Muslims. Literacy in the Arabic letters emerges 
as a bridge to literacy in the vernacular languages which are otherwise be-
coming increasingly marginalized in the era of narrow language national-
ism.
2. The function of Jawi goes beyond facilitating basic Qur’anic literacy. It also 
assumes the role of the formal medium of Islamic religious instruction. 
This is particularly true in the case of Malay, which is still seen by vari-
ous indigenous Muslim groups as the main medium of Islamic religious 
instruction – as it used to be in the past. Many of the Islamic texts that are 
circulated and used in mosques, suraus and madrasahs, in areas of Muslim 
Southeast Asia are Jawi texts. Thus, mastery of Jawi will lead to the edu-
cational empowerment of the Muslim minorities in Mainland Southeast 
Asia.
3. As the main corpus of Islamic religious literature in many areas of South-
east Asia is still essentially Jawi-based, and as the overwhelming majority 
of Islamic religious leaders in Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and the Malay 
provinces of southern Thailand today were Jawi-trained, Jawi is still widely 
viewed as the official script of Islamic scholarship. The use of Jawi here is 
accepted as the main vehicle of Islamic knowledge. 
4. Although the Chams do have their own ancient script its use has been very 
limited. In fact, that ancient script is becoming antiquated, like Latin or 
Sanskrit. It is Jawi that has been used to re-invent the written Cham lan-
guage and give it a practical function. Since Jawi-Cham has now become a 
widely recognizable script for the majority of the Cham Muslims in particu-
lar, it is now also used as a medium of formal/written communication.
 Jawi has evolved among the Malays and Chams of mainland Southeast Asia 
to constitute an intrinsic part of the Muslim psyche and identity. It is the definitive 
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Islamic character of Jawi that has helped preserve its revered status, enhanced its 
viability and guaranteed its sustainability in the region. The cultural and socio-re-
ligious links that Muslim minorities in mainland Southeast Asia have historically 
maintained with the wider Muslim world of Southeast Asia have been facilitated by 
their common heritage of the Jawi tradition and culture. The transnational ties that 
continue to exist between Muslim minorities and the Malay world have essentially 
been supported by regional Jawi networks that have been in place since the early days 
of Islam in the region.
MAJOR EDUCATIONAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
The debate about the relationship between Islamic education and modern/secu-
lar education seems to be polarized along two opposing premises.40 Proponents of 
modern/secular education argue that Islamic education, especially in its traditional 
form, reinforces the fear of modernity. Proponents of Islamic education, on the oth-
er hand, contend that modern/secular education disconnects and uproots people 
from their own identity by separating their spiritual from their material needs. Like 
their counterparts all over the Muslim world the Muslims of mainland Southeast 
Asia have had to tackle these issues head-on. Unlike Muslims elsewhere, however, 
they have to resolve this dilemma under extremely imperfect conditions, among 
them the following:
1. Their status as minorities, often marginalized and weak, in overwhelmingly 
non-Muslim nations;
2. The internal divisions and schisms within the Muslim communities due to 
numerous differences including competing and conflicting interpretations 
of Islam, as well as their limited understanding of Islam;
3. The profoundly disruptive effects of violence, conflict, political turmoil, 
and war which have caused unnecessary deaths, displacements, and de-
struction in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and acute uncertainty and 
insecurity in Thailand’s southern border provinces;
4. The generally low socio-economic status of the overwhelming majority of 
Muslims all over mainland Southeast Asia;
5. The suspicions and prejudices that states, governments, and non-Muslim 
majority populations hold towards the Muslim minorities;
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6. The existence of a competitive educational environment which is domi-
nated by the secular state school system;
7. The absence or lack of educational and political leadership;
8. The collective inability of Muslim minorities to effectively relate to the 
changes taking place as a result of the phenomenon of globalization and 
the ICT revolution; and
9. The persistent negative media portrayal of Islam that has heightened their 
anxieties and concerns.
Notwithstanding the above limitations and challenges Muslim minorities in 
mainland Southeast Asia will need to make the difficult but necessary educational, 
social, cultural and political adjustments to help them escape from their current 
state of poverty, isolation, and indignity. Yet it is likely that whatever they decide to 
do will have to be attempted and achieved in such a way that it will not undermine 
their commitment to the Islamic faith and their duties as citizens. In this endeavour 
they will definitely need considerable help from both Muslims and non-Muslims to 
negotiate the challenges of modernity.
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CHAPTER TEN
MAINTAINING RELIGIOUS TRADITION 
IN BRUNEI DARUSSALAM: INSPIRATION AND 
CHALLENGES
Iik A. Mansurnoor
 “… [T]he responsibility for religious education has been returned 
to the Ministry of Religious Affairs … You should implement it 
properly based on proper research and planning and not just by 
trying things out, even though the predicted results are still un-
clear to us. … You should learn from previous mistakes and ex-
perience while implementing it. What happened to the previous 
science stream in Arabic schools and also the ‘integrated’ system 
should be enough to teach us…. A perfect religious education is 
what we aim for” [Titah (Royal Address) 2005].1
 
INTRODUCTION
In appreciating the strength of the religious foundations in Brunei instead of limit-ing our examination to the conservative nature of the prevailing discourse and 
school of thought we ought also to examine the intellectual and ideological back-
drop of Islamization in this country. Before its decline in the nineteenth century 
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Brunei had succeeded in establishing itself as a powerful polity with a rich religious 
and intellectual tradition. The character and expression of Islam in Brunei reflects 
and at the same time is molded by the religious education in the country.
In addressing the perceptions, study, and propagation of Islam in modern Bru-
nei this chapter looks at three modes in which Islam has been understood: public 
consumption, basic religious education, and more specifically, the advanced study 
of Islam at higher learning institutions. It will discuss the relationship between the 
current religiosity and understanding of Islam in Brunei as exemplified in the edu-
cation system and how Islam has been studied and propagated. I shall elaborate on 
government designs and the policies that have been successful in bringing both sta-
bility to the nation and legitimacy to its leadership. Crucial to the production of this 
legitimacy has been the hegemonic discourse of MIM – “Malay Islamic Monarchy” 
– and within this discourse education has undoubtedly played a strategic role.
Beyond the hegemonic discourse, however, current debate over education po-
licy including how Islam should be studied also demonstrates the presence of an 
endeavour that strives to domesticate, if not claim “independence” over, the mode 
of education as a means both of pursuing knowledge and of developing the coun-
try’s human resources. In an earlier study one Brunei educator has insisted that 
education policy and the country’s school system remain a mere copy of the colonial 
model, despite attempts to move away from this dependency. In his words, “…politi-
cal independence did not bring with it educational independence, as the Brunei Da-
russalam case-study has revealed”.2 This sense of educational dependence is directly 
related to debates about Islam. As one prominent religious scholar, Pehin Yahya, 
maintains, the only solution to the confusion of education policy in the country is a 
“return to Islam”, i.e. giving Islam a commanding position in the management and 
administration of education.3
The predominance and ever-present nature of the state in Brunei has led to 
close interaction between education – including the study of Islam – and the po-
litical establishment. Not surprisingly the Brunei government has consistently at-
tempted to mold education as a means of perpetuating its domination while at the 
same time providing opportunities for competition and change which it views as 
relevant both to the country’s political structure and to a culture of learning and 
professionalism.4 Indeed, education policy toward the study of Islam has been pur-
sued ingeniously and persistently so as to produce the desired outcome: dedicated 
citizens who are loyal to the ruler, moderate in their religiosity, and who uphold the 
much-valued Malay culture. These elements can all be traced throughout policies on 
education produced in 1962, 1972, 1985 and 2003.
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THE STUDY OF ISLAM AND ISLAM IN PRACTICE
As a discipline Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia has developed very rapidly. Based 
on the models proposed by Fazlur Rahman5 and Aziz al-Azmeh,6 Chaiwat Satha-
Anand suggests that a distinction exists between Islamic Studies and Muslim Stud-
ies.7 The former is “the study of Islam which takes into account at least three types 
of sacredness: the Qur’an as Islam’s sacred text; Islam’s three holy cities…; and the 
sacred duties of Muslims which include sacrificing everything for the sake of Allah, 
Almighty”.8 Muslim Studies, on the other hand, seeks to examine the lives of Mus-
lims and their living societies. Muslim Studies does not focus on the scholastic study 
of the Qur’an, the Hadith, nor Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh), all of which require 
profound religious knowledge as well as a high level understanding of the Arabic 
language, not to mention the fact that these are the domains of authority of religious 
scholars. Although the second definition is clearly debatable Chaiwat has opened 
the door wide enough for social scientists and historians to study Islam in history 
and society. Other students of Islam have preferred to distinguish the object of Is-
lamic Studies into that which belongs to normative-doctrinaire teaching, and that 
which develops in history or can be observed empirically in social contexts.9 In char-
acterizing the changing pattern of Islamic Studies in Malaysia Ibrahim Abu Bakar 
suggests a stimulating construct of different chronological phases: the religious, the 
linguistic and the pragmatic-liberal.10
Approaches to Islamic Studies in Brunei have undergone numerous shifts and 
metamorphoses. As earlier studies such as those of 1979, 1982, 1995 and 2000 have 
suggested,11 an enumeration of approaches can be presented, from the traditional to 
the radical. Until quite recently the study of Islam or the offering of Islamic Studies 
programs in Brunei focused primarily on disseminating the core Islamic teaching, 
the revealed knowledge and the religious sciences which fall into the category of 
individual duty (fard `ayn). Following Ibrahim’s categorization the study of Islam in 
Brunei has remained heavily “religious”, with some exceptions. Since a number of 
detailed summaries of the development of the study of Islam in Brunei have already 
been written12 in the following discussion I shall only highlight certain details and 
focus more on a number of relevant issues today. The opening of religious classes 
since the 1930s was geared to providing school children with a basic knowledge of 
the Islamic faith, ethics and practices. In the 1960s a secondary religious school was 
established to prepare students for higher education. Only in 1983 did this school 
receive recognition by al-Azhar University when its leavers were successful in enter-
ing that university. A more advanced Islamic Studies program, the Institute of Islam-
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ic Studies, was founded in 1989 under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Students 
who passed all the study requirements over three years in the Institute were given 
the opportunity to enter the fourth year program at al-Azhar. These two educational 
institutions closely applied the syllabi of al-Azhar. Interestingly, some of the students 
who graduated from the Institute of Islamic Studies were sent to Islamabad’s Inter-
national Islamic University and also universities in Kuala Lumpur.13
The foundation of Brunei’s first university in 1985, the University of Brunei 
Darussalam (UBD), led to the opening of the Department of Islamic Studies. The 
Department’s function was primarily to prepare education students specializing in 
the teaching of Islamic subjects in school. In addition, it also trained students spe-
cializing in religious disciplines such as Islamic law, theology, and history. The syllabi 
were mainly adapted from the Department of Islamic Studies at the University of 
Malaya and that of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.14 The Department experienced 
a metamorphosis in 1992 when it was promoted to a full-fledged Faculty. The three 
departments under the Faculty offered programs in Arabic. The curricula and syllabi 
were increasingly attuned to established Islamic departments at the Middle Eastern 
universities, especially al-Azhar.
When the Institute of Islamic Studies merged with the Faculty of Islamic Stud-
ies at UBD in 1999, three departments were created. Instruction was conducted 
fully in Arabic and a large proportion of its faculty came from al-Azhar. Although 
the syllabi at the three departments reflected a strong Azhari influence, a few innova-
tions were also made. For example, as can be seen in their course offerings in Figures 
5, 6 and 7, such subjects as philosophy, modern ideologies, Orientalism and mis-
sionary work were introduced. The innovations of the 1990s reflect the Malaysian 
model in many respects.
Islamic Studies at the University of Brunei has gone through three major stages 
during its young life of just over two decades.  During its formative years from 1985 
to 1993 Islamic Studies was organized within a Department under the Faculty of 
Arts and Social Sciences (FASS). The major characteristics of this period can be seen 
in the use Malay as the medium of instruction15 and the offerings of Islamic Studies 
courses in the context of the BA program majoring in Islamic Studies and the BA 
Education program majoring in Islamic Studies. The latter survived until the last 
batch of students graduated in September 2005.16
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Figure 1: The Structure of Islamic Studies Programs* at 
the University of Brunei Darussalam 1985-2005
Year Program
Main 
Courses
University and Other 
Courses
1985-1992
Bachelor in Islamic 
Studies (Malay)
See Figure 2
English, Critical Think-
ing, National Philoso-
phy, and a package of 
minor subjects (at least 
4-5 courses)  in non-Is-
lamic Studies disciplines 
1996-1999
Bachelor in Islamic 
Studies (Arabic), Ma-
joring in Shari`ah or in 
Usul ad-Din wal-Dakwah 
See Figures 
3, 4 and 5
English, National Phi-
losophy, and a package 
of minor subjects (at 
least 4-5 courses)  in 
non-Islamic studies 
disciplines 
1999-2005
Bachelor in Shari`ah, 
Usul ad-Din or Arabic 
Language 
See Figures 
6, 7 and 8
English and National 
Philosophy
Note: *BA Education Programs (in Arabic, English, and Malay) are not specifically 
mentioned since the Islamic Studies content in these programs does not differ from 
that offered in pure BA programs.
Figure 2: Islamic courses offered by the Department of Islamic Studies: 
BA Islamic Studies in Malay (1985-92)
Component Subject
Note
Language
Arabic, al-Nusus wal-Balagha, Eng-
lish, Logic/Critical Thinking 
These are taught in the 
early years of study, ex-
cept al-Nusus wal-Balagha
184
Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia
Theology
`Aqidah, `Ilm al-Kalam, Islamic 
Thought,  Tasawwuf
Study of the 
Qur’an
Qur’anic exegesis, 
‘Ulum al-Qur’an
Jurisprudence
Fiqh al-`ibadah, fiqh al-mu`amalah, 
usul al-fiqh, fiqh al-ahwal al-
shakhsiyah, fiqh al-jinayah, siyyasah 
shar`iyyah, Administration of 
Islamic law 
These subjects are 
taught in succession 
until graduation
Prophetic 
Tradition
Hadith, `Ulum al-hadith
History Islamic history, Islamic civilization
Academic 
Exercise
Minor thesis undertaken during 
the final year of study
Focusing on topics 
related to Islamic issues 
in the country and 
Southeast Asia
From 1993 Islamic Studies programs came fully under the administration of 
the Faculty of Islamic Studies (FIS). This period saw the formation of new depart-
ments such as the Shari`ah, Arabic Language and Islamic Civilization, and Usul al-
Din wal-Dakwah, as well as the establishment of Arabic as a language of instruction. 
A BA Program (Arabic) in Islamic Studies (majoring in shari`ah or usul al-din) was 
introduced in 1996. This program survived until 1999 when the Institute of Islamic 
Studies (previously managed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs) was merged with 
the Faculty of Islamic Studies becoming the Sultan Haji Omar Ali Saifuddien Insti-
tute of Islamic Studies (IPISHOAS).
Despite the changes introduced in 1993, 1996 and 1999, the BA Education 
(Malay and English) program majoring in Islamic Studies (Malay and Arabic) con-
tinued to be offered as before. From 1996, students who entered the BA program in 
Shari`ah and Usul al-Din wal-Dakwah took the same subjects and courses for the first 
four semesters (see Figure 3). Specialization started at semesters five until eight (see 
Figures 4 and 5).
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Figure 3: Islamic courses offered for Year One and Two: B.A. Islamic Studies in 
Arabic (majoring in Shari`ah or Usul al-Din wal-Dakwah) 1996-99
Component Subject/Course Note
Language
Arabic, Malay language, Qawa`id al-
‘Arabiya, English, Logic/Methodology in 
Islamic thinking 
Study of the 
Qur’an
‘Ulum al-Qur’an, Memorization of the 
Qur’an
Jurisprudence
Fiqh al-`ibadah, Fiqh al-mu`amalah, al-
Nuzum al-Islamiyah, Usul al-fiqh 
Prophetic 
Tradition
`Ulum al-hadith 
Islamic His-
tory
Biography of the Prophet Muhammad and 
History of the First Four Caliphs
Minor Pack-
age
Four courses within the first six semesters, 
taken from department/faculty outside 
FIS, especially FASS (history, geography, 
economics, literature or linguistics) 
A student 
normally passes 
these courses by 
the time she/
he starts the sev-
enth semester
Figure 4: BA Islamic Studies in Arabic (majoring in Usul al-Din wal-Dakwah)
1996-99: Year Three and Four
Component Subject/Course Note
Research 
Methodology
Asalib al-Bahth al-`Ilmi wa-Masadir al-Dirasat 
al-Islamiyah; Dirasah Nassiya min Kutub 
al-`Aqidah  
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Theology
‘Ilm al-Kalam, Comparative Religion, 
al-Firaq al-Islamiyah, Ethics (Akhlaq), 
Tasawwuf, al-Falsafah al-Islamiyah, Mod-
ern Ideological Schools, Contemporary 
Islamic Thought 
Study of the 
Qur’an
Qur’an on Faith and Ethics  
Missionary 
Work
‘Usul al-Dakwah, Methodology and tech-
niques of Islamic Missionary Work, Con-
temporary Islamic Missionary Movement 
Prophetic 
Tradition
Ahadith on Faith and Ethics
Islamic His-
tory
Contemporary Muslim World, Financial 
and Administrative Systems in Islam 
Academic 
Exercise
Minor thesis undertaken during the final 
year of study
More topics 
chosen from 
the pre-modern 
period
When the IPISHOAS was formed and officially came into operation in 1999 
major organizational changes took place, as can be seen in Figures 6, 7, and 8. 
Although the core Islamic subjects did not experience a major shift throughout 
this period the details and combination of the different disciplines did undergo 
some interesting changes. Osman Bakar’s observations about the two centers of 
Islamic Studies at the University of Malaya can also be used as a starting viewpoint 
for looking at Islamic Studies at the University of Brunei.17 Since the very begin-
ning until 1999 the Department/Faculty of Islamic Studies (D/FIS) fully shared the 
overall policy of the University, intensive interaction and inter-department/faculty 
relations developed smoothly. For example, when the DIS was under FASS from 
1985-93 students taking undergraduate programs at the DIS had to take a minor 
package in non-Islamic studies disciplines such as literature, linguistics, history, Eng-
lish, geography, or economics. This meant that, in a sense, students during this 
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period had access to a variety of subjects beyond the purely Islamic discipline. In 
addition, students also took university- and faculty-required courses such as English, 
critical thinking, research methodology, and national philosophy. I have yet to con-
duct a survey on how such a combination of subjects affected the overall personal 
and educational learning process of students compared to the post-1999 intake who 
had less access to non-Islamic studies disciplines. I would dare to surmise, however, 
following Osman’s observations, that access to other disciplines may have helped to 
widen the horizons of their thought and learning. My own observations of earlier 
batches of Brunei graduates from al-Azhar confirms this assumption. Indeed, they 
were more articulate in diverse fields beyond purely Islamic Studies.
As can be seen in Figures 6, 7, and 8, students who enroll in the IPISHOAS un-
dertake a more in-depth study of various aspects of Islamic Studies, taking additional 
subjects such as philosophy, comparative study of religions, and modern thought; 
however, they do not enjoy the option of taking a minor package of courses beyond 
the wall of the Islamic Studies discipline offered at IPISHOAS. Moreover, compared 
to those who entered the 1996-1999 program they are more exposed to other disci-
plines in Islamic Studies throughout their four years of undergraduate study.
 
Figure 6: BA in Usul al-Din 1999-2005, IPISHOAS
Component Subject/Course Note
Language
Arabic, English, Logic/Methodology in 
Islamic thinking, Dirasah Nassiya  
These are taught 
in the early years 
of study, except 
Dirasah Nassiya
Theology
Tawhid, al-Milal wal-Nihal, Ethics (Akhlaq), 
Tasawwuf, al-Falsafah, Modern Ideological 
Trends, Modern Islamic Thought  
Study of the 
Qur’an
Qur’anic exegesis, `ulum al-Qur’an, Memo-
rization of the Qur’an, Tajwid al-Qur’an, 
Analytical exegesis, Topical exegesis, Meth-
odology of Exegesis, Non-Islamic elements 
in Exegesis, Study of Exegetical texts 
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Jurisprudence
Fiqh al-`ibadah, Fiqh al-mu`amalah, Usul al-
fiqh, Islamic political systems, Fiqh al-ahwal 
al-shakhsiyah 
Missionary 
Work
al-Dakwah al-Islamiyah, Oratory and Call to 
Islam, Orientalism and Missionary Work  
Prophetic 
Tradition
Hadith, `Ulum al-hadith, Study of spurious 
hadith 
History
Islamic history, Contemporary Muslim 
World 
Academic 
Exercise
Minor thesis undertaken during the final 
year of study 
EDUCATION: WHICH SERVES ISLAM BEST?
For some years scholars and leaders in Brunei have been discussing the concept of 
comprehensive and integrated education (sekolah sehari suntuk and pendidikan berse-
padu) which would end the duality of schooling in the country. The idea is not new 
among many proponents of Islamic education and intellectual discourse. What is 
novel is that Brunei is perhaps the first modern state which formally implemented 
the synthesis, even if only for two years, 2004-2005.18 
Since the 1970s the opening of elite schools resulted in the sending of home-
grown students to pursue higher education at renowned universities in Egypt and 
England. Certainly, they were not the first Bruneians to join and later graduate from 
the University of London or al-Azhar University. However, they represented the pio-
neers of successful Brunei elite schooling, both in the secular and religious streams 
respectively. Indeed, in 1966 an ambitious and admirable education plan manifested 
an early attempt at amalgamating the best modern school practice and excellence 
in the madrasah tradition. By 1967 separate schools for boys and girls (Sekolah Arab 
Menengah) had admitted the best pupils to pursue both general and religious instruc-
tion at the secondary level. In addition, Malay, Arabic and English became major 
media of instruction. Interestingly this initiative had been taken by men of religion, 
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the `ulama’. As Brunei gradually assumed full responsibility for its domestic affairs, 
the initiative for the foundation of such an institution can also be located within 
the larger national context. General education obviously had some colonial legacy 
– it had been a British initiative. Thus the decision to establish a model of compre-
hensive schooling was a political statement about national education. An alterna-
tive educational paradigm was created to buttress self-reliance and independence. 
Indeed, in 1971 Brunei launched its major National Education Policy.
The Arabic Secondary School (Sekolah Arab Menengah) was lauded for its success 
in preparing well-trained candidates for al-Azhar University and, to some extent, oth-
er universities offering non-religious degrees. However the fact that the school was 
more successful in winning the recognition of al-Azhar as its students were granted 
direct admission to all its religious faculties but not in other fields raised some doubt 
whether the philosophy behind this initiative had missed its target. Not only were 
those who opted for non-religious specializations small in number but they also 
failed to compete with those of other well-known schools in the country. The aim of 
producing all-round students immersed in both disciplines did not fully materialize. 
It is thus not surprising that the school has focused more on the preparation for 
students to pursue higher education at al-Azhar, even though the general program 
aiming at preparing students for GCE ‘A’ levels has been maintained.
To elucidate the earlier point about the polarization surrounding elite educa-
tion we may examine the case of the elite secular school, the Science College. The 
Science College (Maktab Sains Paduka Seri Begawan Sultan) which began classes in 
1978 caters for the secondary and pre-university education of the best Brunei pupils 
from primary school.19 They are prepared to take the top positions in all the non-
religious professions available in the country. Provided with generous scholarships 
and the promise of lucrative future positions many parents and pupils have taken 
the challenge seriously.
In 1990 the school offered a full days’ schooling for its first year intakes. This 
means that Muslim pupils need not leave the school compound to join the common 
Islamic classes after school in the afternoon, as is normally the case with Muslim pu-
pils at lower secondary. They take the same religious classes offered at the school in 
the afternoon. Although the school then operated two systems of education, general 
and religious, the administration of these systems remained separate. Concomitant 
with the reorganization of the education system in the country in the late 1990s 
serious thought was given and attempts made to reform education. For example, an 
education convention was held in 1998 to address the issue of integrated education. 
The dissemination of “revealed knowledge” and “worldly sciences”, to use the terms 
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commonly used at the International Islamic University, had to be integrated within 
the whole package of the curriculum.20 The Convention produced the following 
resolution:21
1. Integrated education, based on Brunei’s national identity, should be de-
veloped in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education and other 
parties, especially the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which have a stake in 
education;
2. The state philosophy of education based on the Islamic philosophy of 
education and the Malay-Islamic-Monarchy (MIM) philosophy should be 
formed in the near future in order to produce Bruneians who are commit-
ted to the fard `ayn and the fard kifayah tasks;
3. The concept of integrated education should be formulated in the context 
of the nation, and should be widely disseminated to all Bruneians, particu-
larly educators. Only then should further steps be taken in the direction 
of implementing the concept of integrated education in the aims and ob-
jectives of education, the curriculum and co-curriculum, teaching, assess-
ment, and examination;
4. The curriculum for teacher education in the 21st century should emphasize 
the deepening of knowledge, skills, and values of prospective teachers so 
that not only are they immersed in pedagogy but they also inspired by the 
MIM philosophy in particular as well as the Islamic worldview in general. 
Therefore it is necessary that programs for teacher training and teacher spe-
cialization are reexamined and revamped to develop integrated education.
5. The curriculum of integrated education must strictly and consistently main-
tain a balance between the elements of revealed and intellectual knowledge 
in order to achieve human dignity and wellbeing.22
EDUCATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS POLICY: 
ISLAMIC STUDIES AT SCHOOL
Until the 1990s post-World War Two Brunei, like many other Muslim countries, 
had implemented dual educational systems: general education and religious educa-
tion. The first falls under the wings of the Ministry of Education (MoE) while the 
second is under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Interestingly, 
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general education is a derivative and extension of the British educational legacy in 
the country (1906-1959). It is important first to examine the development of reli-
gious education.
Sekolah Ugama and Sekolah Arab (Fully Islamic Classes) 
A reform of religious education was undertaken in 1956 when a specifically designed 
religious school was founded. Religious education had been traditionally offered at 
various venues such as the mosque, surau, balai, and the home. From the 1930s extra 
classes in the afternoon for Islamic knowledge were organized at various schools. 
Not surprisingly traditional instruction also declined. However, it was discovered 
in the mid-1950s that extra-classes for Islamic knowledge had not been successful 
in disseminating basic religious requirements among the pupils. After further stud-
ies and considerations a full religious school (madrasah) was founded, based on the 
Johor model of religious schooling. The major objective of the school was to nurture 
mature Muslim pupils. This can be seen in the guidelines and the curriculum. The 
major emphasis of the curriculum was on providing a foundation for pupils to live 
correctly as Muslims. Religious subjects (fiqh, tawhid, akhlaq, religious practice, Islamic 
history, Arabic reading and writing and Qur’an) formed the core of the study at this 
madrasah.
The 1962 rebellion left an important moral lesson, paving the way for more 
attention to be given to religious education. Various schemes of religious instruc-
tion for all citizens were intitiated. Religious classes for adults were intensified. In 
1965 a package of religious instruction was designed for pupils at all levels of educa-
tion. This was mainly directed at those pupils who had failed to attend the religious 
school.
Islamic Studies as a Subject at General School 
The second half of the 1960s witnessed the beginning of an Islamic resurgence in the 
country. First of all, the Islamic contents of the 1959 Constitution were intensively 
and seriously re-examined and propagated. Moreover, religious education emerged 
as a strategic means to establish order and stability after the political crisis of the 
early 1960s. In fact, Islamic Studies as a subject had been introduced to the schools 
as early as the mid-1930s. Classes were normally offered in the afternoon at the same 
public school buildings. The practice survived until the mid-1950s when the proper 
madrasah (sekolah ugama) was introduced in 1956. Surprisingly Islamic Studies as a 
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subject at the general schools ceased to be taught until 1965 when certain schools 
began to again offer such a subject. Later a package of basic knowledge about Islam, 
including theology, law, ethics, the Qur’an, Prophetic tradition, Sufism, and Islamic 
history, was inserted into school syllabi at all levels. The package was given a teaching 
period comparable to any other major subject at school.
Integrated Education   
Since the early 1990s studies and attempts have been made by the MoE to accom-
modate religious classes in the general system by introducing full-day schooling. Al-
though the introduction of the new system has not put an end to the polarization 
in Brunei’s education it has opened up the opportunity for closer cooperation, ex-
change, and communication.
The original idea of integrated education can be traced to two sources: one 
administrative and one philosophical. In a small state like Brunei, all educational 
matters can be more effectively handled through a centralized body. In other words, 
the idea sprang from practical considerations. The revivalist agenda since the 1970 
that sought to bring all affairs under Islam, including the concept of the Islamiza-
tion of knowledge, seems to have inspired Brunei leaders to introduce an ‘integrated 
education system’. Indeed, the 1972 National Education Policy emphasized the im-
portance of making Islamic Studies a part of the school curriculum at all levels 
of education. The revised National Policy on Education of 1985 again placed the 
Islamization of knowledge as the main agenda for national education through the 
harmonization of teaching and the content of most subjects studied at schools with 
the teachings of Islam.23
After some years of experimentation in January 2004 an integrated system of 
education was implemented at the kindergarten and lower primary grades. During 
the period 2005-2006 the system was extended to the upper primary grades (4, 5, 
and 6). By 2008 it is planned that the system will be introduced at the secondary 
levels (lower and upper: 1-5). By 2012 higher education institutions are expected to 
endorse the system. However, for various reasons, particularly the official decision 
to revamp the national education plan in mid-2005, the system was terminated by 
the beginning of 2006.
By the time the integrated system of education was in full swing in early 2005, 
its aims, objectives, long and short term action plan, syllabi, and schedule were 
spelled out:24
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1. Aim of the system: the unification of current Islamic and general strands 
of education, practically integrating the core revealed knowledge with intel-
lectual knowledge.
2. The objective: 
• to enhance the practice and understanding of Islam;
•	 to uphold and implement national values;
•	 to synchronize education with pupil’s abilities and interests;
•	 to produce pupils well-equipped to face the modern world;
•	 to improve achievements in literacy, numeracy, scientific literacy and func-
tional literacy
•	 to broaden extra-curricular and co-curricular activities.
3. Long and short term action plan:
•	 to integrate the contents of all three curricula of Islamic Studies, that is the 
madrasah curriculum, the curriculum of Islamic Studies as a subject in the 
primary schools, and the curriculum of Qur’anic recitation and Islamic 
knowledge, into one curriculum in the new system;
•	 to disseminate and absorb Islamic values as well as launch the Islamization 
of knowledge at all levels of education;
•	 to integrate general knowledge, including Islamic knowledge, into all cur-
ricula through the concept of immersion and synthesis; 
•	 to synthesize all aspects of knowledge, comprehension, skill and values, 
paving the way for intellectual, spiritual, emotional, and physical integra-
tion.
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MODERN EDUCATION AND THE STUDY OF ISLAM IN BRUNEI:
VIEWS OF PROMINENT SCHOLARS-CUM-LEADERS
To have some comparative perspective on the debate about how the study of Islam 
can be best undertaken in Brunei’s national education system it is useful to examine 
views on this issue as expressed by three prominent scholars in the country. These 
views may help shed light on the recent introduction, and almost at the same time, 
termination of, the “integrated system of education”.
Pehin Jamil’s Concept of Comprehensive Education  
Some years before independence Pehin Jamil Al-Sufri, head of the Language and Li-
terature Bureau, wrote a commentary and guide to the Executive Plan for Education 
Policy, a report by the Brunei Education Commission in 1972. The policy consists 
of eight major components, including Islamic education. Since Islam had been en-
dorsed in the 1959 Constitution as the official religion of Brunei, Islamic education 
at all levels of education was necessary. Education in the country should specify the 
offering of proper Islamic education in school from the earliest stages so that chil-
dren could be expected to be citizens dedicated to religion, nation, and monarchy.25 
For him, the knowledge acquired by students was incomplete without an education 
based on Islam. Only through proper education and the knowledge of Islam could 
citizens be expected to behave and act correctly and in an Islamic way. All Muslims 
needed to study Islam whether in general or in detail depending on their duties and 
responsibilities in society. Yet, Muslims were also encouraged to excel in worldly life 
in the pursuit of general knowledge, science, and technology (fard kifayah) within the 
context of the worship of God.26
Islamic education offered instruction in several fundamental disciplines (fard 
`ayn) such as Islamic jurisprudence, theology, ethics, and Sufism.27 In ensuring that 
the will and aim of the Constitution to make Islam the way of life was truly achieved 
knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence was indispensable for Muslim pupils from their 
earliest schooling as well as the population in general.28 Any idea that Islamic educa-
tion, including instruction in law, was trivial and unimportant had to be discarded 
outright. Islamic education must be soundly grounded in theology, providing pupils 
with a genuine belief in God. Moreover, sound belief and correct actions should be 
ornamented by honesty and submission to God based on Islamic mysticism (tasaw-
wuf). Pehin Jamil argued that since Islam had been unanimously accepted as the way 
of life in the country (as embodied in the Constitution), it was necessary to ensure 
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that the study of Islam be included in all levels of education, whether partially or 
fully.29 The curricula and syllabi of Islamic education had to be implemented and 
supported by textbooks and practical application. Guidance and leadership in im-
plementing Islamic education must be undertaken as efficiently and effectively as 
possible.
Pehin Mufti Ismail’s Articulation of Islamic Education in the Modern Era   
When Pehin Ismail was State Mufti he issued and wrote many treatises on social 
issues, including Islamic education. However, in 1982 he wrote a treatise specifically 
on national education viewed from an Islamic perspective. For Pehin Ismail, Brunei, 
like any other modern independent country, should have its own national educa-
tion policy, paving the way for the stability, order and progress of the country and 
its citizens. He offered some general observations and comparisons with education 
policy in the United States (secular), Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (Islamic, in varying 
degrees), and the Middle East under diverse socialist regimes (an eclectic and mixed 
approach). For Pehin Ismail, “modern education always shifts and changes adjusting 
to the needs and character of each nation”.30 Consequently, it was vital for Muslims, 
Pehin Ismail insisted, to determine and strive to develop modern education based 
on the trodden path of Islam (berusaha hendak balek dan hidup chara Islam, menerusi 
sekolah2, universiti2, pertubohan2 dan akhbar2…).31
In order to guide Muslim leaders and planners in national education, Pehin Is-
mail, as a Muslim legal expert, understandably divides knowledge into two: religious 
knowledge (`ilm al-shara`) and non-religious knowledge (ilmu yang bukan shara`). 
Religious knowledge has three categories: the individual responsibility for know-
ing/learning religious duties (fard `ayn), group responsibility for knowing/learning 
religious duties (fard kifayah), and the non-obligatory (nafl) task of knowing. Non-re-
ligious knowledge may be permissible (mubah), reprehensible (makruh), or prohibited 
(haram). In a sense, education based on an Islamic concept should proceed through 
a pyramidal structure where the higher it advances the more it deals with religious 
knowledge. Knowledge of fard `ayn should be given priority, and more space and 
time at the earlier stage of education. The other two branches of knowledge should 
follow in order of priority. Curiously, the examples provided for non-religious know-
ledge are restricted to morality and literature.32
Pehin Ismail considers the role of the teacher as the most crucial in education. 
After all, the best teacher, he maintains, is one who keeps a low profile (ghayr i`jab) 
despite his depth of the knowledge and who submits all educational works to God. 
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More specifically, he maintains that knowledge should not be ‘prostituted’ for per-
sonal gain.33
Muslim scholars should continuously pursue research and publish their work 
carefully and with confidence (muhaqqiq mujtahid). Research should be conducted in 
unexplored fields and relevant subjects. Educational activities and scientific research 
are considered one of the best professions in Islam since the spread of knowledge is 
indispensable in human society.34
National education should encompass the Islamic way of life as well as national 
components of patriotism, culture, and tradition.35 Brunei has ample opportunities 
to bring Islam into classrooms at all levels of education.
Pehin Yahya’s Argument against Brunei’s ‘Integrated Education’   
The core thought of Pehin Yahya’s thesis on education and the study of Islam comes 
from the idea that the fundamental knowledge in Islam springs from God (revealed 
knowledge), and manifests itself in the knowledge of individual religious duties (fard 
`ayn) for Muslims.36 Complementary knowledge and the sciences belong to the cat-
egory of collective duties (fard kifayah), which should buttress Muslims’ knowledge of 
fard `ayn.37 Quoting Al-Attas, Pehin Yahya argues that fard `ayn means “knowledge 
of prerequisites that must form the basis of all education”.38 These prerequisites 
cover all the important core values in religion and life in general. Since non-Islamic 
systems do not have such a category (fard `ayn), modern education, as advocated by 
the colonial regimes and which continues to be upheld by many in the newly inde-
pendent states, potentially leads to the de-Islamization of Muslim minds.39 Fard `ayn 
education, which forms the foundation of all knowledge and learning, thus suffers 
from underdevelopment and remains at an ‘infantile level.’ For Pehin Yahya, fard 
`ayn education should be emphasized throughout all levels of education, especially 
until the secondary level.40
As Chaiwat has suggested with his concept of the “three sacreds”,41 Pehin Yahya 
argues that religious commands should be excepted from experimentation and rea-
soning, and in fact lie beyond rational capacity. He is convinced that nothing on 
earth can comprehend such complex issues as faith and belief (iman dan taqwa). He 
argues that Islamic education and, to an extent, the study of Islam itself, should be 
independently pursued free from secular Western principles. The latter have no 
permanence let alone eternalness; they constantly change and shift. The key issue 
for Pehin Yahya is that secularism has nothing to offer for worship (`ibadah), espe-
cially in the context of education, whereas worship in Islam brings about a cascade 
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of human knowledge, education, and action. He remains highly suspicious of at-
tempts by Muslim societies to cover up secular education with “Islamic symbols” (cat 
berkilauan dengan istilah merapong), which lead nowhere as far as Islamic education is 
concerned.
Pehin Yahya identifies two major problems facing Islamic education today. First, 
the influence in the new, independent Muslim nations of the Western concept of 
education, as represented by John Dalton (d.1844), Maria Montessori (d.1952), and 
John Dewey (d.1952), cannot be responded to simply by making minor changes to 
the education system. The real problem is that Islamic education has been looked 
down upon and even considered anti-modern, with the consequence that some 
Muslims find themselves detached from their own religion. Pehin Yahya’s criticism 
of Brunei’s “integrated education” scheme should be located in this context. The 
concept of “integrated education” can be traced to a hesitation to fully endorse an 
Islamic system of education. The proponents of the scheme do not understand and 
do not appreciate the value of the Islamic system. For Pehin Yahya the scheme suffers 
from a symbolic approach to Islamic concepts, while in reality it is a total endorse-
ment of general – read: Western – education. Pehin Yahya’s main contention fo-
cuses on the duality of the scheme: the “general”, which is the more dominant, and 
“religious” components. “Islam does not enjoy a commanding position vis-a-vis the 
general sciences. The general sciences do not aim at buttressing and enhancing fard 
`ayn education, as argued by Muslim scholars. The norm should be that the general 
sciences form only a discipline within academic activities which are determined by 
Islam and pave the way for the empowerment of the fard `ayn. They should not be 
placed in an equal, let alone superior, position”.42 After all, revealed knowledge is 
the only eternal truth, whereas acquired knowledge or rational science is only con-
sidered valid if it is relevant to and bolsters divine truth. Non-revealed knowledge 
is value- and methodology-oriented, and thus ephemeral. Value-systems are never 
universal and methodology always differs. Pehin Yahya clearly adopts a religionist 
position here.
The integration of knowledge and science in Islam should not mean duality 
or compartmentalization; for Pehin Yahya revealed knowledge should predominate 
and inspire acquired knowledge. The latter should help Muslims understand the 
meaning and spirit of the divine truth, including individual and societal develop-
ment. “Acquired knowledge should follow the perfection of revealed knowledge, not 
vice versa”.43 Interestingly, a diagram used by Pehin Yahya44 to elaborate his concept 
of integrated knowledge and its impact on Muslim society is similar to those used by 
the Malaysian scholar Kamal Hassan45 and Brunei’s Ministry of Education.46
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The second problem according to Pehin Yahya is the pauperization of fard `ayn 
knowledge among modern Muslim scholars, despite their Ph.D. titles from well-
known universities. Since many of these scholars pursue their studies in disciplines 
other than the core Islamic disciplines of Islamic jurisprudence, the principles of 
jurisprudence, theology, Qur’anic studies and the Prophetic traditions, they cannot 
be expected to address major Islamic issues, particularly the fard `ayn. Their in-depth 
study of civilization and thought, indeed, has limited use and relevance to the actual 
lives of Muslims today. He refers to models taken from the great Muslim thinkers 
such as Avicenna (d.1037), Averroës (d.1198), and Ghiyath al-Din al-Kashi (d.1436) 
(who ironically have little relevance to religious thought in Brunei’s religious es-
tablishment).  It is thus imperative that Islamic education should be free from the 
Western secular approach to religion.47 Pehin Yahya then enumerates factors in the 
disparity or imbalance of Islamic knowledge:
•	 Fragmentation and extreme specialization of modern study and disci-
plines;
•	 Reliance on secondary sources;
•	 Weaknesses in the use and mastery of Arabic language;
•	 Emphasis given to studying the differences of legal opinion in Islamic 
schools (madhhabs), instead of searching for authentic and trusted opinions 
(tarjih al-madhhab).
Despite the differences in their views of the dissemination of knowledge, all 
three scholars agree that the study of Islam should be given priority at all levels 
of education. In the present context of the study of Islam in Brunei, and perhaps 
also in the context of continuing Muslim-European dialogue and exchange, Pehin 
Yahya’s thesis and its ostensible rival, indeed, deserve more thorough examination.
EDUCATING THE PUBLIC TO LIVE ISLAMICALLY
In simplistic terms the study of Islam in Brunei, including its education policy, may 
be viewed as a means of maintaining the hegemonic discourse of the state. This is 
reflected in, for example, the fact that the state, through the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, enjoys full control over all religious activities, mosques, and madrasahs. No 
less important has been the role given to the national philosophy, “Malay Islamic 
Monarchy” (MIM), in generating a particular perception of the relationship between 
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religion and state. After all, Brunei continues to uphold the monarchy as the para-
mount Islamic institution.
 Seen from recent salafi perspectives Brunei and the state of Islamic Studies 
there may be simply categorized as conservative and stagnant. Indeed, its small popu-
lation, its monolithic polity, and its heavy reliance on non-renewable hydrocarbons, 
have made Brunei unique in the region. Does the enterprise of Islamic studies in 
the country merely perpetuate the status quo? How can the population smoothly 
adhere to the long-held approach to Islam? Does the contiguity of social activities 
with religious tradition make commonality and continuity, including Islamic Stud-
ies, the perfect choice? Many other teasing questions may be raised to place Brunei’s 
religious tradition and its approach to Islam into perspective.
At a glance, Islamic Studies in Brunei might be regarded as merely the extension 
of the official dissemination of correct practice and sound faith – as initiated from 
the earlier stages of children’s education with the opening of religious classes for 
kindergarten and primary pupils. This would especially appear to be the case if one 
looks at the emphasis given to developing having Islamic Studies programs in higher 
education which are attuned to and in accordance with highly respected institutions 
like al-Azhar University. More specifically, seen from the perspective of religious 
policy, an emphasis on well-structured and well-defined religious approaches serves 
the status quo of domination and stability. Brunei’s relatively small population and 
its recent resumption of full political independence (1982) have made it keen to 
assert its presence in the community of nations by means of, among other things, 
asserting its Islamic identity. Islam as practiced in the country has thus been specifi-
cally identified and clearly categorized: accordance with the Shafi`i school of Islamic 
jurisprudence or law and the ahl al-sunna wal-jama`a belief system. Consequently, 
Islam in Brunei has been studied mainly to facilitate the implementation of such 
an approach.
 Others may argue that the dominant position of religion in the public dis-
course and life of the nation is open to manipulation for the purpose of silencing 
the vociferant and recalcitrant. More specifically, given Islam’s position as the official 
religion and the backbone of the state philosophy it can be used to undermine other 
voices. In reality, Brunei has been a member of the world community and, closer to 
home, also the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In other words, 
despite its uniqueness in several respects Brunei fundamentally shares with many 
other Muslim societies the intention of making Islam its principal guide and refer-
ence in dealing with modern life. Brunei has always attempted to make its approach 
to Islamic Studies consistent with its Islamic adherence and relevant to the dynamics 
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of state and society. Not surprisingly, when the need emerged following the end of 
the Pacific War for more professional scholars and functionaries in Islamic subjects, 
formal religious schooling was initiated for the first time in 1956. Other more ad-
vanced educational institutions for Islamic studies then followed.
In many ways, these newly introduced Islamic institutions of learning were de-
rivatives of models and forms from elsewhere. The 1956 school was copied from the 
Johor madrasah, the Arabic Secondary schools from the Singapore and Klang col-
leges, and the Institute of Islamic Studies from al-Azhar. Yet, all of them increasingly 
underwent domestication and bore the marks of the national vision and interest. 
The most vociferous example that can be referred to might be the 2003 initiative to 
form the Center for Shafi`i School Studies. While many other centers have pursued 
a broader and more accommodating approach, Brunei seems to have opted for ex-
clusivism.
In spite of its rather conservative approach to Islamic interpretation and prac-
tice Brunei seems to move comfortably within international fora. I have previously 
argued that the firm choice in taking this particular religious stand has facilitated 
confidence and commonality in initiating broader policy.48 In other words, much 
energy has been conserved for other more pressing issues. Yet, it is increasingly ap-
parent that the focus and emphasis on Islamic discourse also compensate for other 
concerns and decisions.
In addition to serving religious demands for proper praxis and correct belief, 
Islamic Studies has been geared toward buttressing the state and the nation. For 
example it is undeniable that the 1956 founding of the religious school and the 
expansion of various schemes of Islamic instruction after 1962 were socially and 
politically significant. The ability of the state to sponsor and monopolize “the serv-
ice of the public,” including the administration and management of Islamic affairs, 
provides it with a legitimacy in almost any undertaking. 
In surveying the present religious constellation in Brunei one can conveniently 
point to a continuing pattern of Southeast Asian mandala. Religious officials or 
functionaries and intellectuals fall under the royal umbrella. Southeast Asian rulers, 
as Geertz illustrates, need no intermediate in linking themselves to god, even though 
the presence of brilliant scholars and religious figures are considered adornments for 
the rulers.49 Can we trace some Islamic model or paradigm in such a close associa-
tion between religious scholars and state? Early Islamic history has been identified as 
having produced autonomous scholars of caliber, including the four founders of the 
legal schools (madhhab), not to mention the emergence of non-mainstream schools.
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However, Muslim rulers used many different means to centralize the polity and 
place religious scholars under the central government’s umbrella, if not control, as 
can be seen clearly in the concept and system of Islamic governance proposed by 
such leading scholars as al-Mawardi (d.1056) and al-Ghazali (d.1111). If the early 
rulers including the Umawis and the ‘Abbasis failed to control the religious scholars, 
later regimes including the Ottomans (1289-1924) and the Safawis (1501-1722) suc-
cessfully co-opted them within a centralized religious bureaucracy, the ‘ilmiye. Since 
the formation of Islamic polities in the Malay archipelago was contemporary with 
the last two great empires it is not surprising, especially given the background of the 
Indic tradition in the region, that religious scholars found themselves closely associ-
ated with the court. The appropriation of Islam by the state and the Islamization 
of the Malay court went hand-in-hand with the bureaucratization of Islamic institu-
tions, including religious scholars. Originally the Malay Muslim courts emerged as 
patrons of Islamic centers and education.
In Brunei the continuity of Malay Islamic monarchy meant the preservation 
of the patterned relations between the court and the religious scholars (‘ulama’). 
The best expression of religious bureaucratization in the country can be seen in the 
pre-20th century formation of religious functionaries (manteri ugama). They formed 
a fixed religious hierarchy based on a rigid system of promotion awarded by the 
ruler through titles and ceremonies. In this sense religious functionaries were closely 
linked to, and in a sense subordinate to, the court and the ruler. Not surprisingly, 
Islamic education in the country has been patronized by the state and centralized. 
Almost all present religious figures and officials have been sent to pursue higher 
education under government schemes, including scholarships and promotions.
In examining the historical development of a corps of ‘ulama’ in Southeast Asia 
and particularly Brunei I have been inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s generalizations on 
the relationship between knowledge, education, and power:50
1 The dominant classes use education to reproduce their influence in society 
as well as to create new modes of domination as the society becomes more 
complex;
2 Political and social order is maintained through two broad means: material 
and symbolic force. Material force is represented in the physical capacity 
of the state, the police or military, for example. Symbolic force, in a Gram-
scian sense, is traditionally perpetuated in the field of religion. In modern 
industrial societies schooling has taken the place of religion. Both religion 
and education, indeed, can be analyzed as systems of symbolic violence. 
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Through schooling the dominant elite in society reproduce themselves, 
obtain access to multiple fields of power, and reassert their authority;
3 The relationship between the dominant elite in society and cultural repro-
duction is very intricate. The dominant elite acquires the social habit of 
distinction and differentiation on the basis of their access to education, 
defined in a broader sense. With their acquired educational power and the 
relationships that it implies, they acquire the ability to differentiate (to dis-
tance and control at the same time) themselves from other classes. Social 
distinction or recognition is the final objective of the dominant classes;
4 There is a polarization of the elite into the bourgeois elite that owes its 
power to education, and the aristocratic elite that derives its power from its 
inherited forms of cultural and material power. 
For Abu Rabi‘, the religious intelligentsia in the Middle East has either to ally it 
self with the state or to opt to refuse to play the game of the power elite, thus leading 
to its marginalization.51 
Ironically, if rapid change and socio-political uncertainty in the Middle East 
have caused the elite to look beyond traditional local education, even al-Azhar,52 in 
Brunei and other parts of Islamic Southeast Asia al-Azhar continues to enjoy influ-
ence as a source of prestige and sophistication. Explanations for such a proclivity 
have been offered by scholars and the actors themselves, including those graduates 
from Brunei. Numerous studies have shown how the prestige of al-Azhar University 
is responsible for assisting its graduates to occupy key positions and high status in In-
donesian Islamic institutions and the Muslim community generally for most of the 
second-half of the twentieth century. Howard Federspiel believes that the specific 
educational background of leading Muslim leaders and scholars during the period 
of the Soeharto regime is an important factor in explaining their prominence.53 In 
contrast to Abaza’s findings54 those of Federspiel emphasize the diversity of their 
educational backgrounds, especially at the university level. Unlike the Muslim lead-
ers in Indonesia, however,55 those in Brunei come almost exclusively from religious 
backgrounds.
Culture, power, and economics are interconnected. The strength of the eco-
nomic and political players significantly determines the dissemination of knowledge 
in a society and the type of education pursued. The choice of education by the Mid-
dle Eastern elite – American degrees ideally taken at universities in the United States 
– has perpetuated and indeed increased the power of this elite.56 As Eickelman has 
argued, “[c]ontinual struggle among competing groups within society, each of which 
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seeks domination or influence, may result in changes in ideas of knowledge and the 
means by which such ideas are transmitted”.57 Indeed, the dominant view which 
relegates or ignores traditional Muslim leaders and scholars at a time of profound 
change has been under attack since the success of the Iranian revolution. In fact, the 
‘ulama’ do respond to change, but based on their own rhythms and perceptions.
Although the major focus of this chapter is the contemporary religious esta-
blishment in Brunei, in order to place the present configuration in the perspective 
of the country’s religious development one must not overlook the legacy of religious 
education and ideological patterns in the country.
RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE AND NATION-BUILDING
Brunei has developed a religious atmosphere that has been instrumental in pro- 
ducing moderation. First of all, the small size of its population made radical inno-
vation and controversies impractical and self-defeating. The British administrative 
reforms which were attuned to certain political ends also produced an environment 
of conservatism in religious administration and, to a large extent, a moderate form 
of Islamic expression.58
How were the al-Azhar graduates and newly educated Brunei ‘ulama able to 
assume religious leadership from the mid-1960s? What were the conditions which 
allowed them to do so? Was there no rivalry between the old religious order and the 
new generation of ‘ulama?
Let us first look closely at the sending of the first batch of students to the 
al-Junied Islamic School in Singapore. Although the sending of Brunei students 
abroad in 1950 was not a novelty, it was a new venture since the earlier study mis-
sions were oriented toward general education rather than Islamic education. A few 
Brunei students had been studying abroad before 1950 pursuing Islamic studies, as 
evidenced by Pehin ‘Abd Mokti bin Nasar, who stayed in the Hijaz around the turn 
of the nineteenth century.59 The first batch in 1950 involved three boys who had just 
completed their primary education.60 Since the instruction in al-Junied was fully in 
Arabic, Brunei students did struggle from the start to catch up to the educational 
level at al-Junied, especially in mastering the language.
The circumstances surrounding the sending of this first batch need some elabo-
ration. Why al-Junied and why at that time? Only in the mid-1950s did major re-
forms in the administration of Islam and Islamic education intensify as the country’s 
Islamic Council, Islamic Law Acts and Islamic schools were formed and established. 
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The usual explanation for the major reform at this time is the determination of the 
energetic new ruler to accelerate the country’s modernization. The administration 
of Islam was included in this scheme. Thus, the sending of students to pursue higher 
learning in Islamic studies was part of the response to the ruler’s development plan. 
Obviously al-Junied was chosen for its excellent training in Arabic and basic Islamic 
discipline, as well as its emphasis on “acceptable and moderate” Islamic teaching. At 
the same time, Brunei had expected its sons to go beyond al-Junied. Al-Azhar was 
chosen, not Saudi universities for example, for straightforward reasons – to guaran-
tee the teaching of the ahl al-Sunnah wal-jama‘a in theology and the Shafi‘i school in 
law.
The new environment in which Brunei found itself in the second half of the 
twentieth century was conducive to major reform. Strong leadership was provided 
by Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien from 1950 and a national awakening was stimulated 
by diverse factors socially, economically, and politically after the end of the Pacific 
War. In the religious field the pressure to provide more sophisticated services to 
the community required modern education, the formation of new institutions, and 
skilled functionaries. What was crucial in the sending of students to madrasahs in 
Singapore, Malaysia, and al-Azhar in Egypt was the design and vision of particular 
religious scholars-cum-leaders and the style and quality of their scholarship. Seen in 
the context of the larger reform movement in the Malay world of the period, it is not 
surprising that the Bruneian religious establishment was determined to preserve its 
religious style and heritage, the ahl al-Sunnah wal-jama‘a in theology and the Shafi‘i 
school in Islamic jurisprudence and law (fiqh). In other words the future experts in 
Islamic discipline were being trained to fill a designated niche in the state structure 
and society at large. In this sense, the sending of students to al-Junied, Klang Islamic 
College, and al-Azhar University had been precipitously anticipated and thoroughly 
implemented. In response the religious homines novi seemed to adjust to the prevail-
ing conditions while pursuing their own agenda of religious revivalism or simply 
reform. In this light foreign observers should not be surprised to see that various 
facets of Islamic reform did take place in the country without the negative impact 
of the “notoriously silly conflict” between the old and new proponents of Islam (the 
Kaum Tua – Kaum Muda division).61
Modern religious education carried new prestige and scholarly sophistication. 
The return of Bruneian graduates to the country was usually followed by employ-
ment in public office. For example, since the mid-1960s al-Azhar graduates have 
joined the Department of Religious Affairs (DRA).62 Although these graduates were 
soon preoccupied with office duties and responsibilities, many continued to devote 
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part of their time to writing and preaching. As can be seen in the religious column 
of the Pelita Brunei of the period, these graduates contributed highly informa tive and 
refreshing views of Islam and society. More specifically, under the spon sorship of 
the DRA the religious publications became more frequent and regular. For example, 
the DRA has published a quarterly journal, Majalah Jabatan Hal Ehwal Ugama, since 
1962. Its contents include various religious topics, the Mufti’s views, and features 
of the DRA’s activities. In 1964 another series, Sinaran Suci, was published. It was 
designed to respond to the popular need for religious teachings. During the 1970s 
more publications were intro duced by the DRA, including a religious journal, al-
Huda, and a series on Qur’anic exegesis, Tafsir Darussalam. The role of the newly 
graduated Bruneians in these undertakings was obviously significant. Interestingly, a 
score of books on Islamic literary works by Bruneians were published during this pe-
riod. Among them was Puisi Hidayat. Several books and monographs were published 
after 1979 in conjunction with the celebration of the fifteenth century of the Hijra. 
Moreover, during the 1980s a number of religious seminars were or ganized in the 
country. They brought together experts in specific fields from around the country 
to discuss various religious topics. On several occasions the participants were inter-
national experts. The proceedings of such seminars were mostly published by the 
DRA. Yet the fast growing publications of religious materials cannot be separated 
from the general trend of Islamic revivalism in the country and beyond. The impact 
of Islamic revivalism can be seen clearly in the speeches and actions of the leaders, 
the political elite, and religious scholars of the country.
The Brunei graduates of al-Azhar University increasingly gained influence and 
popularity. For example, the predominance of the Azharis in the DRA was struc-
tural and consequential. The official adoption of a “moderate” version of Islamic 
practice restricted contact with certain educa tional centers. Al-Azhar continues to 
enjoy the highest position in the list. Since the majority of the religious leaders had 
been educated at al-Azhar it only followed that future cadres should be sent to the 
same institution. Evidently publications on religious subjects came from the works 
of the al-Azhar graduates. This can be seen in the writings of the former Mufti, 
Pehin Mohd. Zain, Pehin Abd Hamid, Pehin Yahya, Pehin Abd Aziz Juned, Dato 
Abdul Saman, and Pehin Badaruddin. All belonged to top religious officialdom. 
It should also be mentioned here that in addition to religious training at al-Azhar, 
all these leaders-cum-scholars had studied at religious schools in Singapore and Ma-
laysia. Some spent time in higher learning institutions in the West. For example, 
Dato Saman and Pehin Dato Mohd. Amin completed post-graduate programs at the 
University of Birmingham following their graduation from al-Azhar. Indeed, several 
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other students who had originally been sent for further religious study at well-known 
Islamic madrasahs ended up being sent to universities in England, Malaysia, and 
Singapore.63
After independence an idea was circulated to locate some Azhar graduates and 
those who had undergone intensive Islamic education to certain non-religious of-
fices in order to inspire higher discipline and morality. Although the experiment 
had mixed results the image and prestige of the Azhar graduates were quite high. As 
a senior officer with an Azhar degree acknowledges, Azhar did not provide him with 
an ‘ulama’ label however it gave him authority in religious matters.
The prestige of ‘authentic’ Islamic learning, like that at al-Azhar University, 
bred a unique scholarly tradition in Brunei. The division of scholarly labor in the 
field of Islamic studies, for example, is worth noting. Despite the strong expres-
sion of Islam in public life, writing on Islamic subjects in Brunei since the 1980s 
has become the sole domain of fully-trained religious scholars. It is true that some 
Brunei students who had com pleted secondary religious school opted to pursue 
non-religious careers. Nevertheless, it is exceptionally rare for Bruneians who have 
not had religious training to write on religious issues.64 The emergence of numerous 
writers on Islam in other countries who have no higher religious education seems 
not to have encouraged their counterparts in Brunei. I do not see that this predilec-
tion has anything to do with the type of religious practice and understanding held 
in Brunei. It has more to do with the formal regulations about the spread of Islamic 
teaching. A teacher of Islam is required to have a teaching license. It can be argued 
that the present arrangement has posi tively contributed to the religious harmony 
and stability in the country. Religious innovations are discussed internally and if 
necessary, introduced slowly and quietly. Open religious polemics and debates have 
never taken place.
Open Opportunities and Religious Careers
When the first batch of Bruneian students was sent to al-Junied, the Klang Islamic 
College, and then al-Azhar University, all three countries – Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Egypt – were in the process of rapid change and nation-building. Singaporeans, Ma-
laysians, and Egyptians were determined to build independent and progressive na-
tion-states. Competing ideologies and parties emerged to win public support, among 
them Muslims, who also asserted their presence and influence to find a proper place 
in society and state. Language was one area in which the Malays found the best way 
to express their thought and vision, as can be seen in the holding of diverse language 
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and literary activities at schools attended by Brunei students at al-Junied and the 
Islamic College. They wrote poems, participated in art and drama performance, 
and competed in debates held for schools. Several Bruneian students did excel in 
composing poems and writing drama scripts and a number of them became regular 
visiting writers for cultural magazines.65
The hunger at home for spiritual nourishment and healthy entertainment also 
played an important role in encouraging these early missionary students to uplift 
their artistic and cultural works, in addition to excelling in their religious studies. 
On the occasions of their return to Brunei during school holidays they took an ac-
tive part in making relevant Islamic holiday celebrations great occasions for Islamic 
art and cultural performances. They directed plays, worked on stage decoration, 
participated in Qur’an recitation competitions, and organized debates and public 
speeches. One of these early students who always took the role of a popular singer 
later occupied one of the key religious positions in the country, Chief Qadi. When 
one of his seniors from Selangor later visited him he recalls how he was ridiculed, 
that someone who had used to sing on the stage could later occupy the Chief Qadi-
ship.
Interestingly, the multifaceted skills achieved by these early batches of students 
seem not to have been followed up by those who began their university study after 
the 1970s. However, a new trend emerged when those who had finished their sec-
ondary school religious education at al-Junied or the Islamic College were sent to 
England for their first degree. Upon graduation most of them were assigned to non-
religious posts. They were expected to disseminate their religious knowledge and 
discipline while being professional in their respective fields of expertise.
If the early batch produced some of Brunei’s great play writers, poets, and 
orators, later students seem to have shifted their attention to pursuing a strictly 
professional career. None of them achieved any importance of note in the arts or 
literature.
Religio-Political Stability: Out of What?   
Brunei’s Islamic identity has evolved to face external challenges and distinguish 
it from ‘suspected’ interpretations such as Wahhabism and other radical forms of 
scripturalism. Consonant with most other Malay states in the Peninsula which opted 
to discard the Wahhabi and Kaum Muda movements, Brunei has been consistent in 
closing its doors to such movements. Although some may argue, as Roff and Yegar 
have suggested,66 that such a religious policy can work better toward maintaining the 
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religious and political status quo, it is clear that the prevailing religiosity and Islamic 
discourse in the country favors the maintenance and implementation of the moder-
ate, which means the jama`i approach to Islamic teachings. How was such a policy 
so successfully implemented? Did public education or rather “indoctrination” play 
a major part in this?
Brunei has been particular in maintaining its well-established religious ap-
proach and practice. It did not allow the development of religious conflict between 
the Kaum Tua and Kaum Muda, experienced in other Muslim communities in the 
Malay world. The well-known argument on this issue can be found in the Mufti’s 
address concerning Wahhabism or its derivatives and origins. “It is useless to re-
peat [the call] propagated by Ibn Taymiyyah [to oppose] the religious innovations 
(bid`ah)”.67 The emphasis on religious understanding and practice focuses on the 
pursuit of Islamic teachings taken from authoritative (meaning acceptable) teach-
ers. Wayward scholars have no place in such a religious structure. For instance, in 
rejecting the opinions of the reformist Rashid Rida (d.1937) and his predecessor Ibn 
Taymiyyah, the former Mufti argues68 that the two well-known scholars were never 
known to have studied under authoritative teachers (tiada mempunyai guru) and thus 
heavily depended on their own ideas without referring to the standard Islamic books 
(hanya ia membaca kitab-kitab dengan sendiri dan menggunakan akal berlebih-lebih). The 
Kaum Muda were strongly criticized for their dismissal of other opinions and for be-
ing more concerned with promoting themselves as true Muslims at the expense of 
coexistence and pluralism.
The uniformity of the religious elite and their control over major religious insti-
tutions, including the centralization of religious schooling and mosque organization, 
and the crucial single national version of the Friday sermon, ensure stability and the 
continuity of religious tradition. Indeed, several factors have worked to buttress the 
centralized management of Islamic affairs:
•	 Brunei has enjoyed stability and prosperity, especially after the oil boom 
period from the mid-1970s. Although, or rather due to the fact that, the 
country continues to maintain its emergency status following the 1962 re-
bellion, it has succeeded in keeping peace and order without any major 
political upsets, let alone unrest;
•	 An effective welfare system has been universally applied in the country 
since the 1950s. Despite a relatively low oil output, Brunei’s oil wealth 
suffices to implement a generous welfare system for its population, which 
reached about 329 000 in 2000, including some 30% expatriates;
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•	 Centralization in various aspects of society, religion, and state has been 
effectively pursued;
•	 Moderate religious practice: In implementing Islamic law, Brunei has been 
consistent in maintaining the strict application of the Shafi`i school. For 
example, as stated in the Undang-Undang Ugama Islam of 1955, only in 
specific cases when public welfare (maslihat) necessitates emergency actions 
can the endorsement of non-Shafi`i opinions be considered. According 
to the former Mufti, based on al-Kurdi (d.1194/1780), any fatwa and legal 
decision should be based on the unanimity of the Shaykhan, al-Nawawi 
(d.676/1277) and al-Rafi`i (d.623/1226), and for less informed scholars 
(laysa min ahl al-tarjih) decisions should refer to either the works of Ibn al-
Hajar al-Haytami (d.973/1565) or those of al-Ramli  (d.1004/1596).
Oil Money and Islam in Brunei  
There has been common talk among scholars concerning the trickling down of oil 
money from the Middle East to Southeast Asian Muslims aiming to spur on a pro-
cess of Islamization, which often meant the spread of a particular approach to Islam: 
the puritanical or Wahhabi movement (salafi).69 In many parts of Southeast Asia 
such financial and ideological support did bring new vigor to local communities 
which pursued the puritanical movement enabling it to establish new roots, and 
more significantly, to establish symbols of material modernity and sophistication, 
such as concrete multi-storey buildings and ICT facilities. These trends can be ob-
served among Muslim minorities throughout the region and in particular among 
certain urban Muslim communities in Malaysia. In Indonesia the impact of such oil 
money-related development is so obvious that enumeration is redundant. However 
Brunei has been resilient toward the salafi challenge, despite its ongoing quiet and 
eclectic internal change.70 How could this process revolve? Being financially and reli-
giously strong Brunei could simply close its doors to the salafi offer. For example, no 
Brunei student has ever been sent on a Brunei government scholarship to any higher 
educational institution in Saudi Arabia. In the mid-1970s when Bruneian students 
were withdrawn from Malaysian campuses following a diplomatic row, an envoy led 
by the incumbent Mufti was sent to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to observe and seek 
out study opportunities.71 Curiously toward the end of the 1980s, higher religious 
officials were sent to study in the “Westernized” IAIN of Jakarta (see Chapter 3 in 
this volume). Normally Brunei graduates in Islamic Studies complete their master 
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or doctoral programs in Malaysian universities, and especially al-Azhar in Cairo. 
Put differently, through a mixture of design and strength in the second half of the 
twentieth century Brunei managed to overtly reject the puritanical onslaught in its 
diverse manifestations.
The control of education and thereby influence over the potential religious 
leaders it produces has thus tended toward administrative centralization. Many Bru-
neians have been sent abroad to complete degrees in Islamic studies. The intellec-
tual training undergone by the Bruneians in various Islamic educational centers has 
formed a strong link be tween the Muslim world and Brunei. After the Pacific War 
they joined al-Azhar University for their university education in Islam. Indeed, it is 
interesting to note that the leadership of the Department of Religious Affairs, and 
later the Ministry, has been dominated by Azhar-trained scholars. Following the 
revival of the Wahhabi movement during the 1920s al-Azhar with its open approach 
to madhhabism provided a more appropriate environment for study for Bruneians.72 
Indeed, the Bruneian graduates of al-Azhar continued to influence the prevailing 
religious system and uphold the status quo while introducing changes from within.
These Azhar-trained scholars had no difficulty in building ties with other Mus-
lim scholars internationally. Bruneian scholars completing their first degree at al-
Azhar en joyed access to a diverse academic circle due mainly to their previous study 
in Singapore and Malaysia. The years of interaction with dif ferent colleagues have 
made them more open-minded and provided them with a broader international vi-
sion. Such students brought home with them outlooks nurtured by diverse social, in-
tellectual, political, and cultural exchanges during their long stay in Egypt. Indeed, a 
Brunei student in Cairo reported in 1961 that his stay in Cairo not only introduced 
him to purely religious subjects but also to diverse disciplines, even nationalism, and 
military drills.73 Again, collections of writings and poems written by Brunei students 
abroad, including Cairo, indi cate that they read widely and participated in current 
scholarly debates. Nevertheless, the strongest link maintained by these graduates was 
with their alma mater. Talented students continued to be sent to Cairo and, lately, 
also Amman for higher religious studies. Again, the experts in the different religious 
dis ciplines have come mostly from al-Azhar University, whereas middle-rank offi cials 
generally complete their higher studies at religious institutions in Malaysia and more 
recently at home.
Despite their erudition in religious scholarship Bruneians who graduated from 
al-Azhar have opted for an evolutionary approach to reform in the religious field. It 
is interesting to note here that in 1953 a religious or ganization, Ikhwan al-Muslimin, 
was founded in Brunei – in the new booming oil town, to be more precise. However, 
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it had obviously nothing to do with the Ikhwan Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) 
of Egypt.
 
Brunei’s NGOs and the Study of Islam   
In the second half of the 1990s local economists noted that the role of the state 
in Brunei’s development began to progressively decrease giving more space to the 
private sector.74 The pervasive and ubiquitous presence of the state in every aspect of 
life, however, gives little space for other societal elements to actively pursue and real-
ize their own contribution to society. The formation of the Religious Council was 
designed as early as 1955 to assist the ruler in religious matters. Yet its membership 
is limited strictly to males over 21 years old and civil servants. Moreover, in order to 
assist the Mufti in performing his duty to issue the fatwa there is a legal committee. 
Again, its membership must come from among civil servants.75
The organization of mosques shows how the government has meticulously tack-
led religious activities in the country. By putting all mosques under the aegis of 
the Religious Council the government enjoys direct control over the mosques. All 
private mosques must thus be registered with and its management transferred to 
the Council.76 Any approved private-property-cum-mosque automatically becomes a 
public endowment (waqf). All mosque functionaries, including the imam and khatib, 
are appointed by the government and given a license (tauliah). As such the function-
aries may be dismissed at any time by the authorities.77 The duties of the mosque 
functionaries include the maintenance of order, good conduct, and standard Islamic 
practice among the surrounding Muslim population, as well as the provision of any 
necessary information to the Religious Council for attention and action.
Strict control over the provision of Islamic education through the possession of 
the license has limited the possibility of novel teaching, let alone religious controver-
sy.78 Religious orthodoxy and the status quo have thus prevailed. Interestingly, some 
attempts to disseminate such controversial ideas have materialized, as can be seen in 
the emergence and even popularity of such movements as Jama`ah al-Arqam, Silat 
Lintau, and certain transient teachers.
Since Islamic orthodoxy (ahl al-Sunnah wal-jama`a) has become the official ver-
sion of religion, it needs to be defended, elaborated, and propagated. The propaga-
tion of Islam is carefully and centrally undertaken through formal education and 
public institutions. Almost all Muslim children are provided with religious instruc-
tion regardless of their formal education. In addition, specifically designed religious 
schools and courses are offered. The Islamic Da‘wa Center, formed in 1985, aims at 
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the propagation of Islam internally and externally, including research and publica-
tions on Islamic issues and current affairs.79 
Interestingly, the ruler openly declared that the duty of providing religious edu-
cation and pursuing Islamic propagation should not be dominated or limited to 
religious officials. All segments of the Muslim community are encouraged to take 
part in such endeavors.80 However, the ubiquity of state power and patronage offers 
little to non-state actors in Islamic education.
In recent years the mosques have been supplied with internet access which is 
expected to be used as a means to disseminate useful information and to protect 
Muslims from negative ideas.81 Concomitant with the call for more public and pri-
vate participation in development, mosque functionaries are urged to upgrade their 
religious knowledge and their dedication to educate society. Mosques should be 
supported with libraries for public use.82
The Movement of Brunei Literati, Asterawani, has emerged as an active NGO 
in promoting Malay culture, literature, and language. Ideally, for Asterawani, the 
government and people (NGO) should work together for the implementation of 
Islam: “Dalam konteks negara ini dapat dianggap bahawa gerakan dakwah dan tarbiyah 
adalah dimonopoli oleh kerajaan, kerana ruang yang ada tidak diisi oleh gerakan rakyat” (In 
this context the da’wa and education are controlled by the kingdom because there 
is no space for society).83 Only Iqra’, an Islamic foundation, has actively offered 
its educational and religious services. The absence of informal channels and occa-
sions for religious leaders and scholars to meet the people may have played a role in 
the lackadaisical development of in-depth Islamization. For Hashim, Islamization 
must be pursued through the education system. The status quo wanted to maintain 
Western education since it has proven its success while it doubts the viability and 
suitability of Islamic education. Graduates from the Islamic education system are 
believed to be too narrowly oriented.84
The Friday sermon, which is centrally managed, serves as an indirect and infor-
mal institution to guide Muslims. Its use extends beyond calling for purely religious 
piety but also touches upon many aspects of societal and state matters. In this respect 
the Friday sermon is consciously and carefully used as a medium of modernization 
in accordance with Islamic precepts. For example, the focus of the sermon ranges 
from showing the importance of maintaining proper decorum in the context of 
neighborhood solidarity, respect for others, or visits among family members, col-
leagues and friends, or explaining the relevance of national and international days 
or events, social issues and current affairs.85
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The Center of Islamic Mission (Pusat Dakwah Islamiyah) has emerged as an 
organized body for the dissemination of Islamic knowledge and public morality. The 
Center has been very active in disseminating religious knowledge through its pub-
lications, TV programs, and radio/public talks. It was set up in 1985 primarily to 
pursue internal Islamization and the spread of Islamic teachings to other segments 
of society. Its publications cover religious issues, social questions, and public life in 
general. In pursuing its mission the Center has fulfilled a key role of socio-religious 
engineering. As part of a government agency the Center exemplifies how many facets 
of religious expression and institutions in Brunei have been fully exploited by the 
state and taken advantage of by religious leaders to advance their respective objec-
tives – which most of the time correspond to each other.
Toward the 21st Century
When ASEAN member countries were plunged into a deep financial crisis in 1997-
98, Brunei was no exception. However, the nature of its economy which did not 
depend on direct foreign investment but heavily on a single export commodity (oil), 
meant that Brunei suffered less of a shock and a shorter period to recovery. The 
heavy financial losses that the country experienced at this juncture as can be seen 
in the collapse of the semi-government owned company Amedio, continue to invite 
more questions. Yet what Brunei’s experience of this period shows is that despite 
the crisis Brunei continues to be immune from the radical trend in religio-political 
expression. Some scholars have suggested that since Brunei has no history of nurtur-
ing any puritanical movements it can easily eradicate the first signs of the growth of 
Islamic radicalism in the country. Let us briefly note some relevant undertakings in 
this regard.
As the number of foreign workers in Brunei dwindled in the late 1990s, due 
mainly to the slow-down in the economy, the government also tightened its control 
over illegal workers. Routine checks of possible illegals were intensified as police and 
immigration officers rounded up and detained those who failed to produce neces-
sary documents, especially passports or visas. Until today, as far as public statements 
are concerned, no suspected terrorist has ever been detained. In one of the many 
police operations during 2002 several foreign workers in the construction industry 
in the capital of Bandar Seri Begawan were caught allegedly in possession of “old 
bombs”. However, they were soon released after expert confirmation was received 
that the bombs belong to the Pacific War period and were apparently of little mili-
tary value.
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On the religious front the MRA and the Islamic Dakwah Centre reiterated 
their war against the deviationists. Public lectures at the pulpit and audio- and video-
channels in the mass media intensified warning Muslims of the danger of contro-
versial teachings and unauthorized teachers. In cooperation with the police and the 
immigration officers religious officials hunted down Muslims entering the country 
on the spot who did not show proper Islamic behavior. Although the operation was 
ostensibly declared to stop Muslims residing in the country from consuming or pur-
chasing alcohol, the campaign was also effective in detecting the entry of Muslims 
suspected of radicalism.
CONCLUSION
In Brunei Darussalam, not only has Islamic education maintained and disseminated 
the officially accepted concept and practice of religion, it has also enjoyed a close 
structural link to state. This chapter has attempted to show how the three levels of 
studying Islam – at the school, higher learning institutions, and society at large – are 
closely aligned with the dominant discourse of the state and its generally accepted 
version of religiosity. Islamic education in Brunei Darussalam has resulted in the 
formation of a neatly-structured religious elite which at the same time reflects social 
reproduction engineered by the ruling class. Although the early model of education 
in Brunei experienced a major decline after the eighteenth century, Brunei contin-
ued to maintain close ties with other Islamic centers which regularly sent teachers to 
other Muslim countries and which also received Bruneian students. Islamic educa-
tion in the country underwent a severe decline in the second half of the nineteenth 
and the early twentieth centuries. Brunei did not welcome the reformist movement 
nor it did not attract the latter’s missionaries. Obviously the fixed and elaborate 
structure of the religious authority under the sultan worked toward favoring the 
status quo.
Although the systematization of religious education was the sine qua non of the 
fulfillment of religious and bureaucratic needs, in the final analysis the broader 
scheme of centralization in the context of power maintenance and strategy clearly 
play a crucial role. First of all, the choice of curriculum and teachers at home was 
attuned to existing religious practices and at the same time intended to sustain con-
tinuity. When reform in Islamic education was launched in the mid-1950s the Johor 
model of religious classes (madrasah) in the afternoon was chosen; the madrasah sys-
tem was supported by teachers from peninsular Malaya and thus began the whole 
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new tradition of the Brunei madrasah. Next, the sending of Bruneians for higher 
religious education in Singapore, the Malay peninsula, and Egypt, cannot be treated 
in isolation from the overall religious policy in the country which aimed at intel-
lectual and religious sophistication and ensuring continuity and political and social 
stability.
The predominance of Azhari graduates in the formation of religious discourse 
and religious bureaucracy has become a self-reproducing mechanism in Brunei’s re-
ligious life. By adhering to well-defined religious practices and belief systems Brunei 
has maintained a relatively stable religious life. The exclusivist approach to Islam 
has not been given any place to operate. The strength of its religious bureaucracy, 
dominated by the Azhari graduates, has been effective in limiting the influence of 
con troversial ideas and figures, even though some might argue that despite its suc-
cess in achieving religious uniformity and stability Bruneians may still be prone to 
new religious movements. The religious establishment seems to be aware of such 
challenges as suggested by their positive response to various developments in the 
Muslim world. Attempts have been made to show that Bruneians are joining their 
Muslim brethren to live more Islamically within the modern world. Inadvertently 
radicalism has never found roots among the population in the country.
Since the 1950s the state has effectively centralized the administration of Islam 
and Islamic education. Islam in post-War II Brunei has experienced the perpetuation 
of the Azhari model of discourse, education, and style. This was made possible when 
the state endorsed an orthodox approach to Islamic belief and practice: ahl al-Sunnah 
wal-jama`a in theology and Shafi`i madhhab in jurisprudence. Education, and more 
specifically the study of Islam, has been attuned to the hegemonic discourse of the 
state which has successfully won legitimacy in amassing Islamic symbols and slogans 
through an elaborate network of ‘organic’ institutions and intellectuals.
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APPENDIX
Figure 5: BA Islamic Studies in Arabic (majoring in Shari`ah) 1996-1999: 
Years Three and Four
Component Subject/Course Notes
Research 
Methodology
Asalib al-Bahth al-`Ilmi wa-Masadir 
al-Dirasat al-Islamiyah; Dirasah Nassiya 
min Kutub al- Fiqh  
Jurisprudence
Usul al-fiqh, Islamic political systems, 
Fiqh al-ahwal al-shakhsiyah, Islamic 
economics, Introduction to Islamic 
Law,  Fiqh al-Jinayah, Brunei Laws, 
Islamic Law in Southeast Asia, 
System of Government in Islam, Fiqh 
al-Qada’ wal-Murafa`at, Jurispruden-
tial Principles in Islam, Comparative 
Jurisprudence in Islam 
Compared to the Usul 
al-Din wal-Dakwah 
program, this pro-
gram offers more 
Specialized courses in 
jurisprudence; history 
courses and theology 
are not listed
Study of the 
Qur’an
Ayat al-Ahkam 
Prophetic 
Tradition
Ahadith al-Ahkam 
Academic 
Exercise
Minor thesis undertaken during the 
final year of study
More topics chosen 
from the pre-modern 
period
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Figure 7: BA in Shari`ah 1999-2005, IPISHOAS
Component Subject/Course Notes
Language
Arabic, English, Logic/Methodology in 
Islamic thinking, Dirasah Nassiya 
These are taught 
in the early years 
of study, except 
Dirasah Nassiyah
Theology Tawhid  
Study of the 
Qur’an
‘Ulum al-Qur’an, Memorization of the 
Qur’an  
Jurisprudence
Fiqh al-‘ibadah, Introduction to fiqh 
and History of legal codification, Com-
parative fiqh, Fiq al-kitab wal-sunnah, Fiqh 
al-mu`amalah, Usul al-fiqh, Islamic po-
litical systems, Fiqh al-ahwal al-shakhsiya, 
Fiqh al-mirath, Jurisprudential principles, 
Contemporary issues on jurisprudence, 
Fiqh al-jinayah, Fiqh al-qada’ wal-murafa’ at 
(judicial and appeal system) 
Missionary 
Work
al-Dakwah al-Islamiyah 
Prophetic 
Tradition
‘Ulum al-hadith 
History
Islamic history, Contemporary Muslim 
World 
Academic 
Exercise
Minor thesis undertaken during the final 
year of study 
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Figure 8: BA in Arabic Language, 1999-2005, IPISHOAS
Component Subject/Course
Notes
Language
Arabic, English, Logic/Methodology in 
Islamic thinking, dirasah nassiyah, Grammar 
and Syntax, Fann Kitabat al-Maqal (Arts of 
Composition), Oratory, Arabic Literature 
(tarikh wa-nusus), Linguistics and Dictionaries, 
Phonetics and Phonology, Literary Criticism, 
Dialects and Qira’at, History of Andalusian 
Literature and the Study of Its Texts, Applied 
Grammar, Qur’anic and Prophetic Bayan 
(Oratory), Modern Arabic Literature, Transla-
tion, Modern Islamic Literature 
Theology Tawhid 
Study of the 
Qur’an
Qur’anic exegesis, ‘Ulum al-Qur’an, Memoriza-
tion of the Qur’an  
Jurisprudence
Fiqh al-`ibadah, Fiqh al-mu ‘amalah, Fiqh al-
ahwal al-shakhsiyah
Missionary 
Work
Orientalism and Missionary activities 
Prophetic Tradi-
tion
‘Ulum al-hadith, Hadith 
History
Islamic history, Contemporary Muslim 
World, Islamic Civilization, Islam in South-
east Asia, Islamic Civilization in Southeast 
Asia 
Academic 
Exercise
Minor thesis undertaken during the final 
year of study 
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